Lea v. White
| Decision Date | 30 September 1856 |
| Citation | 36 Tenn. 73 |
| Parties | MARY C. LEA v. JAMES M. WHITE. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
FROM GRAINGER.
This was a proceeding by writ of habeas corpus, issued upon the petition of the plaintiff, and returned before Judge Hynds, at the December term, 1854, of the circuit court of Grainger county, to recover the custody of two apprentices alleged to have been abducted by the defendant from the possession of the plaintiff. Upon motion, his honor quashed the proceedings; from which judgment the petitioner appealed in error to this court.
Peck and Meek, for the plaintiff; Heiskell and J. R. Cocke, for the defendant.
On the 27th of November, 1854, the plaintiff exhibited her petition to the circuit judge, alleging that the defendant unlawfully detained from her two free girls of color, who had been bound as apprentices to her by the county court of Grainger, and prayed for a writ of habeas corpus. This writ was granted, returnable to the circuit court of Grainger county, and at the return term, on motion of the defendant, the writ of habeas corpus was quashed by the court, and the plaintiff has appealed in error to this court.
Is a habeas corpus an available remedy to restore to the master his apprentice, when illegally detained from him? We think not. This question was directly in judgment before the court of King's bench in the case of The King v. Edwards, 7 Durnf & E., 745. The facts were that one Gabriel, an apprentice, having entered into the sea-service and received the bounty-money, the master moved for a habeas corpus to bring him up, in order that he might be restored to him. The court held, upon a rule to show cause why the writ should not be quashed, that though the apprentice might obtain the writ, the master could not: that its object was the protection of the liberty of the party. That the master was not without his remedy, for that he might have his action against those who detained his apprentice, knowing him to be an apprentice. The King v. Reynolds, 6 Durnf. & E., 497, is to the same effect.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus was not to enable persons to assert a right to property, or to the services of another, but to protect the liberty of the subject. An action on the case for seducing the apprentice from the master's service, instead of a habeas corpus, would have been a proper remedy.
It has also been repeatedly held by this court that from the decision of a...
To continue reading
Request your trial