Lawrence v. Treasurer of the State of Mo. - Custodian of the Second Injury Fund

• Decision Date: 07 July 2020
• Docket Number: WD 83123
• Citation: 609 S.W.3d 782
• Parties: Ronald A. LAWRENCE, II (Deceased); Nancy Lawrence, Deanna Lawrence, and Mayme Lawrence, Appellants, v. TREASURER OF the STATE of Missouri - CUSTODIAN OF the SECOND INJURY FUND, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

609 S.W.3d 782

Ronald A. LAWRENCE, II (Deceased); Nancy Lawrence, Deanna Lawrence, and Mayme Lawrence, Appellants,

v.TREASURER OF the STATE of Missouri - CUSTODIAN OF the SECOND INJURY FUND, Respondent.

WD 83123

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Opinion filed: July 7, 2020

Motion for Rehearing and/or Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied September 1, 2020

Application for Transfer Denied November 24, 2020

EDWARD R. ARDINI, JR, JUDGE

Nancy Lawrence ("Nancy")¹ along with Mayme and Deanna Lawrence (collectively "Children") appeal from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's ("Commission") denial of their motion to be substituted as parties to the workers’ compensation claim of Ronald A. Lawrence, II, ("Ronald") following his death. Nancy and Children argued they were Ronald's dependents and thereby were entitled to receive the permanent total disability benefits that had previously been awarded to him against the Second Injury Fund ("SIF"). Because the final award in Ronald's claim did not establish that Nancy and Children were Ronald's dependents at the time he sustained his work-related injury, the Commission denied their request. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Ronald filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits for a work-related injury suffered on May 11, 2005. Ronald settled his claim with his employer. However, due to several pre-existing injuries, Ronald pursued permanent total disability benefits against the SIF. A hearing was conducted on August 20, 2013, and, on November 20, 2013, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued his decision denying Ronald's claim. The Commission affirmed the decision of the ALJ. This Court reversed the Commission in Lawrence v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri , 470 S.W.3d 6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) and, on December 1, 2015, the Commission awarded permanent total disability benefits to Ronald ("Final Award").

On March 11, 2019, Ronald passed away from causes unrelated to his work-related injury.

On May 16, 2019, Nancy and Children filed a Suggestion of Death of Ronald A. Lawrence, II and Motion to Substitute Parties ("Motion to Substitute") with the Commission claiming that each were dependents of Ronald at the time of his work-related injury and, upon his death, were entitled to receive his permanent total disability benefits pursuant to Schoemehl² and its progeny. The Motion to Substitute asserted that Nancy had been Ronald's wife at the time he sustained his work-related injury and remained his wife until his death and that Mayme and Deanna were his children and, thus, each qualified as his dependents. The Commission denied the Motion to Substitute finding that Nancy and Children's status as dependents at the time of Ronald's injury had not been established in the Final Award. This appeal follows.

Standard of Review

We will not disturb the Commission's decision in a workers’ compensation case unless the Commission acted in excess of its powers, the decision was procured by fraud, the facts found by the Commission do not support the decision, or there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the decision. § 287.495.1. We review questions of law de novo. Gervich v. Condaire, Inc. , 370 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Mo. banc 2012). Therefore, we are not bound by and do not defer to the Commission's interpretation or application of the law. Id.

Carter v. Treasurer of the State of Mo. , 506 S.W.3d 368, 370 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)

Discussion

In their sole point on appeal, Nancy and Children allege that the Commission erred in denying their motion to be substituted as parties to Ronald's claim arguing that the evidence presented at the hearing before the ALJ established their status as dependents and, therefore, they were entitled, under the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Schoemehl v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri , 217 S.W.3d 900 (Mo. banc 2007), to receive Ronald's permanent total disability benefits. Finding that Nancy and/or Children's status as dependents was not established in the Final Award, we affirm.

The Missouri Supreme Court held in Schoemehl "that, when an employee with a permanent total disability dies of a cause unrelated to the compensable work-related injury, the disability benefits shall be paid to the employee's dependents for their lifetime because the surviving dependents are deemed to have the same rights as the employee." Carter , 506 S.W.3d at 371 (citing Schoemehl , 217 S.W.3d at 902 ). While this holding was abrogated by legislation enacted in 2008, Schoemehl continues to apply to claims for permanent total disability benefits that were pending between January 9, 2007, and June 26, 2008 (" Schoemehl window"). Id. (citing Gervich , 370 S.W.3d at 621 ; Strait v. Treasurer of Mo. , 257 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Mo. banc 2008) ). There is no dispute that Ronald's claim was pending during the Schoemehl window.

However, acknowledging that Ronald's claim was pending during the Schoemehl window only begins the analysis. "[T]he issue of a dependent's contingent right to Schoemehl benefits for future determination is preserved if dependency at the time of the injury is established as a matter of law in the final award ." Edwards v. Treasurer of the State of Mo. , 529 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (emphasis added). Only when dependency at the time of injury has been established in the final award does "the Commission [have] the authority to further delineate the award ... after the employee's death as a ‘change in condition.’ " Id. ; see also Carter , 506 S.W.3d at 372 (If the Commission's final award does not make findings that establish the claimant's qualifying dependents, the Commission does not have authority in a later proceeding to disturb the finality of the original award, and substantively modify the award by making dependency findings which the Commission did not originally make.). Thus, the issue before us is whether the dependent status of Nancy and/or Children at the time of the 2005 injury was "established as a matter of law in the final award." We find it was not.

The ALJ issued his forty-nine-page award on November 20, 2013, which was subsequently adopted by the Commission and became part of the Final Award. The only references to Nancy or Children in the Final Award can be found in a two-page section addressing Ronald's "current activities" that recounted Ronald's testimony chronicling his injury-related physical limitations. The Final Award noted that Ronald's "wife" performs "housecleaning" activities and that Ronald drives to his daughter's school. The only other reference in the Final Award to Ronald's family is the statement that he "lives with his wife, 11 year old daughter and 18 year old daughter who just started college." The Final Award never identifies the "wife" or daughters by name.

A close examination of the Final Award reveals no finding that could be construed to establish Nancy and/or Children as dependents of Ronald at the time of his injury – the finding necessary to preserve their ability to later petition to be substituted as parties to the underlying claim and to receive Schoemehl benefits upon Ronald's death. See Edwards 529 S.W.3d at 11 (an employee's dependents are determined at the time of the employee's injury and not at the time of death). In addition to the notable failure to identify Nancy or Children by name, the Final Award provides no temporal context that could be used to establish that the "wife" and daughters referenced in the Final Award – entered in 2013 – were dependents of Ronald's at the time of his 2005 injury.³ As it relates to Nancy and Children, the Final Award at most established that at the time of the hearing before the ALJ – in 2013 – Ronald lived with his wife and two daughters, his "wife" had been performing "housecleaning" tasks and he would drive "to his daughter's school." These findings in no manner established "as a matter of law" that any of these individuals were dependents of Ronald's at the relevant time – May 11, 2005.

Nancy and Children seemingly concede that the findings in the Final Award fall short of what is necessary to preserve a dependent's contingent rights to Schoemehl benefits as their point relied on wholly ignores the Final Award and instead rests on the proposition that their dependent status was sufficiently established by "the evidence presented at the hearing before the ALJ[.]" This reliance on the evidentiary presentation before the ALJ is misplaced. Indeed, it is irrelevant that an individual's status as a dependent of a claimant could have been established in a Final Award or that such a finding would have been supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing before the ALJ. See Estate of Dunkin v. Treasurer of the State of Mo. , 516 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (while appreciating that evidence brought forward after the claimant's death provided clarity on the issue of wife's status as a dependent, the relevant question was whether dependency had been established in the final award). In fact, the requirement is just the opposite – dependency at the time of the injury must be "established as a matter of law in the final award ."⁴ See Edwards , 529 S.W.3d at 11 (emphasis added). The reason for this is quite simple: the Commission loses authority to make additional findings or conclusions regarding an employee's dependents once the award becomes final. See Carter , 506 S.W.3d at 372 (Once the final award was issued, "the Commission lost its authority to make any findings and conclusions regarding [the] dependents at the time of [the] injury."); see also Strait , 257 S.W.3d at 602 (noting that, if employee's claim was no longer pending and her case was closed, "then Schoemehl cannot be applied to allow the substitution of [the employee]’s dependents as beneficiaries of her permanent total disability benefits."). It is only when a dependent's contingent right to Schoemehl benefits has been preserved in a final...