Carpenter v. Carpenter

Decision Date31 July 2008
Docket NumberNo. 48A04-0801-CV-1.,48A04-0801-CV-1.
Citation891 N.E.2d 587
CourtIndiana Appellate Court
PartiesMichael CARPENTER, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Shawna CARPENTER, Appellee-Respondent.
OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Case Summary and Issues

Michael Carpenter ("Father") appeals from the trial court's order on his petitions for modification of child custody and child support; and for emancipation of child and for child support.1 Father raises four issues, which we restate as: 1) whether the trial court's finding that Father's son, B.C., was only partially capable of supporting himself was clearly erroneous; 2) whether the trial court improperly declined to order that Father be reimbursed for overpayment of a child support arrearage; 3) whether the trial court improperly modified the initial decree by allowing his former wife to claim two tax exemptions previously used by him; and 4) whether the trial court improperly determined the amount of weekly child support owed by Father. Concluding the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that B.C. is only partially capable of supporting himself, we reverse and remand. We also conclude that the trial court's findings do not support the re-assignment of the tax exemptions, and instruct the trial court to reconsider its determination after addressing the factors set out in the Child Support Guidelines. Finally, we direct the trial court to make findings of fact regarding Father's overpayment, and to issue new findings regarding this issue. Because we are remanding for a new order, we need not address the fourth issue.

Facts and Procedural History

Father and Shawna Carpenter ("Mother") were married in 1987 and had four children. On January 6, 2004, the trial court entered a decree of dissolution and approved the parties' settlement agreement. Under this agreement, Mother was to have custody of the children, and Father was to pay child support in the amount of $345 per week plus an additional $25 per week towards a $6,000 arrearage. Pursuant to the agreement and the trial court's order, these payments were made through wage assignment. The agreement indicated that Mother would assign the four tax exemptions for the children to Father.

On May 13, 2004, the Madison County Prosecuting Attorney intervened to collect child support, and notified the Secretary of the Treasury of Father's child support arrearage so that Father's federal tax refunds could be withheld to pay the arrearage. On February 9, 2006, the trial court issued an order indicating that Father's arrearage had been paid in full. Father then took action to reduce the amount withheld from his wages so that he was no longer paying the $25 per week. As discussed in more detail below, due to either the tax intercept or Father's wage withholdings, Father ultimately overpaid his arrearage by $2,693.

On April 18, 2007, Father filed a Verified Motion for Modification of Child Custody and Child Support, and a Verified Motion for Emancipation of Child and for Modification of Child Support. Although Father has failed to include copies of these motions in his appendix, it is apparent that Father requested that the trial court grant him custody of one child, who had moved out of Mother's residence and in with Father; terminate his child support obligation with regard to B.C., his oldest son; and credit Father for the overpayment on his arrearage. At the hearing on Father's motions, Mother requested that the trial court allow her to retain two of the tax exemptions.

On November 13, 2007, the trial court entered an order along with findings and conclusions. In this order, the trial court concluded that B.C. was partially emancipated, declined to give Father credit for overpayment of his arrearage, ordered Mother to sign a waiver of one tax exemption and allowed her to retain two tax exemptions,2 and reduced Father's weekly child support obligation to $269.76. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review

Indiana places a "strong emphasis on trial court discretion in determining child support obligations." Brown v. Brown, 849 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ind.2006) (quoting Stultz v. Stultz, 659 N.E.2d 125, 128 (Ind.1995)). We will not reverse a trial court's decision regarding the modification of a child support order unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. On appeal, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. See Butrum v. Roman, 803 N.E.2d 1139, 1146 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), reh'g denied, 806 N.E.2d 66 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. We will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence favorable to the judgment. Bales v. Bales, 801 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind. Ct.App.2004), trans. denied.

We also note that in this case, the trial court entered findings and conclusions at a party's request. Accordingly, "we are not at liberty simply to determine whether the facts and circumstances contained in the record support the judgment." McGinley-Ellis v. Ellis, 638 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (Ind.1994). Instead, our standard of review is two-tiered: we will determine whether evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Dedek v. Dedek, 851 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). We "shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous." Ind. Trial Rule 52(A); see Dunson v. Dunson, 769 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind.2002). We will conclude a finding is clearly erroneous "when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Dedek, 851 N.E.2d at 1050. We will conclude the trial court's "judgment is `clearly erroneous only if (i) its findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law or (ii) its conclusions of law do not support its judgment.'" Dunson, 769 N.E.2d at 1123 (quoting Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind.1996)). Although we defer to a trial court's ability to find the facts, "we do not defer to conclusions of law, and a judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard." Dedek, 851 N.E.2d at 1050.

We note that in this case, the trial court adopted, verbatim, Mother's findings and conclusions.3 Although wholesale adoption is not prohibited, we do not encourage trial courts to engage in this practice. See In re Marriage of Nickels, 834 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). We have recognized that "this practice weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court." Safety Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Cinergy Corp., 829 N.E.2d 986, 993 n. 6 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. Our confidence is particularly eroded in cases such as this, where the resolution depends "less on the credibility of witnesses than on the inferences to be drawn from the facts and the legal effect of essentially unchallenged testimony." Village Commons, LLC v. Marion County Prosecutor's Office, 882 N.E.2d 210, 218 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (quoting Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708-09 (Ind. 2001)). Although we do not apply an altered standard of review when a trial court adopts a party's findings verbatim, "near verbatim reproductions may appropriately justify cautious appellate scrutiny." Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 762 (Ind. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 830, 124 S.Ct. 69, 157 L.Ed.2d 56 (2003).

II. Termination of Support Obligation

Indiana parents have a common law duty to support their children. Bales, 801 N.E.2d at 198. The obligation to pay child support usually continues until the child's twenty-first birthday. Lea v. Lea, 691 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (Ind.1998). However, under Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6:

(a) The duty to support a child under this chapter ceases when the child becomes twenty-one (21) years of age unless any of the following conditions occurs:

* * *

(3) The child:

(A) is at least eighteen (18) years of age;

(B) has not attended a secondary or postsecondary educational institution for the prior four (4) months and is not in enrolled in a secondary or postsecondary educational institution; and

(C) is or is capable of supporting himself or herself through employment. In this case the child support terminates upon the court's finding that the conditions prescribed in this subdivision exist. However, if the court finds that the conditions set forth in clauses (A) through (C) are met but that the child is only partially supporting or is capable of only partially supporting himself or herself, the court may order that support be modified instead of terminated.

Here, it is undisputed that subsections (A) and (B) are satisfied. The only issue is whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that "[B.C.] is not able to fully support himself without the aid of his parents and has no present ability to bear the full brunt of all the obligations which come with full emancipation." Appellant's App. at 11 (trial court finding of fact 14).

We first pause to clarify the apparent misconception held by Mother and the trial court. Subsection (a)(3) does not deal with the "emancipation" of a child; it merely identifies circumstances under which our legislature has determined a parent's obligation to pay child support should terminate. Whether a child is "emancipated" is an entirely separate inquiry. See Borders v. Noel, 800 N.E.2d 586, 591 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (recognizing that subsection (a)(3) is an "alternative basis" to emancipation for terminating child support); Marshall v. Marshall, 601 N.E.2d 9, 12 n. 2 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (recognizing that what is now subsection (a)(3)4 "does not define emancipation"); Brancheau v. Weddle, 555 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing that because the father argues his support obligation should cease under what is now section (a)(3), "we have no occasion to consider whether [the child] was `emancipated' as the term is used in [what is now section (a)(1) ]"). That is, if the conditions of subs...

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