Laws v. State
| Decision Date | 14 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-19-00221-CR,06-19-00221-CR |
| Parties | Jace Martin LAWS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
V. Chris Botto, The Botto Law Firm, 300 N Green St., Ste. 315, Longview, TX 75601-7336, for Appellant.
Brendan W. Guy, Gregg County District Attorney's Office, 101 E Methvin St., Ste. 333, Longview, TX 75601, for Appellee.
Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
A Gregg County jury convicted Jace Martin Laws of assaulting peace officers Nathaniel Lemmon and Christopher Byrdsong. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b-2) (Supp.). The jury also assessed a sentence of thirty years' imprisonment for Lemmon's assault and forty years' imprisonment for Byrdsong's assault.
On appeal, Laws argues that the evidence was legally insufficient because the State failed to prove that his name was Jace Martin Laws. He also argues that the trial court erred by striking a veniremember with a possible theft conviction for cause, admitting extraneous offenses during guilt/innocence, refusing a lesser-included-offense instruction, and allowing an alternate juror to be present in the jury room during deliberations. In his last point of error, Laws argues that his sentences are grossly disproportionate to the offenses.
We find that (1) Laws's argument that the State failed to prove his name is meritless, (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the veniremember for cause, (3) the trial court's evidentiary rulings were not an abuse of discretion, (4) Laws was not entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction, (5) Laws failed to preserve and adequately brief his fifth point of error, and (6) Laws failed to preserve his last point of error for review. As a result, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Lemmon, an officer with the Longview Police Department (LPD), encountered Laws while investigating a call for a suspicious vehicle at an electrical substation. According to Lemmon, dispatchers reported that the vehicle Lemmon found was involved in another crime under investigation. Laws exited the driver's side of the vehicle, and Byrdsong, a patrol officer with the LPD, arrived at the scene. After Byrdsong's arrival, Laws began trying to take off his coveralls, revealing what looked like a gun tucked underneath them. Although Laws yelled out that the gun was fake, a fact that was later confirmed, Byrdsong drew his weapon when he saw Laws grab "what appeared to be a handgun." From there, efforts to restrain Laws turned into an all-out brawl, as shown by the digital recording of his arrest.
Instead of complying with Lemmon's and Byrdsong's instructions, Laws fled and jumped over a barricade but was quickly caught by Byrdsong. Byrdsong testified that Laws struck him in several places, including his genitals, while he was trying to apprehend Laws. Laws was able to evade Byrdsong and jumped back over the barricade where Lemmon was waiting. Lemmon's effort to subdue Laws also failed. Lemmon testified that Laws struck and clawed at his face, scratched his gums, injured his ankle
, and tried grabbing his genitals. Even though Lemmon tased Laws, Laws continued fighting and trying to get back into the car.
Byrdsong intervened when he saw Laws strike Lemmon but was again overtaken by Laws, who grabbed his gun during the fight. Although Byrdsong was able to quickly get Laws's hand off his gun, Laws grabbed the mace held by Lemmon and sprayed both Byrdsong and Lemmon with the mace before other LPD backup officers arrived at the scene to subdue Laws. Photographs of Byrdsong's injuries were shown to the jury, which, after watching the fight on the recording, convicted Laws of two counts of assaulting a peace officer.
In his first point of error, Laws does not argue that the State failed to prove that he was the person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly assaulted Lemmon and Byrdsong. This is likely because the recording and in-court identifications were legally sufficient to establish the element of identity. Laws also fails to challenge any other element of the hypothetically correct jury charge.1 Instead, Laws argues that the evidence is legally insufficient only because the State failed to prove his full name at trial. The record shows that this complaint is meritless.
The State's indictment was filed against "JACE MARTIN LAWS," and it was undisputed that Laws's full name was Jace Martin Laws. Laws identified himself as "Jace Martin Laws" during a bond reduction hearing before trial. At the beginning of trial, the State read the indictment, including Laws's full name, without any complaint raised by Laws. Finally, Laws took the stand in his own defense and clearly identified himself as "Jace Martin Laws." During cross-examination, the State introduced Laws's prior convictions, which also contained his full name. As a result, Laws's complaint that the State failed to prove his name at trial is unsupported by the record.
Because we will not reverse a trial court's judgment based on a meritless complaint, we overrule Laws's first point of error.
In his second point of error, Laws argues that the trial court erred in striking a veniremember for cause after she indicated that she might have a theft conviction. We disagree.
"We review a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause with considerable deference because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate a venire member's demeanor and responses." Tracy v. State , 597 S.W.3d 502, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). "When a venire member's answers in voir dire are ambiguous, vacillating, unclear, or contradictory, particular deference is given to the trial court's decision." Id. "We look at the entire record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's ruling." Id. "A trial judge's ruling on a challenge for cause may be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion." Id.
"A challenge for cause is an objection made to a particular juror, alleging some fact which renders the juror incapable or unfit to serve on the jury." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a). The State can challenge a prospective juror if "the juror has been convicted of misdemeanor theft or a felony" or "is under indictment or other legal accusation for misdemeanor theft or a felony." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(2)–(3). Under Article 35.19, "[n]o juror shall be impaneled when it appears that he is subject to" these challenges for cause "in Article 35.16, though both parties may consent." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.19. Thus, "[a] person who has been convicted of, or who has a pending charge for, either misdemeanor or felony theft is absolutely disqualified as a juror." Gardner v. State , 306 S.W.3d 274, 300–01 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). "[T]he reason that persons under legal accusation for theft are absolutely disqualified from jury service ‘is to insure the probity of the jury[.]’ " White v. State , 225 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting DeBlanc v. State , 799 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ).
During voir dire, the trial court questioned Veniremember 26 separately, as shown by the the following discussion:
Laws argues that the trial court erred in striking Veniremember 26 because her theft conviction was unconfirmed. However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that " Article 35.19 does not require that the trial judge be certain about a veniremember's disqualification; he may disqualify a prospective juror if it ‘appears’ that the person is subject to disqualification under the statute." Gardner , 306 S.W.3d at 300 (quoting Chambers v. State , 903 S.W.2d 21, 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.19. This is because "[t]he issue of whether a venire[member] is disqualified under the statute is one of fact; thus, if the evidence is conflicting, the trial judge does not abuse his discretion by finding either that the veniremember is or is not disqualified." Gardner , 306 S.W.3d at 300–01.
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