Lea v. Lea
| Decision Date | 27 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 24S01-9711-CV-627,24S01-9711-CV-627 |
| Citation | 691 N.E.2d 1214 |
| Parties | James Charles LEA, Appellant (Petitioner below), v. Melody Ann LEA, Appellee (Respondent below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
The Court of Appeals reversed a trial court order requiring a father to pay child support for his mentally retarded adult daughter. We granted transfer and vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals. We now affirm the trial court.
James and Melody Lea, parents of Wesley and Tara, were divorced in 1980. Mother was awarded custody of the two children. From the time of the divorce, Father made child support payments in the amount of $60 per week. In 1996, Father filed a petition to modify the divorce decree and requested the court to determine that their two children, both over the age of 21, were emancipated.
Under our child support statute, a parent's child support obligation terminates when a child is emancipated or reaches age 21, except in certain circumstances. See Ind.Code § 31-16-6-6(a) (Supp.1997). 1 One of those circumstances--central to this case--is where the child is incapacitated. See Ind.Code § 31-16-6-6(a)(2).
The trial court found that one child, Wesley, was emancipated. As to the other child, Tara, the trial court determined that she was incapacitated due to mental retardation and anxiety attacks. There is evidence of record that Tara was born in 1971, that her I.Q. has been measured as 62 and 64, and that Mother is required to manage Tara's money, manage many of her personal care needs, and provide her with transportation.
Father did not and does not contest the trial court's finding that Tara is incapacitated. However, Father does contend that because Tara earns approximately $144 per week working in a fast food restaurant, he should be relieved of any child support obligation. The trial court declined to relieve Father of any child support obligation in this regard. Instead, the trial court applied this court's Child Support Guidelines, calculating the weekly support obligation for the child based on the income of Mother, Father, and Tara. The trial court then apportioned the support based upon the relative amount earned by Mother, Father, and Tara, and determined that Father should pay 60% of the weekly obligation or $75.00 per week.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Lea v. Lea, 681 N.E.2d 1154 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). Relying on a dissenting opinion in another Court of Appeals case, the Court of Appeals rejected the methodology used by the trial court here. Id. at 1156 (citing In re Marriage of Tearman, 617 N.E.2d 974, 978-79 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (Robertson, J., dissenting)). Instead, the Court of Appeals prescribed an alternate methodology "to be employed in computing an adult child support order under the present circumstances." Id. at 1157. Applying this methodology, the Court of Appeals found that Father had no child support obligation. Id.
Section 6(a) of our statute governing child support orders provides:
The duty to support a child under this chapter ceases when the child becomes twenty-one (21) years of age unless any of the following conditions occurs:
(1) The child is emancipated before becoming twenty-one (21) years of age. In this case the child support, except for the educational needs outlined in section 2(a)(1) of this chapter, terminates at the time of emancipation, although an order for educational needs may continue in effect until further order of the court.
(2) The child is incapacitated. In this case the child support continues during the incapacity or until further order of the court.
(3) The child: (A) is at least eighteen (18) years of age; (B) has not attended a secondary or post-secondary school for the prior four (4) months and is not enrolled in a secondary or postsecondary school; and (C) is or is capable of supporting himself through employment. In this case the child support terminates upon the court's finding that the conditions prescribed in this subdivision exist. However, if the court finds that the conditions set forth in clauses (A) through (C) are met but that the child is only partially supporting himself or capable of only partially supporting himself, the court may order that support be modified instead of terminated.
The preface to this section sets forth the general rule that a child support obligation terminates when the child reaches the age of 21, subject to the conditions set forth in the three following subdivisions. Subdivision (1) provides that the obligation (except for certain educational needs) may terminate before the child's 21st birthday if the child is emancipated. Subdivision (2) provides that the obligation may continue beyond the child's 21st birthday if the child is incapacitated. And Subdivision (3) provides that the obligation may terminate before the child's 21st birthday if the child is at least 18 and not in school and the child is or is capable of supporting himself or herself through employment.
Clearly subdivision (2) applies in this case. The trial court made an unchallenged finding that Tara is "incapacitated" within the meaning of the statute. As such, Father's and Mother's duties to support her "continue[ ] during the incapacity or until further order of the court." Ind.Code § 31-16-6-6(a)(2); Free v. Free, 581 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ind.Ct.App.1991).
Father points us to the language in subdivision (3) to support his contention that he should be relieved of his support obligation. His argument appears to be that since "child support terminates upon the court's finding that the conditions" set forth in subdivision (3) exist and that those conditions do exist in Tara's case (she is at least age 18 and not in school and is or is capable of supporting herself through employment), the trial court erred in not terminating support.
We reject this argument for several reasons. First, the trial court did not find that the conditions prescribed in subdivision (3) existed; instead, it found that the condition prescribed in subdivision (2) existed--incapacity. As such, the legislature has prescribed that "child support continues during the incapacity or until further order of the court." See Free, 581 N.E.2d at 998 ().
Second, to the extent that Father claims that the trial court erred in not finding the conditions prescribed in subdivision (3) to exist, our review of the record convinces us that the trial court might well have concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that Tara was or was capable of fully supporting herself through employment. Under subdivision (3), Father would have had the burden of proving that Tara could sustain herself completely through employment. 2 In re Marriage of Tearman, 617 N.E.2d at 977; Brancheau v. Weddle, 555 N.E.2d 1315, 1318 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). Tara earned only approximately $144 per week and was eligible for Medicaid. In addition, as discussed under Background, supra, Tara is mentally retarded and requires assistance in managing her money, managing many of her personal care needs, and providing her with transportation.
We agree with the trial court that, by operation of Ind.Code § 31-16-6-6(a)(2), Father and Mother have a continuing duty to support Tara.
While Father and Mother have a continuing duty to support Tara, Father challenges the amount awarded. He contends--and the Court of Appeals agreed--that given the amount of Tara's income, his support obligation should have been reduced to zero.
We place a "strong emphasis on trial court discretion in determining child support obligations" and regularly acknowledge "the principle that child support modifications will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Stultz v. Stultz, 659 N.E.2d 125, 128 (Ind.1995) (citing Kinsey v. Kinsey, 640 N.E.2d 42, 44 (Ind.1994)). See In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind.1993); Humphrey v. Woods, 583 N.E.2d 133, 134 (Ind.1991). The Indiana Child Support Guidelines aid in the determination of the amount of child support that should be awarded and provide a measure for calculating each parent's share of the child support. There is a "rebuttable presumption that the amount of the award which would result from the application of the Indiana Child Support Guidelines is the correct amount of child support to be awarded." Ind. Child Support Rule 2 (1997). 3
As discussed under Background, supra, the trial court employed the following methodology in computing Father's child support obligation here. First, the trial court applied this court's Child Support Guidelines, calculating the weekly support obligation for the child based on the income of Mother, Father, and Tara. See generally Child Supp.G. 3(A)-(E). The trial court then apportioned the support based upon the relative amount earned by Mother, Father, and Tara, and determined that Father should pay 60% of the weekly obligation or $75.00 per week. See Child Supp.G. 3(F).
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