Lake County Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 64A03-9512-CV-396

• Decision Date: 16 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. 64A03-9512-CV-396,64A03-9512-CV-396
• Citation: 671 N.E.2d 429
• Parties: -Defendants, v. John SWANSON, Individually; Debra Swanson, Individually; John Swanson and Debra Swanson as next friend of Michael Swanson, Appellees-Plaintiffs. Court of Appeals of Indiana
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 429

671 N.E.2d 429

LAKE COUNTY JUVENILE COURT, and Darlene Wanda Mears, Lake County Council, Lake County Board of Commissioners, Edward Smith and Paul Mathews, Appellants-Defendants, v. John SWANSON, Individually; Debra Swanson, Individually John Swanson and Debra Swanson as next friend of Michael Swanson, Appellees-Plaintiffs.

No. 64A03-9512-CV-396.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Sept. 16, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 24, 1996.

Gerald M. Bishop and Cheryl A. Kuechenberg, Greco Pera Bishop & Vernia, Merrillville, for Lake County Council.

James B. Meyer, Meyer, Lyles & Godshalk, Gary, for Lake County & Lake County Board of Commissioners.

Pamela Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Kelly J. Whiteman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Robert M. Schwerd, Hilbrich, Cunningham & Schwerd, Highland, for Edward Smith and Paul Matthews.

Brian J. Hurley, Douglas, Alexa, Koeppen & Hurley, Valparaiso, Ivan Bodensteiner, Valparaiso, for Appellee.

OPINION

STATON, Judge.

Lake County Council, Lake County Juvenile Court, Darlene Wanda Mears, Lake County, Lake County Board of Commissioners, Edward Smith and Paul Matthews (collectively "Defendants") bring this interlocutory appeal from the denial of their motions for summary judgment. In this appeal, there are two issues we must address, which we restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants' motions for summary judgment on Swanson's § 1983 claim.

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants' motions for summary judgment regarding Swanson's state tort claims.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The facts most favorable to the nonmovants, John, Debra and Michael Swanson (collectively "Swanson"), reveal that on September 6, 1992, then seventeen year-old Michael, was arrested and taken into custody by the Lake County Sheriff for driving without a valid driver's license. Michael was transported to the Lake County Juvenile Detention Center where he had to await a pre-trial hearing the next business morning. He was assigned to a room with three other inmates. The room had a video camera which allowed detention officers to monitor the room from a control booth. While in the room, Michael was attacked by one of his cellmates and anally raped. On January 20, 1993, Swanson filed a state court complaint, which was amended two times thereafter. The third amended complaint alleged that each defendant was negligent and that each defendant violated Michael's substantive due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After several Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that there were genuine issues of material fact with reference to all remaining defendants. ¹ This appeal ensued.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidentiary matter designated by the parties shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Ramon v. Glenroy Construction Co., Inc., 609 N.E.2d 1123, 1127 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied. The burden is on the moving party to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once the movant has sustained this burden, the opponent must respond by setting forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial; he may not simply rest on the allegations of his pleadings. Stephenson v. Ledbetter, 596 N.E.2d 1369, 1371 (Ind.1992). At the time of filing the motion or response, a party shall designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion. T.R. 56(C). The movant bears the burden of establishing the propriety of summary judgment, and all facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant. Ramon, supra.

I. Section 1983 Claims

Collectively, the Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motions for summary judgment on Swanson's § 1983 claim. Section 1983 of Title 42 provides a civil remedy against any person who, under color of state law, subjects a citizen of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

First, the Lake County Juvenile Court contends that it is not a person within § 1983. Section 1983 does not provide a remedy against states, state entities or state officials sued in their official capacities. These parties are not considered "persons" under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). County courts in Indiana are exclusively units of the judicial branch of the state's constitutional system; therefore, the juvenile court is a state entity. IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1 and art. 7, § 1; Woods v. Michigan City, Ind., 940 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir.1991). Thus, the juvenile court is not a "person" for purposes of § 1983. The trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment in favor of the juvenile court on Swanson's § 1983 claim.

Second, Darlene Wanda Mears ("Mears"), former judge of the Lake County Juvenile Court, contends she was entitled to summary judgment under § 1983. As a preliminary matter, we must address whether Mears has been sued in her official capacity or in her personal capacity. Swanson alleges that Mears was sued in her individual capacity. An officer sued in her personal capacity comes to the court as an individual unlike an official capacity defendant. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 361-62, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991); Crawford v. City of Muncie, 655 N.E.2d 614, 620 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. A government official sued in her personal capacity fits within the § 1983 statutory term "person." Id.

We must look to the language of Swanson's complaint to determine whether Mears was sued in her personal capacity. One indicia of the capacity in which a government agent has been sued under § 1983 is the language of the caption of the case. Crawford, supra, at 620 (citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986)). Another indicia is the allegations and language used in the body of the complaint. Id. (citing Meadows v. Indiana, 854 F.2d 1068, 1069 (7th Cir.1988)). If a plaintiff seeks to sue public officials in their personal capacities or in both their personal and official capacities, the plaintiff should expressly state so in the complaint. Id. We also note that courts ordinarily assume that an official is sued only in her official capacity when a plaintiff alleges that a state official acted under the color of state law giving rise to liability under § 1983. Crawford, supra (citing Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1373 (7th Cir.1991), reh. denied ).

The caption of Swanson's third amended complaint references Mears as "Darlene Wanda Mears." Record at 257. However, that same caption references another defendant as "Robert Bennett as superintendent of the Juvenile Detention Center and Individually." Id. Thus, Swanson clearly appreciated the difference between official and personal capacity lawsuits. Swanson failed to specify the capacity in which Mears is being sued; therefore, the complaint will be construed as suing Mears only in her official capacity. See Yeksigian v. Nappi, 900 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir.1990).

Furthermore, the language of the complaint supports that Mears is being sued in her official capacity. Paragraph two of the complaint states, "Darlene Wanda Mears was the sitting Juvenile Court Judge at the times mentioned herein." Record at 258. In addition, paragraph seven of the complaint states in pertinent part:

Furthermore, as the employers and masters of the individual defendants and the staff of the Juvenile Detention Center, the Juvenile Court, Darlene Wanda Mears [,] the Juvenile Detention Center and the Lake County Council and Lake County Commissioners were responsible for the negligence and or acts or omissions of the juvenile detention staff and is, [sic] therefore, liable to Plaintiffs.

Record at 260 (emphases added). In that paragraph, Mears was grouped with the other defendants being sued in their official capacities which further indicates that Swanson intended to sue her only in her official capacity. Accordingly, we conclude that Mears was sued in her official capacity only.

Mears argues that because she was sued in her official capacity she is not a "person" for purposes of Swanson's § 1983 claim. We agree. State officials sued for damages in their official capacities are not "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 because they assume the identity of the government that employs them. Hafer, supra, at 25, 112 S.Ct. at 361-62. In Hafer, the United States Supreme Court held that it is only when a state official is sued in her individual capacity that can she be a "person" within the meaning of § 1983. Id. at 31, 112 S.Ct. at 364-65. We have concluded that Mears is being sued only in her official capacity, judge of the juvenile court. Judges of county courts are judicial officers of the state judicial system and are not county officials. Woods, supra, at 279. Accordingly, any suit against Mears in her official capacity is a suit against a state entity and cannot be maintained under § 1983. Thus, Mears is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Swanson's § 1983 claim.

Third, Edward Smith ("Smith") and Paul Matthews ("Matthews"), detention officers at the Lake County Juvenile Detention Center, argue that they were entitled to summary judgment on Swanson's § 1983 claim because they are entitled to judicial immunity. They argue that as employees of the detention center, they are entitled to immunity through the judge because they are an "arm of the court." Appellants' Br. at 10-11. ²

The United States...