Leach v. Vose

Decision Date23 January 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-25-A,96-25-A
PartiesDouglas LEACH et al., v. George VOSE, Director, Department of Corrections. ppeal.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

BOURCIER, Justice.

This matter comes before us on the appeals of both the inmate-applicants and the director of the Department of Corrections (department) from the partial granting of their respective cross-motions for summary judgment in the Superior Court.

I Facts and Travel

Douglas Leach (Leach) is the lead plaintiff for a group of some one hundred plus inmates who had applied for post-conviction relief in the Superior Court. 1 The common basis for their applications is the contention that the computation of good time and industrial time credits by the department, pursuant to G.L.1956 § 42-56-24, is in violation of constitutional and statutory provisions. A year after the applications for post-conviction relief were filed, both the department and the inmate-applicants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On January 2, 1996, the Superior Court trial justice rendered a bench decision on those cross-motions for summary judgment.

In his decision, the trial justice held that the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), G.L.1956 chapter 35 of title 42, was inapplicable to the department's adoption of a method for calculating good time and industrial time credits. The trial justice then determined that the correct method of calculation for good time and industrial time credits required the inmates to earn, and therefore to be awarded, credits on a month-to-month basis and not "upfront" at the beginning of an inmate's sentence, as asserted by the inmate-applicants. Additionally, the trial justice concluded that when an inmate commits an infraction of prison regulations, he or she should, pursuant to § 42-56-24(c), lose one day of good time already accumulated for each day that the prisoner is shut up or otherwise disciplined for bad conduct. The trial justice believed, however, that the inmate should not be prevented from accumulating good time credits for the month in which the infraction occurred because prevention of that accumulation would be in contravention to § 42-56-24(c) and would result in what the trial justice referred to as a "so-called double whammy."

The trial justice finally held that no ex post facto violation resulted from the change in the department's method of calculating an inmate's good time and industrial time credits. He did hold, however, that the inmate-applicants had a liberty interest in the accrual and loss of good time credits that required, pursuant to due process principles, notification

"on the anniversary of the time the sentence commenced, and at such other reasonable times as the prisoner may request, or the prisoner's representative, such as an attorney, then the ACI is under an obligation, it would seem, to tell the prisoner how much time he or she has accumulated by way of good time and industrial time and how much of that time has been lost because of disciplinary infractions as of the time the request is made."

II

Award of Good Time and Industrial Time Credits

The inmate-applicants first challenge the trial justice's determination regarding the proper method for awarding good time and industrial time credits. We note, as an initial matter, that when the trial justice made his determination that good time credits be awarded on a monthly basis and not upfront at the beginning of an inmate's sentence, as asserted by the inmate-applicants, he did not then have the benefit of our detailed opinion in Barber v. Vose, 682 A.2d 908 (R.I.1996). In that opinion, we explained that the specific language in § 42-56-24 required that no good time or industrial time credits be awarded prior to "an inmate's monthly compliance with and obedience to prison rules and regulations." Id. at 912. Even without our guidance in Barber, however, the trial justice nonetheless came to the same conclusion as did this Court. Accordingly, the trial justice's decision as to the month-to-month award of good time and industrial time credits was correct.

III

Administrative Procedures Act

The trial justice's conclusion that the APA was not applicable to the department's adoption of a method for calculating good time and industrial time credits was also correct. In delineating the procedure agencies must follow when adopting agency rules the APA specifically excludes from its mandate "statements concerning only the internal management of an agency and not affecting private rights or procedures available to the public." G.L.1956 § 42-35-1(h). The computation method through which good time and industrial time credits are awarded is clearly a matter of internal management and, thus, is not subject to the requirements of the APA.

The amount of good time and industrial time credits an inmate can receive and the requirements that must be met before receiving those credits are both specifically prescribed by § 42-56-24, as we discussed in detail in Barber, supra. The actual method of computation of those credits is left to the discretion of the department. That calculation method, however, does not affect the number of days an inmate can receive as good time or industrial time credits since that number is already fixed in § 42-56-24. For each inmate whose sentence is for more than six months' imprisonment and not for life, an inmate is entitled to receive one day per month, for each year of the inmate's sentence, not to exceed ten days per month. Furthermore, the statute's method of calculation does not affect the conditions that must be complied with before the inmate becomes eligible to receive those credits, such as compliance with the rules and requirements of the institution. Additionally, the method of calculation does not affect the procedure for receiving the credits, which, as we explained in Barber, requires both the recommendation of the assistant director of institutions/operations and the consent of the director of the Department of Corrections or his or her designee. Barber, 682 A.2d at 912-15; see also § 42-56-24. Thus, the method of calculation chosen by the department, in its discretion, only affects the manner in which the department accomplishes the task of granting good time credits, as those credits are delineated in § 42-56-24. That calculation method is, therefore, purely a matter of internal management and is not subject to the requirements of the APA.

IV

"Double Whammy"

According to the trial justice's decision, an inmate who is disciplined for bad conduct must deduct from his or her previously earned good time credits the amount of time during which he or she was actually disciplined, pursuant to § 42-56-24(c), but he or she can still earn good time credits for that month if he or she acts, with the exception of the punished bad behavior, in accordance with the rules and requirements of the prison. That conclusion is erroneous.

Section 42-56-24(c), which requires that "[f]or every day a prisoner shall be shut up or otherwise disciplined for bad conduct * * * there shall be deducted one day from the time he or she shall have gained for good conduct," must be read in conjunction with § 42-56-24(a), which only permits the award of good time credits for months in which the inmate "appears by the record to have faithfully observed all the rules and requirements of the institutions and not to have been subjected to discipline." In accordance with that clear and unambiguous language in § 42-56-24(a), an inmate cannot receive good time credits for any month during which he or she is "subjected to discipline." Additionally, § 42-56-24(c) requires that one day be deducted from already accumulated good time credits for each day of discipline for bad conduct. Thus, in addition to not accruing good time credits for the month in which the inmate was disciplined, the inmate must also deduct from his or her already accumulated good time credits the number of days during which the inmate was subjected to discipline. That does not amount to a "double whammy," as asserted by the inmate-applicants, because, as we stated in Barber, "so-called good time credit for good behavior while incarcerated is not a constitutional guarantee * * * but is instead an act of grace created by state legislation that may provide therein for the manner in which good time credits may be granted for compliance with, or revoked for violations of, prison rules and regulations." Barber, 682 A.2d at 914 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951 (1974); Tuitt v. Fair, 822 F.2d 166, 180 (1st Cir.1987)).

The Legislature in § 45-56-24 clearly intended that an inmate would not be entitled to good time credits for a month in which he or she has been disciplined for bad conduct. The Legislature also deemed it necessary to provide for additional deterrent penalties to discourage inmate violation of prison rules and requirements, and in response to that need, it enacted subsection (c) of § 42-56-24. That subsection mandates that, in addition to not permitting an errant inmate to accumulate good time credits for a month in which the inmate exhibits bad conduct, the inmate, in addition, loses one day of already earned good time credits for each day the inmate is disciplined, to be deducted from the inmate's earlier accumulation of monthly credits. The clear and unambiguous language of § 42-56-24 precludes any other logical reading of the statute. Accordingly, the trial justice's interpretation of § 42-56-24 is erroneous, and the department's appeal on the so-called double whammy issue is therefore sustained.

V Ex Post Facto Clause 2

The trial justice was correct in his determination that the ex post facto clause has no application to the inmate-applicants' claims....

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