Lawrence v. State

• Decision Date: 29 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2006-CP-01389-COA.,2006-CP-01389-COA.
• Citation: 970 So.2d 1291
• Parties: Bruce LAWRENCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

970 So.2d 1291

Bruce LAWRENCE, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2006-CP-01389-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

May 29, 2007.

Rehearing Denied November 20, 2007.

Bruce Lawrence (Pro Se), Attorney for Appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, Attorney for Appellee.

EN BANC.

ISHEE, J., for the Court.

¶ 1. Bruce Lawrence pleaded guilty to the charge of murder in the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County. Lawrence was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Lawrence's pro se petition for post-conviction relief was summarily dismissed on July 27, 2006, by the circuit court. Aggrieved by the court's decision, Lawrence appeals asserting three issues: (1) his plea was involuntary, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for production of the records, and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. On January 24, 2003, Lawrence was indicted by an Oktibbeha County grand jury for murder and felony D.U.I., having been convicted of D.U.I. on two prior occasions. Mark Williamson, appointed counsel for Lawrence, assisted him with completing the petition to enter a plea of guilty to the charge of murder. In the petition, Lawrence acknowledged that he was entering a blind plea to the crime of murder, and that, if convicted, he could be sentenced to a minimum of life imprisonment and/or a fine in the amount of zero to $10,000. Lawrence also acknowledged that he read and understood the constitutional rights he waived by pleading guilty, specifically, the right to take the witness stand at his sole option and the right to use the power and process of the court to compel the production of any evidence, including the attendance of any witness in his favor. Lawrence attested that he was entering a plea of guilty freely and voluntarily and of his own accord with a full understanding of all matters set forth in the indictment and the plea petition. Furthermore, Lawrence acknowledged that his attorney was fully informed as to all of the facts and circumstances surrounding his case, and that counsel did all that anyone could do to counsel and assist him and that, though counsel told him he might receive probation or a lighter sentence, counsel's prediction was not binding on the court.

¶ 3. The circuit court accepted Lawrence's guilty plea during a hearing held on April 27, 2004, whereupon the State had rested its case-in-chief and Lawrence then petitioned to change his original plea of not guilty to guilty. The judge explained to Lawrence that he possessed the following rights: (1) the right not to plead guilty; (2) the right to a speedy, public trial by a jury; (3) the presumption of innocence; (4) the right to confront his accusers; (5) the right to testify in his own defense, if he chose to do so; and (6) the right to call witnesses and have those witnesses appear and testify on his behalf. The judge further explained to Lawrence that, by entering a plea of guilty he waived the aforementioned rights. Lawrence responded that he understood. Lawrence testified that he and his attorney reviewed his petition to enter a plea of guilty and that he understood the information contained in the petition and that he had no questions regarding the petition. He testified that he understood the nature of the crime with which he was charged, as well as any possible defenses. Lawrence testified he understood there was only one sentence for the crime of murder, that being life imprisonment, and that the judge could impose a fine of up to $10,000. Lawrence testified that no one forced him into pleading guilty. He also testified that his attorney went over his case with him and that he was satisfied with the advice and assistance of his attorney.

¶ 4. At this stage of the hearing the court read the indictment of the murder charge to Lawrence, which stated, "on or about September 28, 2002, in Oktibbeha County, Mississippi, Lawrence did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously and with the deliberate design to affect death, that is with malice aforethought, kill and murder a human being, Lillian Ingram a/k/a Frankie, without authority of law and not in necessary self-defense." Lawrence then admitted that he was guilty of the charge and the court accepted the plea of guilty, finding Lawrence competent to understand the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea of guilty. The court sentenced Lawrence to the only sentence by law that could be imposed, that being a term of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The court further noted that the plea of guilty was being made during the course of the trial, and after the State had rested its case-in-chief and the evidence for the State had been presented. The court then heard and sustained motions pending in companion cases involving Lawrence at which time the State requested the court retire to the file the charge of felony D.U.I. and simple assault on a police officer.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5. In reviewing the trial court's decision to deny a motion for post-conviction relief, the standard of review is clear. The trial court's denial will not be reversed absent a finding that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous. Smith v. State, 806 So.2d 1148, 1150(3) (Miss.Ct. App.2002) (citing Kirksey v. State, 728 So.2d 565, 567(8) (Miss.1999)). However, where questions of law are raised the applicable standard of review is de novo. Pace v. State, 770 So.2d 1052, 1053(4) (Miss.Ct.App.2000).

ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

I. Whether Lawrence's plea of guilty was involuntary.

¶ 6. Lawrence argues that his court-appointed counsel induced him to change his plea to guilty after the State had presented and rested its case-in-chief by stating that Lawrence would only receive a twenty-year sentence for murder. Attached to Lawrence's brief is a handwritten letter subscribed by his sister stating that her brother's attorney told her and Lawrence that Lawrence would get twenty years if he did not testify and entered a guilty plea. The letter was not witnessed or notarized. Lawrence submitted a reply brief with an amended letter that states the letter from his sister was notarized "on the back;" however, the notary's seal was on a separate sheet of paper. This letter from Lawrence's sister was the only evidence submitted to support the contention that counsel stated Lawrence would receive a twenty-year sentence if he entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder. However, the record is replete with evidence that Lawrence was fully advised and understood the consequences of changing his plea from not guilty to guilty at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief on the charge of murder. The petition submitted by Lawrence specifically states the sentence to be imposed for a guilty plea to murder would be life imprisonment with the possibility of a fine from zero to $10,000. Furthermore, the transcript of the plea hearing reflects the court's questioning of Lawrence regarding the consequences of entering a plea of guilty and that the only sentence to be imposed to such plea to murder was life imprisonment.

¶ 7. Where erroneous legal advice on sentencing has been given to a defendant by his counsel and/or defendant relied on assertions or predictions made by his counsel, no error attaches if the record affirmatively shows the defendant was correctly advised of his peril by the sentencing court. Roland v. State, 666 So.2d 747, 749-50 (Miss.1995). In some cases, however, mistaken advice from counsel can vitiate a guilty plea. Gardner v. State, 531 So.2d 805, 809 (Miss.1988). In Gardner, the court stated the thoroughness by which the lower court had interrogated Gardner at the time his guilty plea was tendered was the most significant evidence. Id. The court then determined regardless of the instructions or advice defendant may have received from counsel, the thoroughness of the lower court's questioning at the sentencing hearing was sufficient to render the plea voluntary. Id. at 810 (citing Sanders v. State, 440 So.2d 278, 284 (Miss.1983)). Having reviewed the petition and the transcript from the sentencing hearing, it is clear in this case that Lawrence was thoroughly questioned and fully advised of his potential sentence by the trial court and that his plea was entered voluntarily. Therefore, this issue is without merit.

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Lawrence's motion for production of records.

¶ 8. Lawrence argues that the trial court should not have denied his motion for production of records, specifically his request for the transcript of his partial trial. Lawrence contends that with the records which were denied he would be able to show that his murder was a "crime of passion."

¶ 9. In Fleming v. State, 553 So.2d 505, 506 (Miss.1989), the court stated where a prisoner has filed a proper motion pursuant to the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, and whose motion has withstood summary dismissal under section 99-39-11(2), then that individual may be entitled to trial transcripts and other relevant documents under the discovery provision in section 99-39-15, upon good cause shown and under the discretion of the lower court. Fleming, 553 So.2d at 506. Lawrence's motion did not withstand summary dismissal, however Lawrence was still provided with the transcript of his guilty plea and other relevant documents pertaining to his motion for post-conviction collateral relief. Lawrence's petition is similar to that in Roland, where Roland failed to show good cause that the additional records he sought were of any relevance to the issues raised in his petition. Roland, 666 So.2d at 751. As in Roland, there is no indication here that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying Lawrence's request for production of records. Furthermore, it is apparent that Lawrence seeks to attack his...