Leach v. Page
| Decision Date | 19 May 1937 |
| Docket Number | 596. |
| Citation | 191 S.E. 349,211 N.C. 622 |
| Parties | LEACH et al. v. PAGE et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Moore County; Clayton Moore, Special Judge.
Action by Mrs. Ralph Leach and others against J. R. Page individually, and as administrator and trustee of the estate of Ralph Leach, deceased, and others. From a judgment sustaining demurrers and dismissing the action as to J. R Page, administrator, Gurney P. Hood, Commissioner of Banks and S. J. Hinsdale, Liquidating Agent in charge of the Page Trust Company, on ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action as to them, and that there was a misjoinder of parties and of causes of action, the plaintiffs appeal.
Reversed.
The good faith of administrator who was sued by heirs for recovery of funds could not be raised by demurrer.
A complaint relating a connected series of events and relationships growing out of same transaction or connected with the same subject of action is not demurrable for misjoinder of causes of action.
Defendant J. R. Page, administrator, and Gurney P. Hood, Commissioner of Banks, and S. J. Hinsdale, Liquidating Agent, in charge of Page Trust Company, filed separate demurrers on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as to them, and that there was a misjoinder of parties and causes of action.
From judgment sustaining the demurrers on both grounds and dismissing the action as to the demurring defendants plaintiffs appealed.
Douglass & Douglass and R. L. McMillan, all of Raleigh, for appellants.
U. L. Spence and W. D. Sabiston, Jr., both of Carthage, for appellee.
The appeal presents for review the ruling of the court below in sustaining the demurrers of certain defendants and dismissing the action as to them.
This requires an examination of the complaint, particularly with reference to the objections pointed out by the demurrers, in order to determine its sufficiency. This must be done in accord with the uniform rule that for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning and determining the effect of a pleading its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties (C.S. § 535), and that every reasonable intendment and presumption be made in favor of the pleader. Blackmore v. Winders, 144 N.C. 212, 56 S.E. 874.
The allegations of the complaint may be briefly summarized as follows: That the plaintiffs are the widow and children of Ralph Leach, deceased, and sole distributees of his estate, and the demurring defendant J. R. Page is the duly appointed and qualified administrator and trustee of the estate of Ralph Leach, deceased, and has been acting as such since 1918, and the Page Trust Company (now represented by the demurring defendants, Gurney P. Hood, Commissioner of Banks, and S. J. Hinsdale, Liquidating Agent) is the surety on the bond of J. R. Page; that in 1926, J. R. Page, administrator and trustee, invested $15,000, the funds of said estate, in or through the partnership styled Page & Co., of which J. R. Page was and is a member, defendant J. R. Page stating the investment would be in bonds, and that plaintiffs could get their money whenever desired; that interest was paid from time to time and $1,200 on the principal, until December 1, 1932, when payments ceased; that Page & Co., by letter, advised plaintiffs that the balance of $13,800 was invested in mortgage bonds on real estate, and that "Page & Co. agree that they are responsible for the investment of this amount of money"; that thereafter when plaintiffs complained to J. R. Page of their failure to receive payments, he told them to see Ralph Page, the secretary and treasurer of the partnership of Page & Co., and get their interest, and that Ralph Page executed for and on behalf of Page & Co. a series of promissory notes to the plaintiffs in the aggregate sum of $13,800, said notes being signed Page & Co. by Ralph Page; that plaintiffs have demanded payment of J. R. Page, administrator, Page & Co., Page Trust Company, Page Brothers, and the other defendants, and each of the defendants has failed and refused to pay or account.
The plaintiffs further allege that J. R. Page, administrator and trustee, reported to the clerk of the superior court that the fund was invested in certain bonds, and that J. R. Page now says he does not know anything about the bonds or whether there were any such bonds.
The plaintiffs further allege, in paragraph 11 of the complaint, that Page & Co. and Page Brothers were and are subsidiaries of Page Trust Company, and "that Page Trust Co., or its Liquidating Agent, now holds certain assets and securities of Page & Co. and Page Brothers, which assets and securities the plaintiffs say (are) held by Page Trust Co., surety for J. R. Page, administrator and trustee, for the benefit of the plaintiffs (and) are in equity owing to the plaintiffs, and should be applied to the payment of said investment and indebtedness."
1. It is apparent that the complaint relates a connected series of events and relationships, growing out of the same transaction or connected with the same subject of action, and that the demurrer for misjoinder of parties and causes of action cannot be sustained. Lee v. Thornton, 171 N.C. 209, 88 S.E. 232; Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Peirce, 195 N.C. 717, 143 S.E. 524; Cotten v. Laurel Park Estates, 195 N.C. 848, 141 S.E. 339; Shuford v. Yarborough, 197 N.C. 150, 147 S.E. 824; Shaffer v. Bank, 201 N.C. 415, 160 S.E. 481. "Where a general right is claimed arising out of a series of transactions tending to one end, the plaintiff may join several causes of action against defendants who have distinct and separate interests, in order to a conclusion of the whole matter in one suit." Young v. Young, 81 N.C. 91, 92.
2. The defendant J. R. Page, administrator, demurring on the ground that, as to him, the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, specifies as the ground of his objection "that it appears on the face of the complaint that if as a matter of fact J. R. Page as administrator was at any time liable to the plaintiffs upon his official bond with respect to notes, bonds, and other evidences of indebtedness declared upon in the complaint, such liability has been discharged and waived as against J. R. Page in his capacity as administrator by the acceptance of the obligation and liability of Page & Co. as evidenced by the letter and promissory notes of Page & Co. set out in the complaint."
The above-quoted portion of this defendant's pleading seems to go beyond the true office of a demurrer, in that it sets out deductions from the facts alleged in the complaint which do not necessarily follow. The fact that Page & Co. executed and delivered...
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