New Haven Commission on Equal Opportunities ex rel. Washington v. Yale University

• Decision Date: 14 April 1981
• Citation: 439 A.2d 404,183 Conn. 495
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: NEW HAVEN COMMISSION ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES ex rel. John R. WASHINGTON v. YALE UNIVERSITY. The VISITING NURSES ASSOCIATION OF NEW HAVEN, INC. v. The COMMISSION ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES OF the CITY OF NEW HAVEN.

Page 404

439 A.2d 404

183 Conn. 495

NEW HAVEN COMMISSION ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES ex rel. John R. WASHINGTON v. YALE UNIVERSITY.

The VISITING NURSES ASSOCIATION OF NEW HAVEN, INC. v. The COMMISSION ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES OF the CITY OF NEW HAVEN.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 6, 1981.

Decided April 14, 1981.

John T. Grillo, Sp. Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Clarine Nardi Riddle, Deputy Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Charles G. Albom Corp. Counsel, and Leander C. Gray, Asst. Corp. Counsel, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff in the first case and defendant in the second case).

Robert B. Snow, Jr., New Haven, with whom, on the brief, were S. Robert Jelley and Kenneth Rosenthal, New Haven, for appellee (defendant in the first case).

David A. Reif, West Haven, with whom, on the brief, were John H. Peck, Jr., and Linda Handman, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff in the second case).

Before BOGDANSKI, ARMENTANO, SHEA, WRIGHT and DALY, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

Because these two cases present the identical legal issue they are consolidated for the purposes of this opinion.

In New Haven Commission on Equal Opportunities ex rel. John R. Washington v. Yale University, the complainant, John R. Washington, was a computer operator employed by the administrative data systems of the defendant Yale University. After Yale University terminated his employment, Washington filed a grievance under Yale's grievance procedure claiming racial discrimination in the termination. After a hearing, the grievance panel concluded that there had been no discrimination. On February 24, 1977, Washington filed a claim with the plaintiff New Haven Commission on Equal Opportunities (commission). The commission held a hearing and, on June 8, 1978, ordered Washington reinstated with back pay.

On September 18, 1978, the commission instituted the present action to enforce its order, in accordance with § 121/2-7(a) of the equal opportunities ordinance of the city of New Haven. As an affirmative defense, Yale alleged that the board of aldermen of New Haven lacked the power to adopt the ordinance in question and that the commission's action in the pending matter was a nullity. The trial referee (Thim, J.) agreed with this contention and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff then took this appeal.

In The Visiting Nurses Association of New Haven, Inc. v. The Commission on Equal Opportunities of the City of New Haven, Lillian Cowan, an employee of the plaintiff Visiting Nurses Association complained that she was discharged because of her race. The commission, after a hearing, rendered a decision in her favor and ordered that she be reinstated to her former position with back pay. On appeal to the Superior Court judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, from which judgment the defendant has appealed.

The commission was created by an ordinance of the New Haven board of aldermen which provides that the commission may hear complaints regarding unfair employment practices and take the necessary steps to protect the constitutional rights, privileges and immunities of complainants.

Both the Visiting Nurses Association and Yale University contend that the city of New Haven has only such powers as the state legislature grants to it and that the legislature has made no such grant of authority. On the other hand, the commission argues that enacting the ordinance was a valid exercise of the powers of the city under the Home Rule Act, General Statutes §§ 7-194(25)(26) and (29).

The issue is whether the board of aldermen of New Haven had the authority to grant the powers set out in the ordinance to the commission. The powers specifically at issue are those granting authority to the commission to determine matters of racial discrimination in employment, and to issue and enforce orders to correct such discrimination. We conclude that subsections 7-194(25)(26) and (29) of the Home Rule Act do not authorize a municipality to create a commission to resolve employment discrimination complaints.

Section 7-194 of the General Statutes provides, in relevant part, that "all towns, cities or boroughs which have a charter or which adopt or amend a charter under the provisions of this chapter shall have the following specific powers in addition to all powers granted to towns, cities and boroughs under the constitution and general statutes: ... (25) To preserve the public peace and good order, to prevent and quell riots and disorderly assemblages and to prevent disturbing noises; (26) To make and enforce police, sanitary and other similar regulations and to protect or promote the peace, safety, good government and welfare of the town, city or borough and its inhabitants; ... (29) To define, prohibit and abate within the town, city or borough all nuisances and causes thereof and all things detrimental to the health, morals, safety, convenience and welfare of its inhabitants and to cause the abatement of any nuisance at the expense of the owner or owners of the premises on which such nuisance exists."

It is settled law that as a creation of the state, a municipality has no inherent powers of its own City Council of the City of West Haven v. Hall, 180 Conn. 243, 247, 429 A.2d 481 (1980); Pepin v. Danbury, 171 Conn. 74, 83, 368 A.2d 88 (1976); New Haven Water Co. v. New Haven, 152 Conn. 563, 566, 210 A.2d 449 (1965); State ex rel. Coe v. Fyler, 48 Conn. 145, 158 (1880). On the other hand, a municipality does have such powers as are necessary to enable it to discharge its duties and carry into effect the objects and purposes of its creation. City Council of the City of West Haven v. Hall, supra, 180 Conn. at 247, 429 A.2d 481; New Haven Water Co. v. New Haven, supra, 152 Conn. 566, 210 A.2d 449. The power to form a commission to resolve employment discrimination complaints is a significant power which, however, is not necessary to protect the general welfare of New Haven residents, since state and federal laws provide alternative and adequate remedies to a New Haven resident who claims to have been a victim of discrimination.

In City Council of the City of West Haven v. Hall, supra, we held that § 7-194(26) did not authorize a municipality to grant to its governing or legislative body the power to issue subpoenas. Since § 7-194(26) is not sufficient to grant the power to issue subpoenas, it is surely not sufficient to grant the power to create an equal opportunities commission. Similarly, the language of § 7-194(25) and (29) cannot be given such an expansive construction.

Section 7-194 consists of a detailed enumeration of powers granted to municipalities. In State ex rel. Barnard v. Ambrogio, 162 Conn. 491, 497-98, 294 A.2d 529 (1972), we noted "(t)hat the legislature went to the extent of precisely enumerating fifty-seven specific powers without mentioning a civil service system indicates that it did not intend to grant the municipalities such a power by way of a charter adoption." It is generally held that the express enumeration of powers granted to municipalities constitutes an exclusion of all other powers not expressly delegated to them. 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.Rev.1979) § 10.23, p. 82. See also State ex rel. Barlow v. Kaminsky, 144 Conn. 612, 620, 136 A.2d 792 (1957) ("enumeration of powers in a statute is uniformly held to forbid the things not enumerated").

The commission contends that there is a presumption of constitutionality of a statute, and that the trial court did not give the present ordinance the benefit of this presumption. No such presumption can be involved here, since the ordinance is not being challenged on constitutional grounds. The issue here is purely a question of statutory interpretation. It is the general rule that an ordinance is presumed valid; where, however, the power of the municipality to pass the ordinance is not clear, no such presumption attaches. 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations § 382.

Cases cited by the commission, e.g., Figarsky v. Historic District Commission, 171 Conn. 198, 368 A.2d 163 (1976), and Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944), are inapposite. In those cases the legislature had specifically delegated to the municipality the right to enact an ordinance of the type challenged. Those cases discuss whether the state's police power could regulate certain conduct. Here, the issue is whether the state has elected to retain that power or delegate it under General Statutes § 7-194.

The commission contends that Public Acts 1980, No. 80-403, now General Statutes § 7-148(a)(27), §§ 7-148i through 7-148n, ¹ which empowers municipalities to establish equal rights and opportunities commissions, expressly permits the commission to continue existing and thus recognizes and makes certain its prior legal existence. In Hall, we held that a specific grant of power...