Layman v. Gearhart

• Decision Date: 29 May 1957
• Citation: 132 A.2d 228,389 Pa. 187
• Parties: Roy LAYMAN, a Minor, by Gilbert Layman and Edith Layman, his Wife, Guardians of Said Minor, and Gilbert Layman and Edith Layman, His Wife, in Their Own Right, Appellants, v. George E. GEARHART. Appeal of Roy LAYMAN, a Minor. Appeal of Gilbert LAYMAN and Edith Layman.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 228

132 A.2d 228

389 Pa. 187

Roy LAYMAN, a Minor, by Gilbert Layman and Edith Layman, his Wife, Guardians of Said Minor, and Gilbert Layman and Edith Layman, His Wife, in Their Own Right, Appellants, v. George E. GEARHART Appeal of Roy LAYMAN, a Minor Appeal of Gilbert LAYMAN and Edith Layman.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 29, 1957.

Anthony Cavalcante, Uniontown, for appellants.

Ray, Coldren & Buck, Jos. W. Ray, Jr., David E. Cohen, Uniontown, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO, ARNOLD, BENJAMIN R. JONES and COHEN, JJ.

BENJAMIN R. JONES, J.

These appeals are from the refusal of the court below to take off a nonsuit entered in a trespass action instituted for the recovery of damages for injuries sustained by a minor-pedestrian when struck by an automobile.

At approximately 2 o'clock in the afternoon of December 8, 1951--a clear day--appellee was driving his automobile in an easterly direction on a macadam state highway which runs generally from Connellsville to Melcroft in Fayette County, this state. As this highway passes through the hamlet of Clinton, it is intersected at right angles by another state highway. The intersection is marked with both directional and school zone signs. As the appellee approached this intersection from the west, the minor appellant, Roy Layman, aged 8 years, was observed by two witnesses walking across the grounds of a public school, which school is located on the southerly side of the Connellsville-Melcroft Highway and east of the intersection. They noticed that he was eating something which he held in his hand as he walked along. Just where on the school grounds the boy was walking was not depicted either with exactness or even approximation.

One of the appellants' witnesses testified she saw some children proceeding westerly on the northerly side of the Connellsville-Melcroft Highway east of the intersection, and that appellee's car was coming 'very fast' on the southerly side of said highway, west of the intersection. Another of appellants' witnesses testified that appellee's car was moving 'very rapidly'. Both of these witnesses testified that they heard the squeal of brakes after appellee's automobile had passed the cross road service station * * * located at the southwest corner of the intersection * * * where they were standing, that they saw the automobile running in the ditch on the southerly side of the highway, and that they saw appellee pull the minor child from beneath his car after it stopped with its two right wheels in the ditch and its two left wheels on the highway.

No eye-witness to the accident was called. Appellants sought to establish a prima facie case solely by the testimony of the two witnesses previously mentioned and two additional witnesses, who neither heard nor saw the accident. The appellee presented no evidence.

At the trial it was established that appellee's car had stopped 122 feet east of the intersection and that skid marks ran from the car backward to a point on the highway approximately 25 feet from the intersection.

After the presentation of the above evidence, appellants rested their case on the question of liability and the learned trial judge granted appellee's motion for a compulsory nonsuit on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to submit the question of appellee's liability to the jury. Appellants' motion to take off the nonsuit was denied by the court below and this appeal followed.

Our scope of review upon this type of appeal has often been enunciated by this court. In Szukics v. Ruch, 367 Pa. 646, 649, 81 A.2d 903, 905, we said: 'In passing on a motion to remove a compulsory non-suit and in reviewing a denial of such motion, the evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to plaintiff, and he must be given the benefit of every inference and deduction reasonably to be made therefrom. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. J. Jacob Shannon & Co., 363 Pa. 438, 70 A.2d 321; Kallman v. Triangle Hotel Co. of Pennsylvania, 357 Pa. 39, 52 A.2d 900.' See also Finnin v. Neubert, 378 Pa. 40, 41, 42, 105 A.2d 77.

The principles of law applicable to this kind of case have frequently been enunciated by this court. In Ebersole v. Beistline, 368 Pa. 12, 16, 17, 82 A.2d 11, 12, former Chief Justice Horace Stern stated for this court: '* * * The mere fact that a collision has occurred between two vehicles affords no basis, in the absence of evidence as to the manner of its occurrence, for inferring that one party rather than the other was at fault; in other words, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply. [Citing cases.] * * * The evidence is insufficient to warrant recovery if it fails to describe, picture or visualize what actually happened sufficiently to enable the fact-finding tribunal reasonably to conclude that the defendant was guilty of negligence and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. [Citing Skrutski v. Cochran, 341 Pa. 289, 291, 19 A.2d 106; Martin v. Marateck, 345 Pa. 103, 106, 27 A.2d 42, 44; Balducci v. Cutler, 354 Pa. 436, 439, 47 A.2d 643, 644; Davis v. Moylan, 354 Pa. 508, 509, 510, 47 A.2d 641, 642; Ashby, Adm'r, v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 356 Pa. 610, 612, 52 A.2d 578, 580; Donaldson v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 358 Pa. 33, 36, 55 A.2d 759, 761; Stanalonis, Adm'r, v. Branch Motor Express Co., 358 Pa. 426, 429, 57 A.2d 866, 868.] A verdict cannot be supported on the basis of mere speculation or conjecture. [Citing Purdy v. Hazeltine, 321 Pa. 459, 464, 184 A. 660, 662; Pfendler v. Speer, 323 Pa. 443, 448, 185 A. 618, 620; Stauffer, Adm'r, v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 355 Pa. 24, 25, 47 A.2d 817, 818; Ashby, Adm'r, v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., supra; Stanalonis, Adm'r, v. Branch Motor Express Co., supra.] Proof of negligence may be furnished by the circumstances themselves and it is not essential to have eyewitness testimony, but where the circumstantial evidence is offered because direct proof is not available it must provide as the only reasonable inference the conclusion that the accident was caused by the negligence of the defendant. [Citing cases.] * * *'

Although the Ebersole case involved a collision between two vehicles--an automobile and a bicycle--the same principles are applicable in pedestrian-vehicle accident cases. Cf. Finnin v. Neubert, supra, a case quite similar on its facts and in the questions presented on the present appeal.

Reviewing the present record in the light of these authorities, it is clear that appellants' evidence--considered in the light most favorable to them--was so legally insufficient as to preclude its submission to the jury for a determination of appellee's responsibility for this accident. Appellants failed to establish a prima facie case by their failure to shed any light on the crucial issue of the case, i. e. the physical location of the minor child in relation to the highway at the time he was struck by appellee's automobile. There would be sound reason for sending this case to the jury if it had been shown that the boy was struck while alongside the road, or in the ditch, or even in the road itself if it were also proven that appellee, had he been reasonably...