Lawyers' Mortg. Inv. Corp. of Boston v. Paramount Laundries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 May 1932
• Parties: LAWYERS' MORTGAGE INV. CORPORATION OF BOSTON v. PARAMOUNT LAUNDRIES, Inc., et al. (three cases).
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

279 Mass. 314

181 N.E. 262

LAWYERS' MORTGAGE INV. CORPORATION OF BOSTON

v.PARAMOUNT LAUNDRIES, Inc., et al. (three cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 24, 1932.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Alonzo R. Weed, Judge.

Bills by the Lawyers' Mortgage Investment Corporation of Boston against the Paramount Laundries, Inc., and others. Orders in favor of defendants for interlocutory decrees in the first two cases and for interlocutory decree and for final decree in the last case. On report.

Orders affirmed.

M. H. Sullivan and J. F. Sullivan, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

C. P. Houston, of Boston, for Troy Laundry Mach. Co.

A. Brayton, of Boston, for Samuel G. Braun.

F. J. Muldoon, of Boston, for defendants John J. Mahoney and another.

SANDERSON, J.

These are three bills in equity seeking to establish the plaintiff's title to certain laundry machinery, all of which was sold on conditional sales contracts, a part by the Troy Laundry Machinery Company, herein called the Troy Company, a part by the defendants Poland and Mahoney, and a part by the defendant Samuel G. Braun.

The cases were referred to a master who found that the machinery was installed in the premises of the defendant Paramount Laundries, Inc., herein called the Paramount Company; that the plaintiff was the holder by assignment of a mortgage on its land and buildings and now is in possession as purchaser at foreclosure sale of the mortgage; that no reference to machinery was made in the mortgage; that a laundry business had been conducted on a part of the premises in a building which was torn down; that in 1927 a brick and concrete building was erected on the laundry location and adjoining land; that this building was constructed as a whole, the portion in the rear to be used for a laundry and that in front for stores, offices and a garage; that a boiler or engine room is located in the basement of the building in which was installed a boiler furnishing heat, steam and hot water for both the laundry and the garage, and also steam power to operate a generator located in the boiler room which in turn generated electricity used in the operation of the machinery in the laundry building; that the plaintiff did not know of the conditional sales contracts until after the foreclosure sale; that most of the machinery was completely installed in the premises prior to the execution of the mortgage to the plaintiff's predecessor in title; and that the machinery is of various kinds such as is used in laundries.

At the hearing on the plaintiff's motion in each case to recommit the report and the defendants' motion to confirm, a question arose whether the master had reported all facts upon which he relied in making his finding to the effect that the machinery, the title to which was involved in the suits, was personal property, and the parties agreed that the master might be interrogated by the trial judge in their presence concerning that matter. The master being summoned stated in response to the inquiry, ‘I think I stated in the reports all the facts which I thought were material and on which my decision would be based. I think, also, that I referred to the fact in each instance, in each case, that I had visited the premises and taken a view. With regard to that view, I cannot say I would be able to stress any one particular thing, excepting the general reaction I might get from it, but I say in these reports that I have all the facts that I thought material and pertinent and essential to come to a final conclusion.’ The judge: ‘I understand you also to say, so far as you can now recall, you have stated in your report all that you observed in your view of the premises.’ The master: ‘In other words, I could not add anything, so far as I can see, to the report as I made it.’ The parties thereupon agreed that the answers made by the master should be treated as though incorporated in the report itself.

In the Troy case by the terms of the order for interlocutory decrees the machinery was declared to be personal property and the Troy Company to be entitled to its possession with the right to remove the same from the premises and also entitled to recover from the plaintiff the damages suffered by it by reason of the plaintiff's detention of the property; and it was further ordered that the case be recommitted to the master to determine the amount of damages, if any. The case was reported to this court upon the pleadings, the...