Lawson v. Gee

Decision Date21 April 1900
Citation35 S.E. 759,57 S.C. 502
PartiesLAWSON et al. v. GEE et al.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Union county; Ernest Gary Judge.

Action by H. C. Lawson and others against R. T. Gee, executor, and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

J Clough Wallace, for appellants.

D. E Hydrick, for respondents.

GARY A. J.

The record contains the following statement of facts: "This is an action by the unpaid creditors of M. M. Humphries, deceased, against the sureties on the administration bond of R. T. Gee as administrator of M. M. Humphries, who qualified on September 15, 1881. The bond is in the form required by the statute. R. T. Gee, as such administrator, accounted in a creditors' bill in the court of common pleas, entitled, 'R. T. Gee, as Administrator of M. M. Humphries, Plaintiff, against Mary G. Humphries et al., Defendants.' Upon said accounting R. T. Gee was decreed to be indebted to his intestate's estate in the sum of $5,680.90 on the 20th day of September, 1897, together with $155.95 costs; and the decree of the court provided that H. C. Lawson and other unpaid creditors might enter up judgment therefor, which was done. The amount decreed to be due not having been paid, this action was brought on the bond of R. T. Gee as such administrator, which was joint and several, and dated and executed September 15, 1881. The case came on to be heard at the June term of the court (1899) for Union county, before his honor, Judge Gary, and a jury. Upon the reading of the answer of William Munro, the only defendant who appeared or answered, plaintiffs interposed several oral demurrers to the several matters set up as defenses in paragraphs 1 (except the denial), 2, 3, and 4 of the answer, upon the ground that they did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. His honor sustained plaintiffs' several demurrers, and struck out the paragraphs and part of paragraph demurred to from the answer, and, against the objection and exception of plaintiffs, allowed defendant to amend the answer, as will appear from the order. Upon the reading of the amended answer, plaintiffs again interposed several oral demurrers to the several matters alleged as defenses in the several paragraphs thereof numbered 2, 3, 4, and 5, upon the grounds that the facts therein stated did not constitute a defense, and also moved to strike out paragraph 5, as unauthorized. His honor overruled the demurrers, and refused the motion to strike out paragraph 5. Plaintiffs gave notice of intention to appeal. The case was withdrawn from the jury, and this appeal questions the correctness of the action of his honor in allowing defendant to amend his answer by properly pleading the laches of plaintiffs, and in overruling plaintiffs' demurrers to the amended answer, and in refusing plaintiffs' motion to strike out paragraph 5." The circuit judge allowed the defendant William Munro to amend his answer, among other things, "by properly pleading the laches of the plaintiffs." The circuit judge granted the following order overruling the demurrer, and refusing the motion hereinbefore mentioned: "The defendant William Munro having served his amended answer, and upon the reading thereof plaintiffs having interposed several oral demurrers to each of the five paragraphs of said amended answer upon the ground that the facts therein stated were not sufficient to constitute a defense, and moved to strike out paragraph 5, as new matter not authorized by the order of amendment, upon hearing argument ordered that the demurrers and motion be, and are, overruled." The plaintiffs appealed upon exceptions, the first of which assigns error on the part of the presiding judge as follows: "(1) In allowing defendant to amend his answer by properly pleading the laches of plaintiffs, when laches could under no circumstances constitute a defense to this action." It rests within the discretion of a circuit judge whether he will allow the amendment of a pleading, and his action in allowing such amendment is not the subject of appeal, unless there has been an abuse of his discretion, which we fail to find in this case.

The second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh exceptions are as follows: "(2) In overruling plaintiffs' demurrers to the first matters and item alleged in paragraph 2 of...

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