Lawton v. Joesting
| Decision Date | 10 November 1905 |
| Docket Number | 14,508 - (59) |
| Citation | 104 N.W. 830,96 Minn. 163 |
| Parties | RANSOM L. LAWTON v. FRANK H. JOESTING and Another |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county commenced by Security Trust Company as assignee of Daniel D. Merrill (for which Ransom M. Lawton was afterwards substituted as plaintiff) to recover from defendants the possession of certain land and $1,150 for the use and occupation thereof. The case was tried before Kelly, J., who found in favor of defendants. From an order denying a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appealed. Reversed.
Judicial Construction of Writing.
The sole office of the rules of judicial construction is to ascertain and declare the intention of the parties, as made apparent and evidenced by the language of the instrument construed, taken in its entirety, and particular forms of expression, technical legal phraseology, and rules of grammatical analysation are not conclusive. The writing is taken as a whole, and the various provisions thereof, if incongruous and inconsistent, made to harmonize and unite in a consistent agreement in consonance with the intention of the parties.
Construction of Deed.
A deed of real property conveyed to the grantee "a perpetual easement, for the purpose of a public levee or street only over and upon lot number 2 in block A, lots number 3 and 4 in block C * * * in Robertson's addition to West St. Paul according to the recorded plat thereof, and also lots numbered 5 and 6 in block 2 in Marshall's addition to West St. Paul. * * *" Held, that a perpetual easement only was transferred and conveyed by the deed, not only to the lots in Robertson's addition, but also to those in Marshall's addition. The words "over and upon," immediately preceding the description of the lots in Robertson's addition, must, to effectuate the intention of the parties, be supplied by intendment immediately preceding the description of the lots in Marshall's addition.
Durment & Moore, for appellant.
John W. Pinch and Samuel Whaley, for respondents.
The facts in this case are substantially like those presented in the case of Sanborn v. Van Duyne, 90 Minn. 215, 219, 96 N.W. 41; but for a proper understanding of the present opinion a restatement is necessary. They are, in short, as follows: On and for some time prior to August 16, 1883, one Daniel D. Merrill was the owner of lots numbered 5 and 6 in block 2, located on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in Marshall's addition to West St. Paul. Prior to the date named the municipal authorities of the city of St. Paul instituted certain proceedings to condemn the same and other real property similarly situated and adjacent thereto for levee purposes, all of which land so sought to be condemned belonged to and was the property of said Merrill; a portion thereof being situated in Robertson's addition to West St. Paul, and a portion in Marshall's addition, and all bordering upon the Mississippi river and subject to overflow in time of high water, a considerable portion of some of the lots being in the bed of the river. The proceedings to condemn were irregular, and doubt existed on the part of the municipal authorities as to their validity, and to obviate any such defect an agreement was entered into between the city and Merrill by which the latter conveyed the property to the city for the consideration of $700. The conveyance was in the form of a warranty deed; the part here important being as follows:
This indenture, made this 16th day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, between Daniel D. Merrill and Alice K. Merrill, his wife, of Ramsey county, Minnesota, parties of the first part, and the city of St. Paul, Ramsey county, Minnesota, party of the second part, witnesseth: That the said parties of the first part, in consideration of the sum of seven hundred ($700) dollars to them in hand paid by the said party of the second part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, have granted, bargained, sold, and conveyed and do by these presents grant, bargain, sell, and convey, to the said party of the second part, its successors, heirs, and assigns, forever, all those tracts, pieces, or parcels of land lying and being in the county of Ramsey and state of Minnesota, described as follows, to wit: A perpetual easement, for the purpose of a public levee or street only, over and upon lot number two (2) in block A, lots number three (3) and four (4) in block C, lots number one (1) and two (2) and three (3) in block E, lot five (5) in block one hundred and eighty-three (183), and lots four (4) and five (5) in block one hundred and eighty-eight (188), all in Robertson's addition to West St. Paul, according to the recorded plat thereof, and also lots numbered five (5) and six (6) in block two (2) in Marshall's addition to West St. Paul, according to the recorded plat thereof in the office of the register of deeds in and for said county.
The city never made use of the property for the purposes for which it was acquired, namely, levee or street purposes; but under and pursuant to chapter 34, p. 255, Sp. Laws 1891 being an act to authorize the common council of the city of St. Paul to lease this particular property, the municipal authorities leased the same to the defendants in this action, who have erected thereon a manufacturing establishment, the buildings being so erected that they can be readily removed without injury to the real estate, and they are now in possession of the property under and by virtue of that contract, claiming no other right or title. In 1893 Merrill became insolvent and made a general assignment for the benefit of his creditors to the Security Trust Company. The trust company accepted the trust imposed by the assignment, and at the time of the commencement of this action was acting in that capacity, and brought the same as assignee of Merrill. Subsequently the trust company duly sold and transferred to the plaintiff, Lawton, all of Merrill's right, title, and interest in and to the lands, and he was duly substituted as plaintiff in the action, so that the controversy is now...
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