Lawson v. Lawson

• Decision Date: 02 June 1902
• Citation: 69 S.W. 246
• Parties: LAWSON et al. v. LAWSON.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

69 S.W. 246

LAWSON et al. v. LAWSON.¹

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

June 2, 1902.

Appeal from district court, Ft. Bend county; Spencer C. Russell, Special Judge.

Suit by Caroline Lawson against Harry Lawson and Virginia Walker Lawson and her four minor children. From a decree for plaintiff, the minor defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Hutcheson, Campbell & Hutcheson and Peareson & Peareson, for appellants. James Slyfield and F. M. O. Fenn, for appellee.

GILL, J.

This suit was instituted on the 27th day of August, 1900, by the plaintiff, Caroline Lawson, against the defendant Harry Lawson for divorce and partition of community property. Virginia Walker Lawson and her four minor children were made parties defendant, as claimants of the property in controversy. In respect to the property, plaintiff pleaded in the alternative that, if the court should hold she was not the lawful wife of Harry Lawson, then an undivided half interest therein should nevertheless be adjudged to her, because the property was acquired by the joint labors of herself and the defendant Harry Lawson while living together as husband and wife in the honest belief that they had been legally married. Defendants Harry Lawson and Virginia Walker Lawson answered jointly by exceptions, general denial, and pleaded the statute of limitations of two and four years. D. R. Peareson, appointed by the court as guardian ad litem for the minor defendants, adopted the answer of Harry and Virginia, and filed also a general denial. Upon this state of the pleadings a trial was had before the court without a jury, and the court adjudged that the plaintiff had never been legally married to Harry Lawson, and the prayer for divorce was refused. But the court found, as hereinafter more fully shown, that the property had been acquired by the joint labors of Caroline and Harry while living together in the honest belief that they were husband and wife, and that as the evidence furnished no guide by which to determine the proportions in which each, respectively, contributed to its acquisition, plaintiff should be adjudged the owner of an undivided half interest therein, and have her decree of partition. Only the minor defendants, through their guardian ad litem, have appealed.

The conclusions of fact prepared and filed by the trial judge find sufficient support in the evidence, and contain such a clear and concise history of the case that we are content to adopt them, and here set them out in full: "Prior to the emancipation, the woman Caroline, who is the Caroline Lawson, plaintiff in this case, and one Alf Woods were the slaves of one Smith. That in the manner usual among slaves, and with the consent of their master, the said Caroline and Alf lived together as husband and wife, and were such as near as slaves could be. That after emancipation they continued to live together in such relation for several months, until about Christmas, 1865. That then, or shortly thereafter, Alf quit Caroline, and afterwards, some time in 1867, he married one Rachel ____, in due form of law. Thereupon, and in the same year, Caroline and Harry Lawson, the defendant, made and entered into an agreement to be man and wife, and thereafter lived together as such, and were known and regarded as such in the neighborhood in which they lived and held themselves out to the world as such until about 1889 or 1890, when Harry forced Caroline to leave the house where they lived. He let her occupy a house on the same premises until about 1899, but did not further live with her, or in any way treat her as his wife. All the property in controversy was acquired by the joint efforts of Caroline and Harry, in the same manner as if they had been actually husband and wife; but in what proportion their respective labors contributed to such accumulation, I am unable to say. Alf Woods died in 1897 or 1898. From all the facts and circumstances in the case, I find that, in entering into the contract of marriage with Lawson, Caroline did so in the utmost good faith, not knowing or believing that she was the wife of Woods, or that her living with him after emancipation would, in law, act as a ratification of her slave marriage with him, and that from 1867 to 1890 she was the de facto wife of Lawson. From the date of his marriage with Rachel until his death, Woods lived with her in the same general neighborhood as did Caroline and Lawson, and there is nothing to show or indicate but that Caroline throughout this time was aware of the fact that Woods was still alive. I find that in about 1899, and several years after driving Caroline off, and a year or two after the death of Woods, Lawson married, in due form, Virginia Walker, by whom he had already had three illegitimate children, all of whom, together with a child born since their wedlock, are the defendants in this cause, and that, about a week or ten days before the institution of this suit, Lawson conveyed to his then wife and the said four minor children the 309 acres of land and the 15 or 16 head of cattle and horses which had been acquired during his relationship with Caroline, and through their joint efforts, and which are the effects in controversy herein; that the said conveyance was without consideration, and was made by Lawson to keep any one who might have claims upon him from seizing said property."

Appellant contends that, if it be conceded that the fact conclusions find sufficient support in the evidence, the judgment, nevertheless, is wrong: First. Because, even if plaintiff believed she was the lawful wife of Harry Lawson, she knew all the facts, and, as her belief rested in a mistake of law, she cannot be heard to predicate good faith thereon, and recover according to the measure of the rights of a lawful wife. Second. If the first contention is unsound, and she may be accorded the consideration to which good faith would entitle her, the burden would nevertheless rest upon her to show by clear and unequivocal proof the amount of her earnings which were invested in the property, thus establishing a resulting trust in her favor, and the findings of the court affirmatively show that no guide can be found in the evidence by which the amount can be ascertained.

In the earlier decisions of this state the de facto wife was, under certain circumstances, accorded the property rights of a wife, notwithstanding her knowledge of the invalidity of the relation. This rule was applied by reason of the peculiar wording of the early laws governing land donations from the state on the faith of occupancy by families, and for other reasons growing out of the Spanish laws of marriage. Babb v. Carroll, 21 Tex. 765: Lewis v. Ames, 44 Tex. 345; Yates v. Houston, 3 Tex. 433. The reason for the rule does not apply to cases such as this, and now the courts refuse to award anything to a pretended wife, who, by reason of her knowledge of the illicit relation, occupies the position of an adulteress and a breaker of the laws. In such cases the courts will leave the parties as they find them, on the same principle that they refuse to enforce any other contract which by reason of its objects, or the nature of the consideration upon which it rests, is violative of law or against public policy. If the plaintiff is in such a position, she can neither be accorded the rights of a wife; nor will the courts declare a resulting trust in her favor, or allow the interest of a partner, however clear the proof may be, if to do so they must base the judgment upon the unlawful contract. In the case at bar, inasmuch as plaintiff was never the lawful wife of Harry Lawson, she could not,...