LCEOC, Inc. v. Greer
| Decision Date | 23 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 45A03-9710-CV-356,45A03-9710-CV-356 |
| Citation | 699 N.E.2d 763 |
| Parties | LCEOC, INC., and Greater Hammond Community Services, Inc., Appellants-Defendants, v. Patricia S. GREER, Administratrix of the Estate Of Freddie Greer, Deceased, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Defendants-Appellants Lake County Economic Opportunity Council ("LCEOC"), Greater Hammond Community Services, Inc. ("GHCS") and Bruce Lewis appeal from the denial of their motion for summary judgment following the complaint filed by Patricia Greer, Administratrix of the Estate of Freddie Greer, Deceased ("Greer").
We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
This case presents the following issue: Whether community action agencies created under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 are entitled to immunity from liability under the Indiana Tort Claims Act ("the ITCA"), Ind.Code 34-4-16.5-1 et seq.
This interlocutory appeal arises from a civil action for personal injury and wrongful death brought by Greer's estate against LCEOC, GHCS and GHCS's employee following an accident which resulted in Greer's death.
LCEOC is a private not-for-profit corporation that provides an array of social services to disadvantaged individuals and families in the six counties of Northwest Indiana. In order to fulfill its mandate of providing services to the citizens of such a large geographic region, LCEOC divided its service region into ten separate areas. LCEOC then designated a non-profit "community service corporation" for each of these ten areas. LCEOC contracts with its various community service corporations to carry out its mission of providing family services. LCEOC formed GHCS as the community service corporation to implement its policies in the cities of Hammond, Whiting, Munster, Highland and Northern Dyer. 1
On May 3, 1994, Greer used the transportation services provided through GHCS. Bruce Lewis, the driver employed by GHCS, transported Greer to his doctor's appointment without incident. On the return trip however, Lewis lost his balance and dropped Greer while he was strapped into his wheelchair. In April of 1996, the Estate filed a wrongful death action and an alternative survival action against the Defendants. The Defendants denied all material allegations in their answer and raised several affirmative defenses including failure to comply with the notice requirements of the ITCA.
In February of 1997, the Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment alleging that LCEOC and GHCS were governmental entities under the ITCA, and Greer's cause of action was therefore barred for failure to comply with the notice requirements under the ITCA. The Estate filed its response challenging both organizations' immunity status. Following a hearing, the trial court denied summary judgment finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether LCEOC and GHCS were entitled to the protection of the ITCA. This interlocutory appeal followed. 2
The purpose of summary judgment is to end litigation about which no factual dispute exists and which may be determined as a matter of law. Luider v. Skaggs, 693 N.E.2d 593, 595 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court, and we resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party. Ebbinghouse v. FirstFleet, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 644, 646 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the designated evidentiary matter shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind.Trial Rule 56(C).
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment because the Estate failed to comply with the notice provisions of the ITCA. Specifically, Defendants contend that LCEOC is a "community action agency" and thus a "political subdivision" pursuant to the ITCA. Compliance with the ITCA is a procedural precedent which the Estate must prove and which the trial court must determine prior to trial. Brunton v. Porter Memorial Hosp. Ambulance Service, 647 N.E.2d 636, 639 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). Thus, compliance with the ITCA is not a question of fact for the jury but rather a legal determination to be made by the court. Lake County Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429, 437 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), reh'g denied, trans. denied.
As this court has previously stated, the clear legislative intent of the ITCA is to set up a uniform body of law to govern the prosecution of tort claims against the State and other governmental entities. Hasty v. Floyd Memorial Hosp., 612 N.E.2d 119, 121 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Indiana Code 34-4-16.5-7 mandates that claims against "political subdivisions" are barred unless notice of the claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision and the Indiana political subdivision risk management commission within 180 days after the loss occurs. 3
As defined by Ind.Code 34-4-16.5-2(c), a "governmental entity" is the state or a political subdivision of the state. Indiana Code 34-4-16.5-20 provides in pertinent part that "community action agencies" as defined in Ind.Code 12-14-23-2 "shall be treated as political subdivisions." Ind.Code 12-14-23-2 defines community action agency as follows:
As used in this chapter, 'community action agency' means an entity that meets the following conditions:
(1) Is any of the following:
(A) A political subdivision of the state.
(B) A combination of political subdivisions.
(C) An agency of a political subdivision.
(D) A private nonprofit agency.
(2) Has the authority under state or federal law to receive money and support the community action programs described in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter.
(3) Is designated as a community action agency by the governor or by federal law.
In support of its status as a community action agency, LCEOC designated a letter from former Governor Evan Bayh recognizing the organization as the "Community Action Agency" for Jasper, Lake, Newton and Porter counties. 4 Additionally, Defendants designated the deposition testimony of Clifton Johnson, LCEOC's Vice-President of Administration. Johnson testified that LCEOC was a community action agency pursuant to statute. LCEOC also designated a pamphlet entitled "LCEOC, Inc.1965 to 1990: Celebrating 25 Years of Excellence." (R. 497). The first paragraph of this LCEOC literature explains the organization's formation as follows:
LCEOC was established as a Community Action Agency by the Lake County Board of Commissioners in February, 1965. Community Action Agencies were created to implement the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Community Action Agencies, or "CAP's" as they were called, were the flagship of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs.
(R. 498).
In denying summary judgment, the trial court stated that the Governor's letter did not "appear to be an official designation" in that it was not a public record nor was it certified under State seal. With regard to the LCEOC's private literature, the court opined that labeling itself as a community action agency did not equate with an official designation by the Governor. Hence, the trial court found that genuine issues of material fact remained on the issue of LCEOC's status under the ITCA. We disagree. While the trial court's findings illuminate its rationale, we do not rely upon such findings on appeal. Mapleturn Utilities, Inc. v. Foxcliff South Associates, Inc., 673 N.E.2d 5, 10 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Rather than relying upon the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court, we base our decision solely upon the properly designated evidence. Id.
Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was passed to "stimulate a better focusing of all available local, State, private, and Federal resources upon the goal of enabling low-income families, and low-income individuals ... to become fully self-sufficient." Specifically, the Economic Opportunity Act "provides for community action agencies and programs, prescribes the structure and describes the functions of community action agencies and authorizes financial assistance to community action programs and related projects and activities." 42 U.S.C. § 2781(a). Under the statute, a community action agency is a "State or political subdivision of a State ... or a public or private nonprofit agency or organization which has been designated by a State or such a political subdivision ..." and which is "capable of planning, conducting, administering and evaluating a community action program ..." 42 U.S.C. 2790(a). A community action program "includes or is designed to include ... a range of services and activities having a measurable and potentially major impact on causes of poverty in the community ..." Id.
LCEOC's Corporate History indicates that LCEOC is a private, not-for-profit corporation chartered by the State of Indiana in February of 1965. Indeed, LCEOC owes its beginnings to the Lake County Board of Commissioners. Article II of LCEOC's By-Laws detail the purposes and objectives of the corporation as follows:
To stimulate a better focusing of all available Federal, State, local and private resources in such localities as in the opinion of the Board shall effectuate the purposes of the Corporation upon the goal of enabling low-income and disadvantaged families and individuals ... to attain the skills knowledge, and motivations and secure the opportunity needed for them to become fully self-sufficient ...
(R. 191). We note that this language mirrors the language of ...
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