Lawson v. Wiggins

Decision Date23 February 1983
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. CV82-PT-0559-S.
Citation557 F. Supp. 500
PartiesMichael Dennis LAWSON, Plaintiff, v. James WIGGINS, etc., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

J. Michael Campbell, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff.

Herbert Jenkins, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for defendant Wiggins.

Whit Thomas, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant Lawson.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PROPST, District Judge.

This cause is before this court on Motions for Summary Judgment which were filed by each defendant, James Wiggins and Renee Lawson, on December 30, 1982 and January 6, 1983, respectively. Pursuant to this court's order of January 7, 1983, this matter was to be deemed submitted on January 27, 1983 but in response to a request from the plaintiff the submission date was extended to February 1, 1983.

Plaintiff asserts that this court has jurisdiction over this controversy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3), (4). The alleged basis of the § 1983 claim is that the defendants conspired and acted under color of state law to deprive plaintiff of his civil rights as protected by the United States Constitution. The alleged deprivation was effectuated by a state court warrant issued by a Magistrate of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County based on information received from defendant Renee Lawson which resulted in the arrest of the plaintiff for burglary. Allegedly, throughout the time of the conspiracy and resulting arrest, defendant James Wiggins was a policeman employed by the City of Birmingham and acting under color of state law. Wiggins and Renee Lawson acknowledge that Wiggins was employed by the City of Birmingham as a policeman at all times pertinent to this case. Defendants contend, however, that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the dispositive jurisdictional question (whether defendants' actions were under color of state law) and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Dennis Lawson and Renee Lawson were granted a divorce by the Jefferson County Circuit Court on July 20, 1980. Defendant Wiggins and Renee Lawson became friends and began dating one another sometime prior to March 19, 1981, the day the plaintiff was arrested.

Dennis Lawson (Mr. Lawson), under the divorce decree, had the right to live in the house, which he and Renee Lawson (Ms. Lawson) owned jointly, located at 7827 7th Avenue North, East Lake until the house could be sold. Mr. Lawson conveyed his interest in the house and the lot to Ms. Lawson on February 26, 1981.

Ms. Lawson says in her deposition that James Wiggins, her son Casey, and she went to the house on Saturday, February 28 to work in the yard. Ms. Lawson says she talked to her neighbors on both sides of the house that day. According to Ms. Lawson, one neighbor, Mrs. Eley, said that she had seen Mr. Lawson at the house on the day before (February 27) and he was getting a stove, refrigerator and chandelier from the house. Ms. Lawson said her other neighbor, Mrs. Lillian Hubbard, told her that she had seen "Dennis over there yesterday getting some things."1 Relying on this information, Ms. Lawson reported a "burglary" at her 7th Avenue residence to the Birmingham Police Department (B.P.D.) on or shortly after February 28, 1981. She maintains that she named Dennis Lawson as a suspect because of the conversations she had with her neighbors.

The case was assigned to Sgt. T.E. Joiner of the B.P.D. and an incident report, No. H-155431, was filed. A copy of Sgt. Joiner's affidavit is attached to both defendants' motions for summary judgment. Sgt. Joiner is assigned to the East Precinct of the B.P.D. and handles reports of burglaries, particularly cases in which a suspect is named in the report. Sgt. Joiner talked to Ms. Lawson and "advised her that she would have to talk to a District Attorney so that he (D.A.) could decide whether or not an arrest warrant should be issued for the suspect." Regarding James Wiggins, Sgt. Joiner's affidavit says:

I am familiar with Officer James L. Wiggins, Jr., who also is assigned to the East Precinct as a patrol officer.
After advising Ms. Lawson, I also discussed the procedure with Officer Wiggins and he asked if it would be best for him to come with Renee Lawson with whom he said that sic he was dating. I told him he could if he wanted to. At no time did he request or suggest that a warrant be issued. In fact, he was advised that only the District Attorney could make that decision. On the 13th day of March, 1981, I met Officer Wiggins and the victim Renee Lawson at the District Attorney's Office and Scott Boudreaux, a Deputy District Attorney, was assigned to screen the case. We went into his office and Renee Lawson told him everything that she had told the investigating officer and myself. Officer Wiggins did not talk to the District Attorney about the case since he was not a witness. After this screening, a warrant was typed up and taken to the issuing Magistrate who was Mary Drew. Officer Wiggins did not sign a warrant. Thereafter, the suspect, Michael Dennis Lawson, was arrested on the warrant but I did not follow up on the case for its disposition.

Affidavit of Sgt. T.E. Joiner at pp. 1-2. This statement is consistent with the position of both defendants as to the role Officer Wiggins played vis a vis Sgt. Joiner and the District Attorney. Plaintiff offers no evidence concerning Wiggins' participation in obtaining the warrant. Plaintiff apparently expects this court to draw the inference that he may have acted under color of state law from the fact that he was present and a police officer. Both Ms. Lawson and Officer Wiggins admit having discussed, prior to seeing the Magistrate, the possibility of having Dennis Lawson arrested. Sgt. Joiner had no personal information as to the arrest itself or Officer Wiggins' role therein.

The affidavits submitted by the plaintiff do not discuss the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the plaintiff but the complaint and the briefs of the defendants containing excerpts from depositions describe the situation as it was at the time of the arrest.2 Plaintiff maintains that on the evening of March 19, 1981 he and Ms. Lawson agreed to meet at a local lounge to discuss the plaintiff's visitation rights with their son, Casey. Plaintiff contends that he "was placed under arrest by defendants James Wiggins and John Doe and subsequently charged with the crime of burglary, third degree" after he entered the lounge for the rendezvous with Ms. Lawson.

Defendant Wiggins' brief indicates that Officer M.K. Edmondson of the Birmingham Police Department actually arrested the plaintiff while Wiggins was off-duty and with Officer Edmondson in order to identify Mr. Lawson. According to Wiggins' brief:

Defendant Renee Lawson had called Officer Wiggins and told him that the plaintiff wanted to meet her at a local lounge. Officer Wiggins went to the Precinct and reported that there was a warrant for the plaintiff and where he could be found and he would meet the arresting officer there.

Apparently, Wiggins and Officer Edmondson waited for Mr. Lawson to arrive, and once he was there, placed him under arrest pursuant to the warrant issued by the Magistrate. Mr. Lawson's deposition at pp. 27-28 says:

And we had set up a meeting place to meet and discuss visiting Casey and trying to kind of get along a little better than we had been.
We set up that meeting place and I drove up that night somewhere around 6 or 7, somewhere like that. I don't recall exactly what time. And I seen my ex-wife's car in the parking lot.
So I went in. And as I walked through the door, I seen Mr. Wiggins sitting to my left. And I went on back and sat down. And about five minutes later, him and another guy walked up. And the guy that was with him said, are you Dennis Lawson? I said, yes, sir. He said, well, you're under arrest.

(emphasis added).

The arrest initiated a prosecution of the matter in the Criminal Division of the Jefferson County Circuit Court. The case was dismissed on April 28, 1981 "For Want of Prosecution" by the State. Ms. Lawson asserts that she did not appear on that date due to a lack of notice.

Plaintiff filed this action on March 24, 1982 naming Renee Lawson, James Wiggins in his individual and official capacities, John Doe in his official capacity, and the City of Birmingham as defendants. This court granted the City of Birmingham's Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1982. On October 8, 1982 this court denied defendant Wiggins' Motion to Abstain or for a Stay of the proceedings in this court while a similar suit proceeds in state court. This court has denied Wiggins' and Ms. Lawson's Motions to Dismiss on May 20, 1982 and June 25, 1982, respectively. By direction of the pretrial order, the fictitious party (John Doe) named in the original complaint was dropped from the style of the case.

Plaintiff maintains that he was a victim of a false arrest and malicious prosecution as a result of a conspiracy engaged in by the defendants under color of state law. The issue before this court on the defendants' motions for summary judgment is:

Does the record before this court present a factual dispute as to whether Wiggins was, at any time pertinent to this case, acting under color of state law?

Of course, this court must view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party(s) opposing the motion. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). All reasonable doubts about the facts must be resolved in favor of the non-movant. Casey Enterprises v. American Hardware Mutual Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598 (5th Cir.1981). If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them. E.D.F. v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983 (5th Cir.1981). Even if the facts are undisputed, if reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from the undisputed facts, then summary judgment should be denied. Impossible Electronics Techniques, Inc....

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