Lawson v. State

• Decision Date: 04 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. A–10164.,A–10164.
• Citation: 264 P.3d 590
• Parties: Michael A. LAWSON, Appellant,v.STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Court of Appeals

264 P.3d 590

Michael A. LAWSON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. A–10164.

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

Nov. 4, 2011.

Tracey Wollenberg, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and John J. Burns, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.Before: COATS, Chief Judge, and MANNHEIMER and BOLGER, Judges.

OPINION

BOLGER, Judge.

A jury convicted Michael A. Lawson of felony murder and other crimes for the shooting death of Bethany Correira. At trial, Lawson did not dispute that he shot Correira and that she died as a result, but the jury heard conflicting evidence on the circumstances that led to the shooting. Some of the State's evidence suggested Correira was killed during an attempted rape or kidnapping, while other evidence suggested she was killed after she walked in on a drug deal. The jurors were instructed that they could convict Lawson of felony murder without choosing among these possible scenarios, as long as they found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson killed Correira while committing one or more of the felonies alleged by the State. The jury returned a general verdict of guilt, so it is not known which theory or theories formed the basis of its verdict.

Lawson argues that the trial court misinstructed the jury on the requirement of jury unanimity relating to the felony murder charge. The trial judge told the jurors that they, as a group, did not have to unanimously agree on which predicate felony Lawson was committing (or attempting to commit) when he shot Correira. The trial judge also told the jurors that they, as individuals, did not have to reach a firm conclusion on which predicate felony Lawson committed, as long as they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson committed at least one of the predicate felonies. Lawson contends that both of these jury instructions were error.

Lawson raises two other challenges to his felony murder conviction. He argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the various predicate felonies to allow those theories of felony murder to go to the jury. And Lawson argues that the State failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule with respect to those predicate felonies.

We conclude that it is unnecessary to resolve these claims, because the jury unanimously agreed that Lawson was guilty of murder under the other subsections of the second-degree murder statute—subsection (a)(1), the provision that applies when a person causes the death of a person while acting “with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person,” or “knowing that [their] conduct is substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury to another person,” or subsection (a)(2), the provision that applies when a person causes the death of a person while acting with manifest indifference to the value of human life.¹ Lawson's conviction under subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) of the statute merged with his felony murder conviction for purposes of judgment and sentencing. Therefore, even if we were to reverse Lawson's conviction under the felony murder theory, this reversal would have no effect on Lawson's second-degree murder conviction under alternative theories, or on his sentence.

Lawson also challenges the superior court's mid-deliberation instructions to the jury. He argues, for the first time on appeal, that by telling the jurors there was no dispute at trial that Lawson shot and killed Correira, the trial judge essentially directed a verdict on the weapons charge and on the element of each homicide count that required the jury to find that Lawson caused Correira's death. He also argues that the trial judge improperly commented on the evidence by directing the jury's attention to the State's evidence that Correira was shot at close range. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that Lawson has not shown plain error, and we affirm Lawson's convictions.

Background

Bethany Correira was reported missing on May 4, 2003, after her mother went to her apartment and found that her door was unlocked and that her wallet, keys, and cell phone were on the kitchen counter. Correira had recently moved into a complex of apartments in the Bootlegger's Cove area of Anchorage, and the police investigation into her disappearance soon focused on the manager of those apartments, Michael Lawson. Correira had agreed to do some on-site maintenance and cleaning for the owners of the apartment complex, and shortly before she disappeared Correira told her boyfriend that Lawson had arranged to train her to show apartments to prospective tenants.

Although the police early on had evidence linking Lawson to the suspected crime scene and to a suspicious fire in one of the apartments, the break in the investigation did not come until February 2004, when Lawson's brother, Robert Lawson, told the police where to find Correira's body. The police located Correira's remains in a gravel pit off the Parks Highway, and from clothing and a bullet found near the remains, investigators determined that Correira had died from a wound to the chest from a bullet shot at close range.

In April 2004, Robert Lawson agreed to participate in police-monitored telephone calls to Michael Lawson. During those phone calls, Lawson told his brother that he shot Correira by accident after she walked in on him cutting up “Coca–Cola” ( i.e., cocaine). Lawson denied sexually assaulting Correira. When Robert Lawson asked his brother why her body was unclothed, Lawson explained that Correira was stripped of clothes to prevent her from running away. Robert Lawson committed suicide before Lawson's trial, but a redacted version of these phone conversations was played to the jury.

At trial, the State relied on Lawson's admissions to his brother to argue that Lawson might have killed Correira during a kidnapping or drug offense. The State also presented evidence that Correira's bra was pushed up over her breast at the time she was shot, suggesting that she might have been killed during a sexual assault. The State only charged one of these predicate felonies, kidnapping, as a separate count. Superior Court Judge John Suddock instructed the jury that it could convict Lawson of felony murder without determining which of these possible felonies Lawson committed.

Later, in response to a jury question during deliberations, Judge Suddock further instructed the jury that there was no dispute that Lawson shot and killed Correira—the only dispute was his state of mind at the time.

The jury convicted Lawson of second-degree felony murder. The jury separately convicted Lawson of second-degree murder under alternative theories. In addition, the jury convicted Lawson of tampering with physical evidence, ² and third-degree weapons misconduct.³ The jury was unable to reach verdicts on the remaining charges of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and arson. At Lawson's sentencing hearing, the superior court merged the two second-degree murder verdicts into a single conviction for purposes of judgment and sentencing.

Discussion

Lawson makes several claims of error relating to his felony murder conviction.

Lawson contends that the superior court's jury instructions pertaining to felony murder deprived him of his right to a unanimous verdict.

As we have explained, the State pursued the felony murder charge under the theory that Lawson was committing (or attempting to commit) one or more of four possible predicate felonies when he killed Correira: first-degree sexual assault, second-degree sexual assault, kidnapping, or third-degree controlled substances misconduct (possession of cocaine with intent to sell).

Judge Suddock told the jurors that they, as a group, did not have to unanimously agree on which predicate felony Lawson committed when he shot Correira, and the judge also told the jurors that they, as individuals, did not have to decide which predicate felony Lawson committed, as long as they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Lawson committed at least one of the predicate felonies.

Lawson argues that this instruction violated his right to jury unanimity under state law⁴ and his right to due process under the state and federal constitutions⁵ by allowing the jury to convict him of felony murder without reaching a unanimous decision on which felony or felonies he committed. He also argues that the instruction violated his due process right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime by informing the jurors that they did not have to find that he committed a particular felony or felonies, as long as they found beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused Correira's death while committing or attempting to commit one of the felonies alleged by the State.⁶ Lawson argues that these errors require reversal of his felony murder conviction and of his conviction of second-degree murder under alternative theories.

In State v. James, the Alaska Supreme Court held that when a jury is instructed on alternative means of committing a single offense, the jury need not be unanimous on the precise means employed in committing that offense. ⁷ In reaching that decision, the court adopted the majority rule in the landmark New York case People v. Sullivan.⁸ In Sullivan the defendant had been charged with first-degree murder under two theories: premeditated murder and felony murder. The Sullivan court held that the jury was not constitutionally required to agree on which theory the government proved:

It is not necessary that a jury, in order to find a verdict, should concur in a single view of the transaction disclosed by the evidence. If the [jury's] conclusion may be justified upon either of two interpretations of the evidence, the verdict cannot be impeached by showing that a part of the jury proceeded upon one interpretation and...