Layman ex rel. Layman v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 18 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV.1:03 CV 6.,CIV.1:03 CV 6.
• Citation: 343 F.Supp.2d 483
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina
• Parties: Virginia LAYMAN, as General Guardian for Ricky C. LAYMAN, Plaintiff, v. Richard T. ALEXANDER, in his Individual and Official Capacity as Sheriff of Haywood County; Jeremy K. Holland, Individually and in his official capacity as an Employee of the Sheriff of Haywood County; Cheryl B. Trull, Individually and in her official capacity as an Employee of the Sheriff of Haywood County; and Redland Insurance Company, Surety for Sheriff Richard T. Alexander, Defendants.

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343 F.Supp.2d 483

Virginia LAYMAN, as General Guardian for Ricky C. LAYMAN, Plaintiff, v. Richard T. ALEXANDER, in his Individual and Official Capacity as Sheriff of Haywood County; Jeremy K. Holland, Individually and in his official capacity as an Employee of the Sheriff of Haywood County; Cheryl B. Trull, Individually and in her official capacity as an Employee of the Sheriff of Haywood County; and Redland Insurance Company, Surety for Sheriff Richard T. Alexander, Defendants.

No. CIV.1:03 CV 6.

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Asheville Division.

November 18, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph P. McGuire, Mary E. Euler, McGuire, Wood & Bissette, P.A., Asheville, NC, for Plaintiff.

Scott D. Maclatchie, Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Charlotte, NC, Leon M. Killian, III, Killian Kersten, Jeffrey W. Norris, Killian, Kersten, Patton & Kirkpatrick, P.A., Waynesville, NC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THORNBURG, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' motions for summary judgment and to bifurcate the trial into liability and damages phases. Responses to these motions have been filed and the matter is ripe for resolution.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

During the early morning hours of February 12, 2000, the Haywood County Sheriff's Department was called to Springhouse Saloon in Maggie Valley, North Carolina, to investigate an altercation between patrons. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ["Plaintiff's Response"], filed June 22, 2004, at 2. Upon arriving, Deputy Sheriff Timothy Fowler arrested Plaintiff Ricky Layman ("Plaintiff") for drunk and disorderly conduct. Id.

Fowler transported Layman to the Haywood County Detention Center ["HCDC"]. Id. Layman was escorted to the booking area on the third floor, where he was searched by Fowler and Deputy Sheriff Brian Sizemore. Id., at 3. Defendants Cheryl Trull and Jeremy Holland, Sheriff's Department Detention Officers, were also present to obtain information from Layman. Id., at 2-3. While searching the front side of Layman, Fowler was headbutted by Layman. Id., at 3. In response to being headbutted, Fowler, and perhaps other officers, threw Layman to the floor; as he was brought to the floor, Layman hit his head on a protruding hinge of the steel door behind him. Id., at 3. Layman was knocked unconscious for about one minute and was observed to be bleeding from behind his left ear. Id., at 3-4. The Officers rolled Layman over to open his airway and called the EMS to the scene. Id. The EMS staff examined Layman and called the Haywood County Emergency Room. Id. Dr. Michael Brown, the ER physician on duty, instructed the EMS staff to advise the detention officers present to watch Layman carefully for signs of abnormal behavior, i.e., dizziness or vomiting, and to bring him to the ER if he exhibited such signs. Id., at 4. Sheriff's Department Lieutenant Jeffrey Haynes was also called to the booking area following the altercation and independently told Holland and Trull to watch Layman closely for abnormal behavior. Id., at 4. Layman was then placed in a cell on the fourth floor of the HCDC. Id.

During the early morning hours of February 12, 2000, Defendant Holland was responsible for the detainees and inmates on the fourth floor, including Layman, while Defendant Trull was responsible for those on the third floor. Id., at 2-3. Holland testified in his deposition that Trull was his supervisor; however, Trull testified they both shared a shift supervisor, Lucretia Ray, who that night was transporting an inmate to Broughton Hospital. Id., at 4-5; Deposition of Jeremy Holland ["Holland Deposition"], attached to Plaintiff's Response, at 17-18; Deposition of Cheryl B. Trull ["Trull Deposition"], attached to Plaintiff's Response, at 11-13, 42.

Around 4:30 AM on February 12, 2000, Holland observed Layman stumbling, cursing, and acting in an abnormal manner. Plaintiff's Response, at 5. Holland told Trull of Layman's condition and she advised Holland to call Dr. Brown in the emergency room. Id. It is undisputed that Holland called Dr. Brown, however, the substance of their conversation is disputed. Holland claims Dr. Brown told him that if Layman was acting abnormally, then he should be brought in to the emergency room. Defendants' Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment ["Defendants' Brief"], filed June 8, 2004, at 6. However, Dr. Brown and his corresponding notes from that night indicate he told Holland to bring Layman in immediately, without qualification. Plaintiff's Response, at 6; Exhibit A, attached to Affidavit of Michael A. Brown, M.D., attached to Plaintiff's Response. Holland's log is also consistent with Dr. Brown's version of the conversation, and reads "Dr. Brown ... said to bring him to emergency room." Plaintiff's Response, supra; Jeremy Holland Jail Log, attached to Defendants' Brief. After his conversation with Dr. Brown, Holland observed that Layman had fallen asleep. Holland Jail Log. Holland communicated the phone call and Layman's condition to Trull and claims the two of them, together, decided to "wait & see" before taking Layman to the emergency room since he had fallen asleep. Id. Trull disputes that there was a joint decision, instead claiming Holland made the decision not to take Layman to the emergency room on his own. Trull Deposition, at 50. Regardless, Layman was left sleeping in his fourth floor cell and was not taken to the ER at that time. Holland Jail Log, supra. Holland testified that he waked Layman up a couple of times after this point; when he did so, Layman was combative, cursing at Holland, and made the statement that he had "called the sheriff" even though he had no access to a phone in his cell. Plaintiff's Response, at 7; Holland Deposition, at 55-56.

William Chambers, a detention officer with the Sheriff's Department, replaced Holland at the end of his shift at 5:45 AM, and was told by Holland that Layman had hit his head and needed to be watched. Plaintiff's Response, supra. Around 11:17 AM, Virginia McNair, the jail's nurse, after hearing Layman snoring, asked Chambers to wake him because she said he did not look right to her. Defendants' Brief, at 6. Though unable to wake him, McNair confirmed Layman's vital signs were good. Id.; Deposition of Virginia Allen McNair ["McNair Deposition"], attached to Plaintiff's Response, at 19. She was called back to Layman's cell by Chambers a few moments later, and observed that Layman had turned blue and was not breathing. Plaintiff's Response, at 9; McNair Deposition, at 23. She performed mouth to mouth resuscitation while Chambers called the EMS staff. Id. Layman was first taken to the Haywood County Regional Medical Center Emergency Room and later to Mission St. Joseph's Hospital in Asheville, North Carolina, where he underwent surgery to remove a blood clot from his brain located behind his left ear. Defendants' Brief, at 7. Layman was in a coma for two weeks. Id. It is undisputed that Layman suffered a severe and permanent brain injury. See id.

Layman, through his guardian Virginia Layman, filed suit against Haywood County Sheriff Alexander; Redland Insurance Company, as the Sheriff's surety; Sheriff's Office Lieutenant Haynes; and Detention Officers Holland, Trull, and Chambers, in their individual and official capacities,¹ alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state law negligence, and a claim pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 162-55. On November 21, 2003, the Court dismissed Layman's § 1983 claims against Alexander and Haynes in their individual capacities, and the negligence and negligent supervision claims against Alexander in his individual capacity. Layman v. Alexander, 294 F.Supp.2d 784, 797 (W.D.N.C.2003). On July 26, 2004, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal of all remaining claims against Haynes and Chambers. Defendants now move for summary judgment on the following claims: the § 1983 claim against all remaining Defendants in their official capacities; the § 1983 claim against Trull in her individual capacity; the negligent failure to obtain medical care claims against Trull, in her individual and official capacities; the negligent supervision claims against Alexander in his official capacity; the N.C. Gen.Stat. § 162-55 claims against all Defendants in their official capacities; the N.C. Gen.Stat. § 162-55 claims against Alexander and Trull in their individual capacities; and all claims against Defendant Redland Insurance Company as surety for Sheriff Alexander.

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment should be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment for the moving party is warranted as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists where there is evidence such that a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id., at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. However, the non-moving party opposing summary judgment "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [her] pleadings," but instead must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir.2003). Unsupported allegations and speculation are not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987); see also, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("One of the primary purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses.").

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

1) Official Capacity Claims versus...