Lawson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 May 1933
• Docket Number: 13641.
• Parties: LAWSON v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

169 S.E. 430

169 S.C. 540

LAWSON v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO.

No. 13641.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

May 26, 1933

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Union County; G. B Greene, Judge.

Action by Albert A. Lawson against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

The complaint read as follows:

The plaintiff herein, complaining of the defendant above named, would respectfully show:

I. That the plaintiff is a resident and citizen of the county of Union and state of South Carolina.

II. That the defendant is a corporation of great wealth and immense resources, organized and chartered under the laws of the state of New York, and, as such, is authorized to engage and is engaged in the business of soliciting, executing, and issuing contracts or policies of life and accident insurance and that, in connection with such business, the said defendant maintains offices and agents and does business in the aforesaid county of Union and state of South Carolina and that D. H. Wade is its agent in charge of defendant's said office in the aforesaid county and state.

III. That, on November 8, 1929, this plaintiff applied to the defendant for, and on November 11, 1929, the defendant, for and in consideration of the previous payment of the semiannual premium of $11.90, issued and delivered to this plaintiff, its contract or policy of accident insurance whereby it agreed and covenanted for a term of six months from November 9, 1929, to pay this plaintiff weekly indemnity of $25 during such part of the aforesaid term as he might be continuously and wholly disabled and prevented from performing his occupation.

IV. That, both at the time of the application for, and at the time of the receipt of, the policy or contract of insurance, described above, this plaintiff notified the defendant that he expected shortly thereafter to change his occupation from that of a mail carrier to that of a state traffic policeman, and specifically stated that, if this fact should in any wise affect the policy or change the amount of the weekly benefit, he did not want the policy, whereupon the defendant assured him and solemnly represented to him that such change would in no wise affect, alter, change, or violate the said contract of insurance or the benefits thereunder; and that it was solely and expressly in reliance upon such representations of the defendant that this plaintiff applied for the said policy, paid the said semiannual premium of $11.90, and accepted the said policy of the defendant, all of which representations of the defendant were made with the false and fraudulent purpose of inducing this plaintiff to pay the said premium and to apply for and to accept the said policy of insurance, and which representation was made in spite of the fact that even then the defendant intended and purposed to violate the same in case this plaintiff should subsequently make any claim under the terms of the said policy.

V. That, after this plaintiff had paid the premium on the said policy, thereby putting the same in full force, and after this plaintiff had accepted the said policy and after this plaintiff had complied with all the other conditions of the said contract, all in reliance upon the aforesaid fraudulent representations of the defendant, and during the period of time covered by the said policy, this plaintiff did accidentally break his right arm, which accident wholly and continuously disabled and prevented this plaintiff from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupation for a period of eight weeks; that, during the period of such disability, the plaintiff duly notified the defendant of such accident and procured of the defendant its claim forms for filing proofs of injury under the aforesaid policy, and thereafter duly prepared and filed with the defendant the said claim forms covering such accident, which said claim forms the defendant duly accepted.

VI. That, while the plaintiff was so disabled and while the defendant, under the terms of its said policy, was bound to pay the plaintiff the sum of $25 per week during the period of such disability, the defendant, acting through D. H. Wade, who in said particulars was acting within the scope of his employment as an agent of the defendant and in furtherance of its business, tendered to this plaintiff weekly indemnity covering the period of such disability at the rate of $9 per week; that, when this plaintiff refused such tender, the defendant, acting through D. H. Wade, who was there acting within the scope of his employment as agent of the defendant, in order fraudulently to induce this plaintiff to accept the said tender which was made in the form of a check with the notation thereon that the same was in full settlement to date of this plaintiff's claim under his aforesaid policy, stated and represented to this plaintiff that a mistake had been made in the amount of the check, and that the defendant would subsequently right the same and pay the plaintiff such difference as might be necessary so as to bring the plaintiff's weekly benefits under said policy during such disability up to $25 per week and accordingly just to go ahead, take the check, and cash it, even though the agent D. H. Wade then and there knew, as he subsequently stated to this plaintiff, that the defendant intended to and was going to refuse to pay the said claim at the rate of $25 per week; and that this false and fraudulent statement and representation by the defendant's said agent, who, in such particulars, was acting within the scope of his employment as such agent, was made solely for the purpose of inducing this plaintiff to accept the said check, which check was marked in full settlement of this plaintiff's claim, to the end that the plaintiff might be cheated and defrauded out of his rightful payments of $25 per week during the period of his disability in accordance with the defendant's representations and the terms of its said policy.

VII. That, while this plaintiff was disabled and after he had refused the fraudulent tender of weekly benefits under the terms of said policy at the rate of $9 per week, a premium became due on said policy; that, when the defendant acting through D. H. Wade, who in said particular was acting within the scope of his employment as defendant's agent, called on this plaintiff to collect said premium, this plaintiff expressed his reluctance to pay any additional premiums on said policy until he had been paid by the defendant, pursuant to its representations, his weekly benefits covering his present disability at the rate of $25 per week; that, in reply to this statement of the plaintiff, the defendant, acting through D. H. Wade, who then and there was acting within the scope of his employment, in order to influence this plaintiff into paying the semiannual premium on said policy then due, and in order to cheat and defraud him, knowingly falsely stated to the plaintiff that he (the said plaintiff) would in just a few days receive payment of his weekly benefits covering his then disability at the rate of $25 per week, and that the tender of weekly benefit during such disability at the rate of $9 per week was all due to a mistake which was then being corrected; and that this...