Lawson v. Whitey's Frame Shop

• Decision Date: 15 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. SC,SC
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Frank LAWSON v. WHITEY'S FRAME SHOP. Dorothy CHAREST v. WHITEY'S FRAME SHOP. 15545.

Page 1137

697 A.2d 1137

241 Conn. 678

Frank LAWSON v. WHITEY'S FRAME SHOP.

Dorothy CHAREST v. WHITEY'S FRAME SHOP.

No. SC 15545.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 23, 1997.

Decided July 15, 1997.

Michael D. O'Connell, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Julia B. Morris, for appellant (defendant).

Kirstin B. Coffin, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before CALLAHAN, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, KATZ and PETERS, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether, under the circumstances of these consolidated cases, the Appellate Court properly concluded that the defendant, Whitey's Frame Shop, violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) ¹ by disposing of automobiles owned by the plaintiffs, Frank Lawson and Dorothy Charest, in accordance with the defendant's contract with the city of Hartford (city). We conclude that the city acted within its authority in enacting an ordinance providing for the towing of scofflaw vehicles and that the defendant was authorized by its contract with the city, entered into under that ordinance, to tow and dispose of the plaintiffs' vehicles. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court improperly determined that the defendant had violated CUTPA and we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court insofar as it affirmed the trial court's finding of a CUTPA violation.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following facts relevant to these appeals. "The plaintiffs each incurred over $3000 in fines arising from unpaid parking tickets issued by the city of Hartford. The plaintiffs did not contest the tickets when they were issued. On April 5, 1990, the defendant, acting at the direction of the Hartford police department, towed the plaintiffs' automobiles to its lot. At a hearing pursuant to a city ordinance before the Hartford tax department on April 6, 1990, a hearing officer reduced the amount of the fines the plaintiffs owed by eliminating the additional interest and penalties due. Each plaintiff still owed over $1000, the total of the face amounts of the tickets. ² Some time later, the plaintiffs contacted the defendant and informed it that they were still contesting the validity of the tickets.

"Pursuant to both a city ordinance ³ and the contract between the defendant and the [city], the defendant was prohibited from releasing automobiles to their owners until all outstanding parking fines were satisfied. The contract specified that when the automobile owner came to retrieve his or her automobile with proper proof of payment of the fines, the defendant was to collect its towing, storage and administrative fees from the automobile owner. The contract also stated that any automobiles not claimed by their legal owners should be stored and disposed of pursuant to General Statutes § 14-150. ⁴ "The plaintiffs did not pay the parking fines and thus could not retrieve their automobiles from the defendant. On April 24, 1990, allegedly acting pursuant to § 14-150(g), the defendant sent notice to the department of motor vehicles of its intent to sell both automobiles. On May 4, 1990, the defendant, also allegedly acting pursuant to § 14-150(g), sent notice to the plaintiffs that their automobiles would be sold. On July 16, 1990, the defendant sold the automobiles for their salvage value of $50 each.

"The trial court determined that because the plaintiffs demanded the return of their automobiles while they contested the tickets in a variety of fora, the automobiles were not 'abandoned' as that term is used in § 14-150. Because the automobiles were not abandoned, the court reasoned, the defendant did not have the authority to dispose of them. Therefore, the trial court awarded to each plaintiff the $50 salvage value the defendant received for each automobile. ⁵ This amount was then trebled pursuant to General Statutes § 52-564. ⁶ The trial court also awarded to each plaintiff CUTPA damages of $1018 because it concluded that the defendant's improper disposal of the automobiles could cause substantial injury to consumers. These awards were offset by the trial court's determination that each plaintiff owed the defendant $1168 in towing and storage fees." Lawson v. Whitey's Frame Shop, 42 Conn.App. 599, 601-603, 682 A.2d 1016 (1996).

The plaintiffs appealed from the judgments of the trial court to the Appellate Court, arguing that the trial court had improperly awarded fees and costs to the defendant. The defendant filed cross appeals, challenging the trial court's determination that it had violated CUTPA. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment with respect to the towing and storage charges, and also affirmed the trial court's determination on the CUTPA claim, concluding that the defendant's actions were not exempt from CUTPA despite the defendant's argument that it had acted on the authority and direction of the city in disposing of the plaintiffs' automobiles. ⁷ We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the defendant violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act by disposing of the plaintiffs' automobiles?" Lawson v. Whitey's Frame Shop, 239 Conn. 929, 683 A.2d 397 (1996). Thereafter, pursuant to Practice Book § 4140(b), ⁸ the plaintiffs argued that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be modified because the Appellate Court had improperly concluded that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding only the $50 salvage value for the plaintiffs' automobiles; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its ruling on attorney's fees and punitive damages. We reverse in part the judgment of the Appellate Court with respect to its resolution of the CUTPA issue.

I

The defendant argues that it did not violate CUTPA because: (1) the city had the authority to tow scofflaw vehicles pursuant to the city ordinance; and (2) the defendant relied, in good faith, upon its contract with the city, which authorized the defendant to store and dispose of such vehicles in accordance with the procedures set forth in § 14-150(g). In response, the plaintiffs argue that the defendant could not have relied on the disposal procedures in § 14-150 because that statute does not contemplate scofflaw vehicles within its provisions. We agree with the defendant.

We begin by recognizing that the city, in accordance with its police powers and the Home Rule Act; General Statutes §§ 7-187 through 7-201; ⁹ had the authority to take the necessary actions to carry out its municipal duties. See New Haven Commission on Equal Opportunities ex rel. Washington v. Yale University, 183 Conn. 495, 499, 439 A.2d 404 (1981) ("a municipality [has] such powers as are necessary to enable it to discharge its duties and carry into effect the objects and purposes of its creation"). Here, the city ordinances provided that the police department had the right to tow any vehicle that had five or more unpaid municipal parking citations. ¹⁰ Those ordinances, however, did not set forth any procedures for the disposal of such vehicles when their owners failed to pay the amounts owed to the city and the towing company.

The defendant argues that, for such scofflaw vehicles, the city, recognizing such omission in the ordinances, adopted the storage and disposal procedures set forth in § 14-150(g). The defendant further argues that a plain reading of the contract between the city and the defendant confirmed the intent to adopt those storage and disposal procedures. We agree.

The contract outlines the reasons that the city might have for directing the defendant to tow and store a vehicle, including clearing vehicles during snowstorms, removing vehicles following accidents or to be held for evidence, removing scofflaw vehicles and such other actions as the police department may designate. Furthermore, the contract provides that "[f]or vehicles not claimed by their legal owners, the [defendant] shall store and dispose of said vehicles as provided by section 14-150 of the Connecticut Statutes."

The trial court concluded that because the plaintiffs had continually demanded the return of their vehicles, the vehicles were not "abandoned" under § 14-150(a) and, accordingly, the defendant could not rely on the statute. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court, concluding that the failure of the contract to reference subsection (g) of the statute; see footnote 4; which governs the procedure for storage and disposal of unclaimed vehicles, required application of § 14-150 in its entirety. The Appellate Court then concluded that, "because § 14-150 does not contemplate the disposal of scofflaw vehicles, the contract between the city and the defendant by necessity could not have provided for the disposal of such vehicles." Lawson v. Whitey's Frame Shop, supra, 42 Conn.App. at 616, 682 A.2d 1016.

Our resolution of the defendant's claim is guided by the general principles governing the construction of contracts. A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the parties, which is "determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction.... [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ... the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.... Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.... Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one pa...