Lawton v. Sweitzer

• Decision Date: 09 February 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22146.,22146.
• Citation: 354 Ill. 620,188 N.E. 811
• Parties: LAWTON v. SWEITZER, County Clerk.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

354 Ill. 620

188 N.E. 811

LAWTON

v.SWEITZER, County Clerk.

No. 22146.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1933.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 9, 1934.

Mandamus by G. J. Lawton against Robert M. Sweitzer, County Clerk. Judgment for defendant, and petitioner appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; David M. Brothers, judge.

C. Sidney Van Duzer, of Chicago, for appellant.

Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (Hayden N. Bell, Louis H. Geiman, Robert S. Cushman, and Jacob Shamberg, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

HERRICK, Justice.

The appellant (hereinafter called the petitioner) filed his petition for a writ of mandamus against Robert M. Sweitzer, county clerk of Cook county, the appellee herein (hereinafter called the defendant), in the circuit court of Cook county, for the purpose of compelling the defendant to issue to the petitioner a tax deed for a certain parcel of land described in the petition. An answer was filed to the petition, the cause was heard, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

The petitioner claims the right to a tax deed to the premises under sections 216, 217, 218, and 219 of the Revenue Act of 1872 as amended while the defendant bases his refusal to issue such tax deed on the provisions of section 211 of the act. Sections 216-219 of the act, Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 120, §§ 202-205, pp. 2391, 2392, and section 211 of the act, p. 2391, § 197, Cahill's Rev. St. 1933, c. 120, pars. 232-235, p. 2341, and paragraph 227, p. 2340.

The following facts were uncontroverted in the record: On September 16, 1930, the petitioner, by his agent, purchased at a tax sale in Cook county, pursuant to a judgment entered on September 13, 1930, the premises involved in this litigation, for the general taxes for the year 1928. A certificate of sale was issued to the agent and thereupon duly assigned and delivered to the petitioner. Thereafter judgments were entered and sales commenced as follows: Sale for 1930 special assessments; judgment entered December 18, 1930; sale commenced December 22, 1930. Sale for 1929 general taxes; judgment entered July 24, 1931; sale commenced July 27, 1931. Sale for 1931 special assessments; judgment entered September 24, 1931; sale commenced September 28, 1931. Sale for 1930 general taxes; judgment entered July 23, 1932; sale commenced July 25, 1932. Sale for 1932 special assessments; judgment entered October 20, 1932; sale commenced October 29, 1932. It is uncontradicted that the last day on which sales were made pursuant to judgments for delinquent taxes and assessments were as follows: 1930 special assessments, December 5, 1931; 1929 general taxes, November 3, 1931; 1931 special assessments, July 11, 1932; 1930 general taxes, March 31, 1933.

It is the contention of the defendant that the sales are still open, while the petitioner takes the position that the last day of the second annual sale for taxes has passed and that the sales are closed. It is claimed by the defendant and conceded by the petitioner that the premises involved in this appeal are subject to the general taxes for the years 1929 and 1930 and special assessments for the years 1930 and 1931; that said taxes and special assessments have not been paid and that objections were filed by the petitioner to judgment and order of sale for the taxes of 1929 [354 Ill. 623]and 1930, which objections are still pending and not disposed of; that temporary injunctions were issued in certain causes pending in the circuit court of Cook county restraining the sale of the premises and lands in controversy, with other lands, for the nonpayment of special assessments for the years 1930 and 1931; that the petitioner herein was an intervening petitioner in the cause in which the injunctions were obtained; that the injunctions have not as yet been dissolved; that in consequence of the objections and injunctions, the premises, the subject-matter of this suit, have not been sold or forfeited for the non-payment of general taxes for the years 1929 and 1930 or special assessments for the years 1930 and 1931; and that the premises have not been withdrawn from collection in default of bidders.

The case involves the construction of section 211 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 120, § 197), above mentioned, which section is as follows: ‘Sec. 211. If any purchaser of real estate sold for taxes or special assessment shall suffer the same to be forfeited to the State, or again sold for taxes or special assessments, or if the same shall be withdrawn from collection at a subsequent tax sale in default of bidders, before the expiration of the last day of the second annual sale thereafter, such purchaser shall not be entitled to a deed for such real property until the expiration of a like term from the date of the second sale, forfeiture or withdrawal, during which time the land shall be subject to redemption upon the terms and conditions prescribed in this Act; but the person redeeming shall only be required to pay for the use of such first purchaser the amount paid by him. The second purchaser, if any, shall be entitled to the redemption money, as provided for in the proceding section; provided, however, it shall not be necessary for any municipal corporation which shall bid in its own delinquent special assessments, at any sale, in default of other bidders, to protect the property from subsequent forfeitures, sales or withdrawals, as above required in this section.’

In construing a statute, not the mere section under consideration is to be examined nor any particular portions, words, phrases, or sentences in the section before the court, but other sections, a part of the same legislative act, may be and should be considered which tend to disclose the legislative intent and the purpose to be attained by the enactment of the law. People v. Giles, 268 Ill. 406, 109 N. E. 273. Generally speaking, legislative enactments have for their prime purpose either the remedying of some evil or the granting of some power and assistance for the protection, security, or enforcement of private or public rights or the furtherance of definite governmental agencies in the discharge of their governmental functions. In interpreting a statute the court must consider the legislative intent and purpose as expressed in the act and then determine whether such intent and purpose have been sufficiently manifested by the statute, always keeping in mind the circumstances under which the act was passed and the purpose to be accomplished.

It is urged by the defendant that the Revenue Act is a penal statute, which should be strictly construed, and that courts are not allowed to enlarge its provisions by construction. It is true that section 211 should be strictly construed so far as it pertains to conveying the title by the county clerk to the purchaser at the tax sale. Wisner v. Chamberlin, 117 Ill. 568, 7 N. E. 68. However, ‘construing a statute strictly means, under the authorities, simply that it should be confined to such subjects or applications as are obviously within its terms and purposes.’ 2 Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) §§ 518, 519. ‘In recent years the rule of strict construction has lost much of its force, as it has become more and more generally recognized that the paramount duty of the judicial interpreter is to put upon the language of the legislature, honestly and faithfully, its plain and rational meaning and to promote its object.’ Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, § 329; Warner v. King, 267 Ill. 82, 107 N. E. 837. The section of the statute under consideration is to be construed in the light of these principles laid down as a guide for the interpretation and construction of statutes.

Section 1 of the Revenue Act of 1909 (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 120, § 411, p. 2445, Cahill's Rev. Stat. 1933, c. 120, par. 376, p. 2376), providing for the redemption by the original owners after the issuance of a tax deed where the purchaser at the tax sale is not in the possession of the premises or the premises are not occupied by such purchaser or grantee in the tax deed, contains the following statement referring to the grantee in the tax deed for the premises: ‘shall suffer the same to be forfeited to the State, or again sold for taxes or special assessments.’ Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 120, § 197. There is no doubt that this section provides that such grantee must pay the taxes and assessments against such premises. The petitioner practically concedes that fact in his argument of the case. The law is that where the same word is used in different sections of the same legislative act the presumption is that it is employed with the same definite meaning unless there is something in the act to show clearly that a different meaning was intended. Board of Education v. Morgan, 316 Ill. 143, 147 N. E. 34.

The petitioner earnestly argues that section 211 does not require him to pay the taxes during the two-year period; that it is only his duty to ‘protect’ the property against sale or forfeiture. He cites and relies upon, in support of his position, Gage v. Parker, 103 Ill. 528. It is true that in the opinion in that case the court uses the word ‘protect,’ but there is nothing in the opinion from which it can reasonably be inferred that the court intended by anything said in the opinion to decide that the buyer at the tax sale was relieved of his obligation to pay the taxes and assessments becoming due against the...