In re Application of County Treasurer

• Citation: 291 Ill.Dec. 758,214 Ill.2d 253,824 N.E.2d 614
• Decision Date: 17 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 98146.,98146.
• Parties: In re APPLICATION OF the COUNTY TREASURER (Forus Mortgage Corporation, Appellee, v. Denis Dwyer et al., Appellants).
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

824 N.E.2d 614

214 Ill.2d 253

291 Ill.Dec. 758

In re APPLICATION OF the COUNTY TREASURER (Forus Mortgage Corporation, Appellee, v. Denis Dwyer et al., Appellants).

No. 98146.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

February 17, 2005.

Douglas W. Graham, Chicago, for appellants.

Benjamin J. Bass, Lake Forest, Marc D. Sherman, Lincolnwood, and Howard Harris, Fountain Hills, Arizona, for appellee.

Matthew A. Flamm, of Flamm & Teibloom, Ltd., Rodney C. Slutzky, of Slutzky & Blumenthal, and Steven F. Pflaum, of McDermott, Will & Emery, L.L.P., Chicago, for amicus curiae Chicago Bar Association. Justice FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In this appeal, we consider whether a property owner may file a postjudgment motion challenging the circuit court's order for issuance of a tax deed. The appellate court held that an order of the circuit court for issuance of a tax deed is incontestable and the property owner may not file a postjudgment motion for reconsideration. 346 Ill.App.3d 624, 281 Ill.Dec. 981, 805 N.E.2d 349. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

The opinion of the appellate court contains a thorough discussion of the facts of this case. In this opinion, we outline only the facts relevant to this appeal.

Denis and Lillian Dwyer owned a single-family residence which was sold on February 13, 1998, to Tax Deed, Inc., for taxes due for the tax year 1996. Tax Deed subsequently transferred the property to Forus Mortgage Corporation. On August 24, 2000, Forus filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County for a tax deed, stating that the redemption period would expire on January 17, 2001. The Dwyers did not redeem the property, and, on February 16, 2001, Forus filed an application for an order directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed.

Pursuant to section 22-30 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/22-30 (West 2000)), Denis Dwyer appeared pro se and objected to issuance of the tax deed. The court held several hearings on the matter and entered an order on July 30, 2002, directing the county clerk to issue the tax deed. On August 21, 2002, Denis Dwyer and Lillian Dwyer each filed a postjudgment motion seeking to have the order of July 30, 2002, vacated. The court denied the motions on October 24, 2002. On November 19, 2002, the Dwyers filed a notice of appeal.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal as untimely. 346 Ill.App.3d 624, 281 Ill.Dec. 981, 805 N.E.2d 349. Initially, the court determined that an order for issuance of a tax deed may be challenged only by direct appeal or by petition in the circuit court for relief from judgment, pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). 346 Ill.App.3d at 629, 281 Ill.Dec. 981, 805 N.E.2d 349. The court further held that, in limiting the avenues for relief from the order for issuance of the tax deed, the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/22-5 et seq. (West 2000)) does not violate the separation of powers clause of our constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1. The court next determined that the Dwyers' postjudgment motions could not be considered petitions for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 346 Ill.App.3d at 629-30, 281 Ill.Dec. 981, 805 N.E.2d 349. The court concluded that the Dwyers' postjudgment motions were not proper challenges to the order for issuance of the tax deed; the motions did not toll the time for filing the appeal; and the appeal was untimely. 346 Ill.App.3d at 636-37, 281 Ill.Dec. 981, 805 N.E.2d 349.

The Dwyers filed a petition for appeal as a matter of right, or, in the alternative, for leave to appeal. 134 Ill.2d R. 317. We granted the Dwyers' petition in order to determine whether the circuit court's order to issue a tax deed could be contested by a postjudgment motion for reconsideration or motion to vacate. We allowed the Chicago Bar Association to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the Dwyers. 155 Ill.2d R. 345.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

In the case at bar, we are called upon to review the appellate court's construction of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)) and the court's determination that section 22-45 of the Code is constitutional (35 ILCS 200/22-45 (West 2000)). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill.2d 141, 149, 227 Ill.Dec. 753, 688 N.E.2d 90 (1997), quoting Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill.2d 189, 194, 21 Ill.Dec. 144, 381 N.E.2d 222 (1978); In re B.C., 176 Ill.2d 536, 542, 223 Ill.Dec. 919, 680 N.E.2d 1355 (1997). To do so, we examine the language of the statute, usually the best indicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting the law. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493, 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). We afford the language of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning (Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504,247 Ill.Dec. 473,732 N.E.2d 528) and construe the statute as a whole (Sylvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 197 Ill.2d 225, 232, 258 Ill.Dec. 548, 756 N.E.2d 822 (2001)). We do not view words and phrases in isolation but consider them in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Sylvester, 197 Ill.2d at 232,258 Ill.Dec. 548,756 N.E.2d 822; Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504,247 Ill.Dec. 473,732 N.E.2d 528.

Legislative intent is ever paramount and controls our construction of a statute. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill.2d 103, 111, 183 Ill.Dec. 6, 610 N.E.2d 1250 (1993), citing Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill.2d 178, 189, 149 Ill.Dec. 286, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1990). We recognize that traditional rules of statutory construction are merely aids in determining legislative intent and must yield to such intent. Collins, 155 Ill.2d at 111, 183 Ill.Dec. 6, 610 N.E.2d 1250, citing Carey v. Elrod, 49 Ill.2d 464, 471, 275 N.E.2d 367 (1971). When the spirit and intent of the legislature are clearly expressed and the objects and purposes of a statute are clearly set forth, the courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause of the statute that might defeat such clearly expressed legislative intent. In re D.F., 208 Ill.2d 223, 230, 280 Ill.Dec. 549, 802 N.E.2d 800 (2003); Collins, 155 Ill.2d at 112, 183 Ill.Dec. 6, 610 N.E.2d 1250. Ambiguity caused by a literal and confined construction of a statute may be modified, changed or rejected to conform to an otherwise clear legislative intent. Collins, 155 Ill.2d at 112, 183 Ill.Dec. 6, 610 N.E.2d 1250 (citing Community Consolidated School District Number 210 v. Mini, 55 Ill.2d 382, 386, 304 N.E.2d 75 (1973), Carey, 49 Ill.2d at 471-72, 275 N.E.2d 367, and Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 42 Ill.2d 385, 395, 251 N.E.2d 253 (1969)). We presume that in enacting a statute the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill.2d at 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528.

Additional principles of statutory construction apply when the constitutionality of a statute is at issue. We note that all statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the burden of rebutting this presumption and clearly establishing a constitutional violation. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill.2d 21, 31, 259 Ill.Dec. 753, 759 N.E.2d 533 (2001). In considering a challenge to a statute, a court must construe the statute so as to affirm the statute's constitutionality and validity, if reasonably possible. People v. Greco, 204 Ill.2d 400, 406, 274 Ill.Dec. 73, 790 N.E.2d 846 (2003); In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d 291, 296, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233 (2001). Moreover, a court will consider a constitutional question only where essential to the disposition of a case, that is, where the case cannot be decided on other grounds. Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill.2d 363, 370, 273 Ill.Dec. 784, 789 N.E.2d 1216 (2003), quoting Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill.2d 391, 396, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994). Review of the constitutionality of a statute is de novo. In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d at 296, 253 Ill.Dec. 699, 745 N.E.2d 1233

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B. Postjudgment Motion Practice

Turning to the merits of the appeal, we consider first the interplay between the filing of a postjudgment motion and the filing of an appeal. Section 2-1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2000)) provides:

"Motions after judgment in non-jury cases. (a) In all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for a rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.

(b) A motion filed in apt time stays enforcement of the judgment."

Thus, a party may seek review in the circuit court within the statutorily allotted time, and the filing of the postjudgment motion stays enforcement of the circuit court's judgment.

Supreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill.2d R. 303) governs the filing of an appeal. The rule provides in part:

"(a) Time; Filing; Transmission of Copy.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a nonjury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last remaining post-judgment motion.

(2) When a timely post-judgment motion has been filed by any party, whether in a jury case or a nonjury case, a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-judgment

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