Leacox v. Griffith

• Decision Date: 29 October 1888
• Citation: 40 N.W. 109,76 Iowa 89
• Parties: LEACOX v. GRIFFITH.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

76 Iowa 89

40 N.W. 109

LEACOX

v.GRIFFITH.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 29, 1888.

Appeal from district court, Fremont county; GEORGE CARSON, Judge.

This is a controversy between Merton Leacox and John X. Griffith, administrator of Thomas Leacox, deceased, growing out of the settlement of the estate of Thomas Leacox. The plaintiff is a son and heir of the deceased, and the defendant is the administrator of the estate. The administrator filed his report, and the plaintiff filed exceptions thereto. An issue was made up between the parties, and the cause was referred to a referee, who found the facts and conclusions of law, and reported in favor of the plaintiff. Exceptions were taken to the report by the defendant. The exceptions were overruled, and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff in conformity with the report of the referee. Defendant appeals.James McCabe, for appellant.

C. S. Keenan, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, J., ( after stating the facts as above.)

1. No exception was taken to the facts found by the referee. His report is set out at length in the abstract. It is not necessary to set it out in detail here. The material facts are, in substance, as follows. In September, 1881, Thomas Leacox, the father of the plaintiff, was killed in a railroad accident, through the negligence of the railroad company operating the road upon which he was traveling as a passenger. The defendant was appointed administrator of his estate, and in that capacity he collected $3,000 damages from the railroad company. The deceased left no will, and no other property, and the plaintiff was entitled to a distributive share of the money collected by the defendant. The plaintiff was born on the 16th day of December, 1864, and became of age on the 16th day of December, 1885. In June, 1881, the plaintiff purchased a threshing-machine, and gave his promissory notes therefor. The defendant signed said notes as surety for the plaintiff, and, to indemnify the defendant for becoming surety on the notes, the plaintiff executed to defendant a chattel mortgage upon the machine and other property, in the usual and proper form. In the fall of 1882, without the knowledge or consent of the defendant, the plaintiff sold the machine, the mortgage being wholly unsatisfied, and the machine at that time being worth about $500. The defendant learned of the sale of the machine about a month afterwards, but at no time gave his consent to the sale, nor ratified the same. When the notes given for the machine became due, the defendant was compelled to pay the same in full, the amount paid by him being more than $700. About a year after the defendant paid the machine notes, as administrator, and as an individual, he had a settlement with the plaintiff. At that time defendant had $500 in his hands as the distributive share of the plaintiff in the estate. It was then agreed between the parties “fairly, honestly, and free from fraud, and with full knowledge and understanding of all the parties, that the plaintiff should receipt to the defendant for said five hundred dollars without receiving any money, and that the defendant should release all claims he held against the plaintiff by reason of having paid the machine notes;” and in pursuance of said agreement the plaintiff gave to the defendant a written receipt in which he acknowledged the receipt of $500 as his share in his father's estate; and the plaintiff then and there gave his distributive share in the estate to the defendant, and the same was accepted by defendant in settlement and satisfaction of said suretyship obligation, so far as plaintiff could act as a minor. At the time of the settlement the plaintiff had part of the proceeds of the sale of the machine in his possession. This settlement was made, and the receipt executed, July 27, 1883. Thirty-two days after the plaintiff became 21 years of age he served a written notice on the defendant, of which the following is a copy: “ To John X. Griffith: You are hereby notified that on the 16th day of December, 1885, the undersigned attained his majority, and that he now disaffirms a contract made and entered into with you during the year 1881, consisting of a note for $665, with a chattel mortgage, to secure the same, on a threshing machine, having been executed by him while he was a minor. He further states that he is unable to make any restitution of any money or property acquired by him under or by virtue of said contract for the reason that he has not owned or held possession of the same or any part thereof since attaining his majority aforesaid. He also disaffirms any and all other contracts, of every nature and kind, made and entered into with you prior to said December 16, 1885, on the ground of his minorship aforesaid. Witness my hand at Shenandoah, Iowa, this 18th day of January, 1886. MERTON S. LEACOX.” At the time of the settlement between the parties there had been no tender of said machine, or of the proceeds of the sale of said machine, nor of the part of the proceeds of said machine, to the defendant nor to the machine company; and at the time of serving the above notlce, and at all times thereafter, the plaintiff had no part of the proceeds received by him for said machine. The defendant at all times knew the age of the plaintiff. Upon these facts the referee and the court held that the settlement and release of the defendant were invalid, and of no force, and that the defendant must pay the $500 to the plaintiff. The correctness of this holding is the question presented for determination by this appeal.

It is provided by section 2238 of the Code that “a minor is bound, not only by contracts for necessaries, but also by his other contracts, unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable time after he attains his majority, and restores to the other party all money or property received by him by virtue of the contract, and remaining within his control at any time after attaining his majority.” This statute was doubtless enacted for the purpose of more clearly defining the rights and obligations of infants, growing out of their contracts other than for necessaries. By the terms of the statute the infant is bound by his...