Lay v. Adley, No. 2003-CA-001685-MR (KY 10/1/2004)
| Decision Date | 01 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2003-CA-001685-MR.,2003-CA-001685-MR. |
| Parties | Sharon LAY, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Brandon LAY, Deceased; and Fred LAY, Appellants. v. Christopher S. ADLEY, M.D.; And Pediatric Care of Kentucky, P.S.C., Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Eric C. Deters, Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky, Briefs and Oral Argument for Appellants.
Mark G. Arnzen, Mary K. Molloy, Covington, Kentucky, Brief for Appellees.
Mary K. Molloy, Covington, Kentucky, Oral Argument for Appellees.
Before: GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON, and MINTON, Judges.
Sharon Lay, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Brandon Lay, deceased, and Fred Lay, individually, have appealed from the trial order and judgment entered by the Kenton Circuit Court on July 7, 2003, following a defense verdict in their medical malpractice action against the appellees, Christopher S. Adley, M.D. and Pediatric Care of Kentucky, P.S.C. Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Lays an evidentiary hearing or in denying their post-verdict motions for a mistrial with respect to the issues of juror impropriety, we affirm.
On June 8, 2001, the Lays filed a medical malpractice action against the appellees, in which they alleged, inter alia, that Dr. Adley was negligent in his care and treatment of their son, Brandon Lay, and that his negligence resulted in Brandon's death.1 The case proceeded to trial and on February 21, 2003, a Kenton County jury returned a 9-3 verdict in favor of the appellees. Following the verdict, the Lays requested the trial court to poll the jury. Each juror subsequently confirmed his or her vote in open court, thereby reaffirming the 9-3 verdict in favor of the appellees. Shortly thereafter, the Lays' attorney, Eric Deters, approached several members of the jury as they exited the courtroom to inquire about the verdict.
On February 27, 2003, the Lays filed a motion for a mistrial based on allegations of juror misconduct. In support of their motion, the Lays submitted affidavits from several members of the jury, namely, Sarah Brady, Ray Davis, John Gilligan, Dan Gaddy, Darren McCulley and Michael Clark.2 In sum, the affidavits cited various instances of alleged misconduct. More specifically, Brady stated that she "did not speak truthfully when polled" and that she "switched [her] vote to the defense . . . to get it over with." Brady further stated that juror Diane Russell informed her during deliberations that she had discussed issues related to the case with her daughter-in-law, who is a nurse. Gilligan stated that he "did not speak truthfully when . . . polled[,]" and he claimed the jurors that supported the appellees "convinced [him] wrongfully . . . to change [his] vote." Gaddy also stated that he "was not speaking truthfully when . . . polled." Davis and Clark both stated, in separate affidavits, that Russell informed the panel during deliberations that she had discussed issues related to the case with her daughter-in-law. Davis and Clark further stated they were under the impression that Russell had spoken with her daughter-in-law during the trial. McCulley stated that he discussed the result of a prior case that involved a medical malpractice claim in which he served as a juror with Beth Averbeck.3 McCulley further stated that he "recall[ed] discussions among several jurors at jury breaks, prior to deliberations, about [a] prior baby death case heard by [the same venire]."4 In addition to the aforementioned allegations of misconduct, the Lays claimed that juror Justin Smith was not a legal resident of Kenton County when the case was tried.5
In response to the Lays' motion for a mistrial, the appellees submitted affidavits from jurors Terry Legg, David Meyer, Russell, Averbeck and Smith.6 In sum, Russell unequivocally denied having discussed the case with her daughter-in-law during the trial and Averbeck, Meyer, Legg and Smith stated that they did not recall Russell ever mentioning that she had discussed the case with her daughter-in-law. Smith further stated that he was a resident of Kenton County.
On March 18, 2003, the Lays filed a motion requesting an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Russell's alleged conversation with her daughter-in-law. On July 7, 2003, the trial court entered an order denying the Lays' motions for a mistrial and evidentiary hearing. The court stated that it was not convinced "[the] parties were denied a fair trial[,]" or that "[t]here was [a] fundamental defect in [the] proceedings that resulted in any manifest injustice." On the same date, the trial court entered a trial order and judgment consistent with the jury's verdict.
On July 15, 2003, the Lays filed a motion for a new trial, a motion to vacate judgment, and a motion for an evidentiary hearing. On August 8, 2003, the trial court entered an order denying the post-judgment motions filed by the Lays. The order reads, in relevant part, as follows:
There is an abundance of information, accusation, innuendo, and name-calling in the various affidavits and pleadings filed of record. The Court concludes that a further evidentiary hearing is not necessary. Moreover, the Court finds no authority or grounds that would permit counsel for Plaintiff to depose a juror about the manner of the jury deliberations. Therefore, the plaintiffs' requests for an evidentiary hearing and to depose juror Diane Russell are DENIED [emphasis omitted].
As in the case of Wells v. St. Elizabeth, decided contemporaneously herewith, the plaintiffs' grounds for new trial in this matter are asserted on various and different shifting theories. The allegations made are directly controverted by other members of the jury panel. The decision of the jury was confirmed by the jury poll in open Court, and no member of the panel at anytime had reported any violation of the Court's admonitions. See Rietze v. Williams, [Ky.,] 458 S.W.2d 613 (1970). This is particularly significant because the foreperson . . . McCulley, was aware of the issues that had been raised in the Wells trial, and, as stated in his affidavit, was particularly cautious during these deliberations. Based upon the totality of these circumstances, the Court concludes that no juror's conduct had any prejudicial effect on the deliberations or verdict. . . . Furthermore, the Court is not convinced that this jury rushed to judgment. The jury deliberated for more than two hours. The jury asked questions, and had them answered. . . . The verdict of this jury was supported by the evidence.
This appeal followed.
The Lays argue on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a mistrial and subsequent motion for an evidentiary hearing. In support of this contention, the Lays cite several instances of alleged juror misconduct, which they claim prejudiced their right to a fair trial. Specifically, the Lays contend that: (1) several jurors switched their vote just to end the trial; (2) Russell and Averbeck discussed the case during their lunch breaks; (3) Russell and Averbeck improperly allowed prejudice to influence their votes; (4) Averbeck interfered with the deliberations of the jury; (5) Russell discussed issues related to the case with her daughter-in-law during the trial; (6) several jurors discussed a prior case heard by the same jury venire, which also involved a medial malpractice claim, during the trial; and (7) Smith was not a "proper member of the jury." In addition to the foregoing allegations of juror misconduct, the Lays claim the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the jury "to review in part or in whole" the video deposition of a witness, Dr. Gary Utz, who testified at trial. We will address the issues raised by the Lays in this appeal in order.
It is well-established that a mistrial should only be granted "if there is a manifest, urgent, or real necessity for such action."7 As the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated in Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc.:8
It is universally agreed that a mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings which will result in a manifest injustice. The occurrence complained of must be of such character and magnitude that a litigant will be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way.9
A trial court's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.10
"It is a long-established and generally accepted doctrine . . . that testimony or affidavits of jurors impeaching a verdict rendered by them will not be received where the facts sought to be shown are such as inhere in the verdict" [footnote omitted].11 That is to say, absent a few limited exceptions, "a verdict cannot be impeached by the affidavit or testimony of a juror."12 As the United States Supreme Court noted in Tanner v. United States:13
There is little doubt that post-verdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it. Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict seriously disrupt the finality of the process. . . . Moreover, full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople would all be undermined by a barrage of post-verdict scrutiny of juror conduct.14
In Doyle v. Marymount Hospital, Inc.,15 this Court acknowledged that prohibiting a juror from impeaching his or her own verdict "may work a hardship when juror misconduct . . . can only be shown...
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