Lawrence v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 August 1934
• Docket Number: No. 412.,412.
• Citation: 174 A. 226
• Parties: LAWRENCE v. MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INSURANCE CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

174 A. 226

LAWRENCE

v. MASSACHUSETTS BONDING & INSURANCE CO.

No. 412.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Aug. 28, 1934.

Appeal from District Court of Newark.

Action by Ralph Lawrence against the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Reversed, and new trial ordered.

Argued May term, 1934, before LLOYD, CASE, and DONGES, JJ.

Herman L. Fast, of Newark, for appellant.

Reuben Brown, of East Orange, for respondent.

CASE, Justice.

The appeal is from a judgment rendered in the First district court of the city of Newark; the judge sitting without a jury. The action was on an indemnity policy wherein one Lippold was insured "against bodily injury sustained during the life of this policy directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means." Lippold assigned his claim to Lawrence.

The case was settled by the trial judge for the appeal and certified to us in the following language: "The suit is brought upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendant to the plaintiff's assignor, 'against bodily injury sustained during the life of this policy, directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means.' Plaintiffs-assignor testified that he is accustomed to playing quoits for exercise and amusement and has an individual and peculiar form of delivery, which he has always used. There was no testimony to show in what manner the assured's delivery differed from any other delivery. On May 30th, 1927, while in the act of pitching a quoit, assured gave himself or experienced a twist, wrenched his back and fell to the ground, suffering excruciating pain. The medical testimony disclosed that the assured was suffering as a result of this experience. The policy is a New York contract No point was made at the trial concerning the injury sustained or the length of disability, the sole question being whether the facts stated warranted a recovery under the policy."

Judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

The point made on the appeal is that the court erred in finding against the defendant, in that there are no facts to support the only proposition upon which liability could rest; namely, that the injury arose directly and independently of all other causes, through accidental means. A chance happening, commonly called an accident, may occur otherwise than by accidental means. The distinction was drawn in U. S. Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100, 121, 9 S. Ct. 755, 762, 33 L. Ed. 60, 67, wherein it was said: "That if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen, unexpected, unusual, occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means." Our Court of Errors and Appeals has lately, Lower v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 111 N. J. Law, 426, 168 A. 592, excepted that language as a definition of "accidental means." As to the proofs, we are limited to the statement prepared by the trial judge at the request of the parties and set out at length above. It therein appears that the injury was a wrenched back caused by the plaintiff's throwing quoits...