Lazaridis v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 November 2012
• Docket Number: FSTCV116011100S.
• Court: Superior Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Stavros LAZARIDIS v. PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INS. CO. et al.

Stavros LAZARIDIS v. PROGRESSIVE NORTHERN INS. CO. et al.

No. FSTCV116011100S.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk.

November 7, 2012

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

GENUARIO, J.

FACTS

This case arises out of a two-car accident. Stavros Lazaridis, the plaintiff, has sued Kani Pennant and the Hertz Corporation (Hertz), amongst others. The plaintiff filed a substituted complaint dated April 4, 2012 wherein the plaintiff alleged inter alia, the following. On or about October 30 2009, the plaintiff, while operating a motor vehicle, was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Pennant as a result of Pennant's negligence. The defendant Hertz owned the vehicle driven by Pennant. While operating the vehicle Pennant was an employee, agent or servant of Hertz and acting in the course of his employment or agency.

On May 18, 2012, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to count one. In support of the motion, the defendant submitted (1) a memorandum of law; (2) a copy of an affidavit of Kim Leone, a senior claim examiner for the defendant and (3) a copy of a rental agreement between Hertz and Pennant for the vehicle driven by Pennant during the alleged accident. The plaintiff has filed no memorandum, affidavit or documentation in opposition to the motion. The unopposed motion was heard at the short calendar on September 24, 2012.

DISCUSSION

" Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v. Sweeney, 299 Conn. 196, 210, 9 A.3d 347 (2010). When " there [are] no contradictory affidavits, the court properly [decides] the motion by looking only to the sufficiency of the [movant's] affidavits and other proof." Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 795, 653 A.2d 122 (1995). " The existence of a duty [in a negligence case] is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky, 280 Conn. 190, 217 905 A.2d 1135 (2006).

The defendant asserts the following grounds in support of its motion. First, 49 U.S.C. § 30106(a)^[1] has preempted General Statutes § 14-154a, ^[2] thereby abolishing negligence claims based on vicarious liability against renters of motor vehicles, and, therefore, the defendant's status as a car rental company precludes its liability. Second, § 30106(a) has preempted General Statutes § 52-183, and, furthermore Pennant's capacity was not that of agent, servant or employee, whose actions, under an agency theory, could make the defendant vicariously liable as a principal or an employer. The defendant's grounds are discussed in turn.

I.

On August 10, 2005, Congress enacted § 30106, which expressly preempts state laws, such as § 14-154a, that purport to hold those who rent or lease motor vehicles vicariously liable for harm that arises during a rental or leasing period. See Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Finance Corp., 98 Conn.App. 665, 668 n. 1, 911 A.2d 315 (2006) (" [A]s of August 10, 2005, federal law preempts the state law and abolishes claims for vicarious liability against lease companies. 49 U.S.C. § 30106"). Consistent with the statute, the Connecticut courts have stated three requirements to applying the statute: " The first prong, requiring that the action must have commenced on or after the statute's effective date of August 10, 2005 ... The second requirement ... that the vehicle owner must be engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles ... The third and final requirement ... that there can be no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the vehicle owner." Steinfeld v. Lipman, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. CV 08 5009730 (July 30, 2008, Bellis, J.) (granting summary judgment and noting " Connecticut courts have routinely granted motions filed by defendants based on § 30106 where the conditions have been met").

The documentation and affidavits filed by Hertz readily satisfy the first two elements of the Steinfeld test. With regard to the third element, Hertz contends that the plaintiff's allegations in count one sound in negligence based solely on vicarious liability, that is, that no negligent acts of the defendant are alleged. The court observes that paragraph 11(I) of the first count contains an allegation that the vehicle " was not equipped with brakes adequate to bring it to a controlled stop" and that " the brakes were not in good working order." However, the operative allegation in paragraph 11(I) is that the defendant " operated" the vehicle while it was in that condition. Only the defendant Pennant operated the vehicle, and, accordingly, the...