Lawson v. Weidman
Docket Number | A23A1259,A23A1623 |
Decision Date | 09 November 2023 |
Parties | LAWSON v. WEIDMAN (two cases). |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
In these related appeals arising out of an action to set aside a conveyance, defendant Rhonda Lawson challenges: (i) the trial court's order granting the plaintiff's request for a temporary injunction, and (ii) the court's subsequent order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss in part the appeal in Case No. A23A1259 and otherwise affirm the trial court's rulings in each case.
In July 2022, non-party Sanna Weidman executed a general power of attorney ("POA") in favor of Lawson. Pursuant to that POA, Lawson executed a quitclaim deed the following November purporting to convey Sanna's residence and the 11.36-acre tract of surrounding land from Sanna to Lawson. County property tax forms filed by Lawson state that she paid $1.00 for the property. Sanna died two days after the conveyance. In January 2023 Sanna's brother, George Weidman, III (as Sanna's sole heir at law), and Sanna's estate filed this action against Lawson to set aside the conveyance and for injunctive relief and an accounting.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued a temporary injunction in February 2023 that, among other things: (i) barred Lawson from transferring or encumbering the real property at issue, (ii) prohibited her from making transfers or withdrawals from Sanna's accounts, (iii) required Lawson to return any personal property she removed from the premises and restore all funds transferred from certain accounts, and (iv) directed her to provide an inventory and accounting. Lawson appeals from that order in Case No A23A1259.
After George was appointed the administrator of Sanna's estate, the trial court substituted him as a plaintiff in that capacity. George thereafter moved for summary judgment on his request to set aside the November 2022 quitclaim deed on the ground that Lawson lacked the authority to make the conveyance. The trial court granted the motion and set aside the deed in May 2023. Lawson appeals from that order in Case No. A23A1623.
1. In this appeal, Lawson challenges the February 2023 temporary injunction.
We agree with George that the trial court's ruling setting aside the quitclaim deed - which we affirm in Division 2, below - moots the temporary injunction as it relates to the property conveyance. See generally McClain v. George, 267 Ga.App. 851, 853 (600 S.E.2d 837) (2004) ( that a final judgment superseded an earlier interlocutory injunction in the same case and thereby rendered an appeal from the injunction moot); accord Cox v. Smith, 244 Ga. 280, 280, 284 (2) (260 S.E.2d 310) (1979) ( ); see also generally Veterans Parkway Developers v. RMW Dev. Fund II, 300 Ga. 99, 102 (793 S.E.2d 398) (2016) (). We therefore dismiss in part the appeal in Case No. A23A1259 to the extent that it challenges temporary injunctive relief affecting the real property.
Denhardt v. Jones, 363 Ga.App. 865, 866 (2) (873 S.E.2d 234) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Lawson contends that: (i) the trial court erred by "failing to perform any substantive analysis of the merits or balancing of the . . . equities"; (ii) there was no evidence of irreparable harm or an inadequate remedy at law; (iii) the threat of harm to George did not outweigh the threat of harm to Lawson; and (iv) the evidence was insufficient to show that George likely would prevail on the merits.
As to the first of these contentions, Lawson identifies no authority suggesting that the trial court was required to provide any particular quantum of analysis in its order under the circumstances of this case. See Brittain v. State, 329 Ga.App. 689, 704 (4) (a) (766 S.E.2d 106) (2014) () (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Tolbert v. Toole, 296 Ga. 357, 363 (3) (767 S.E.2d 24) (2014) (). Moreover, because she has not provided a transcript of the evidentiary hearing that led to the temporary injunction, we must presume that the evidence supported the trial court's rulings. See Bollinger v. State, 259 Ga.App. 102, 105 (2) (576 S.E.2d 80) (2003) ("[W]here the proof necessary for determination of the issues on appeal is omitted from the record, the appellate court must assume that the judgment below was correct and affirm.") (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Maree v. Phillips, 274 Ga. 369, 370 (2) (552 S.E.2d 837) (2001) ( ); Denhardt, 363 Ga.App. at 867 (2) (a) () (citation and punctuation omitted).
The absence of a transcript similarly dooms Lawson's remaining challenges to the temporary injunction. See Maree, 274 Ga. at 370 (2); Bollinger, 259 Ga.App. at 105 (2). Consequently, we affirm that part of the temporary injunction directed toward issues other than the real property, to the extent that any such rulings were not mooted by the grant of...
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