Lawrie v. State

• Decision Date: 06 May 1994
• Docket Number: 282,1993,Nos. 243,s. 243
• Citation: 643 A.2d 1336
• Parties: David J. LAWRIE, Defendant-Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee. . Submitted:
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 1336

643 A.2d 1336

David J. LAWRIE, Defendant-Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff-Below, Appellee.

Nos. 243, 282, 1993.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: May 6, 1994.

Decided: July 8, 1994.

Rehearing Denied July 19, 1994.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Bernard J. O'Donnell, Public Defender's Office, Wilmington, for appellant.

Richard E. Fairbanks, Jr., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for appellee.

Before VEASEY, C.J., MOORE, WALSH, HOLLAND, and HARTNETT, JJ., constituting the Court en Banc.

VEASEY, Chief Justice:

In this case we review the sentences of death imposed on July 8, 1993, by the Superior Court on David J. Lawrie ("Lawrie") for the first degree felony murders of Fawn and Tabitha Lawrie, two of the three children of Lawrie and Lawrie's wife, Michelle Lawrie ("Michelle"), and a four-year-old neighborhood boy, Charles Humbertson. ¹

Lawrie deliberately set fire to the house where the victims and a survivor of the fire (Lisa Humbertson, another neighborhood child) were staying. He was charged with several counts of murder in the first degree: the intentional murder of Michelle, and the felony murders of Fawn, Tabitha, and Charles Humbertson. The felony murder counts were based on 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2), which provides that a person is guilty of first degree murder if "[i]n the course of ... a felony ... he recklessly causes the death of another person." The jury convicted Lawrie of the first degree felony murders of his two daughters and Charles Humbertson. The jury acquitted Lawrie of the intentional first degree murder of Michelle, but convicted him of the second degree murder of Michelle. ²

Lawrie asserts for the first time on this appeal two errors in the jury instructions: (1) failure to instruct the jury regarding the elements of criminally negligent felony murder because that crime, according to Lawrie, is a lesser included offense of reckless felony murder, and (2) failure properly to instruct the jury on the burden of proof with regard to the non-statutory aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances. Since these issues were not raised at the trial level, we have considered them under the plain error standard of review.

After determining guilt, the jury considered the penalty phase. By a vote of 9 to 3, the jury determined that the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweighed the mitigating circumstances found to exist. Following his own assessment of the relevant circumstances, and with due regard for the jury's recommendation, the Superior Court concluded that it was more likely than not that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. Based on this conclusion, the Superior Court sentenced Lawrie to death for the first degree felony murders of Tabitha Lawrie, Fawn Lawrie, and Charles Humbertson.

In its analysis, the Superior Court found that the following statutory aggravating circumstances had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of arson; (2) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of burglary; (3) the defendant's course of conduct resulted in the deaths of two or more persons where the deaths were a probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. 11 Del.C. § 4209(e)(1)j and k. The trial court also considered several non-statutory aggravating circumstances, including Lawrie's conduct while in prison (he had two violent encounters with other inmates) and the impact of the deaths on the victims' families.

Finally, the Court considered the following mitigating circumstances: (1) There was no evidence that Lawrie intended to kill the children; (2) the jury concluded that Lawrie did not intend to kill Michelle; (3) Lawrie's execution would have "a substantially adverse impact" on his seven-year-old son Marcus and on Lawrie's mother; (4) Lawrie assisted Lisa Humbertson to escape, although he did this only after he was out of danger and did not put himself at risk to try to save the others; (5) Lawrie had no record of prior unrelated offenses, though he did violate a recent Family Court no-contact order; (6) Lawrie had performed kind acts toward his family and friends in the past; (7) Lawrie had been gainfully employed for most of his adult life; and (8) Lawrie accepted responsibility for his actions.

This case presents the following questions for our review: (1) whether the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding the elements of criminally negligent felony murder; (2) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and (3) whether, under our statutorily mandated review, (a) the evidence in the record supports the Superior Court's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, (b) the sentences were arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, and (c) the sentences were disproportionate to that recommended or imposed in similar cases arising under 11 Del.C. § 4209.

We hold that the trial court committed no error and we AFFIRM the convictions and the sentences of the trial court.

I. FACTS

Prior to November 1991 Lawrie lived in Dover, Delaware, with Michelle, and their three young children: Marcus, Fawn, and Tabitha. ³ Relations between Lawrie and his wife were strained. Around Thanksgiving of 1991 Lawrie moved to Florida with his family, but returned to Dover in early January 1992. Michelle remained in Florida with Fawn and Tabitha until late January 1992, when they returned to Dover. Lawrie experienced numerous problems in 1992, including sporadic unemployment, use of crack cocaine, and separation from his wife.

In late July 1992 Lawrie and Michelle had a heated argument in which Lawrie threatened to kill his wife. Lawrie was arrested and charged with terroristic threatening and offensive touching. On August 5, 1992, Lawrie pleaded guilty to the terroristic threatening charge in Family Court. He was placed on probation and ordered to have no contact with his wife. As Lawrie was leaving Family Court, Michelle told him that she was filing for divorce. Lawrie testified that, on the night of August 5, he smoked crack cocaine ⁴ in order to relax, but that it instead increased his anger. He also brooded over statements from friends and family members that Michelle had been unfaithful to him.

On the morning of August 6, 1992, Lawrie went to the house where Michelle, Fawn, and Tabitha were staying. Two neighborhood children, Charles Humbertson (age 4) and Lisa Humbertson (age 8), were also in the house. Lawrie brought a two-gallon can of gasoline with him to the house and kicked in the back door. Lawrie also had a knife with him in the house. ⁵ After Lawrie broke into the house, he began pouring gasoline around the living room where Fawn and the Humbertson children were playing. The children fled to the bedroom where Michelle and Tabitha were located. Lawrie then ignited the gasoline with a lighter. Lawrie claimed at trial that he did not intend to kill anyone, but instead wanted to "scare the hell out of Michelle." As the living room rapidly became engulfed in flames, Lawrie went into the bedroom and stabbed Michelle several times with the knife. Lawrie claimed that the stabbing was accidental and reflexive.

Lawrie escaped from the bedroom (which was filled with smoke) by climbing over a chest of drawers and breaking a window. Lawrie then obtained a step ladder, placed it near the window, and helped Lisa Humbertson escape. Lawrie testified that he asked Michelle to hand him the other children, but did not receive any response. By this time, thick smoke was pouring out of the window. Michelle, Fawn, Tabitha, and Charles Humbertson died in the fire. Lawrie fled to the home of a neighbor, and told the neighbor what he had done. The neighbor called the police, and Lawrie waited at the neighbor's home until the police arrived. He was arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced as outlined above.

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY REGARDING THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT FELONY MURDER

Lawrie argues on appeal that the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding the elements of criminally negligent felony murder, 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(6), which he claims is a lesser included offense of reckless felony murder, 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2). Lawrie contends that, if he had been convicted of the former offense instead of the latter, he could not have been sentenced to death. We need not address this contention because we hold that the Superior Court was not required to instruct the jury regarding the elements of 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(6).

Lawrie did not ask the trial court to give the instruction which he now claims was required. As a result, he must demonstrate that the trial court's failure to give the instruction constituted plain error. Supr.Ct.R. 8; Liu v. State, Del.Supr., 628 A.2d 1376 1387 (1993). "Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process." Wainwright v. State, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 107 S.Ct. 236, 93 L.Ed.2d 161 (1986).

It is not necessary for us to address the question of whether 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(6) is a lesser included offense of 11 Del.C. § 636(a)(2) because no instruction is required to be given under the facts of this case. Under 11 Del.C. § 206(c), "[a] court is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." As this Court has explained, "it is not enough that a defendant could be convicted of a lesser charge if he had been indicted for it; rather, the evidence must support a jury verdict convicting the defendant...