Leaf River Forest Products, Inc. v. Deakle

• Decision Date: 14 September 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92-CA-00792-SCT,92-CA-00792-SCT
• Citation: 661 So.2d 188
• Parties: LEAF RIVER FOREST PRODUCTS, INC., Leaf River Corporation; Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation; Georgia-Pacific Corporation; Warren Richardson; Acker Smith; Perry County, Mississippi v. William Dory DEAKLE, et al.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 188

661 So.2d 188

LEAF RIVER FOREST PRODUCTS, INC., Leaf River Corporation;

Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation;

Georgia-Pacific Corporation; Warren

Richardson; Acker Smith;

Perry County, Mississippi v. William Dory DEAKLE, et al.

No. 92-CA-00792-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 14, 1995.

W. Joel Blass, Gillespie & Blessey, Biloxi, Frank D. Montague Jr., Montague Pittman & Varnado, Hattiesburg, Paul D. Walley, Richton, Gene Partain, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA; Kevin Buster, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA; for appellant.

Erik M. Lowrey, Hattiesburg, for appellee.

Before PRATHER, P.J., and PITTMAN and McRAE, JJ.

PRATHER, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellants Leaf River Forest Products, Inc., Leaf River Corporation, Great Northern Nekoosa Corporation, Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Warren Richardson, Acker Smith, and Perry County Mississippi (hereinafter referred to as "LRFP"), who are alleged tortfeasors and defendants in various dioxin suits in several Mississippi courts, sought equitable relief from these numerous suits in the Perry County Chancery Court via a bill of peace. The bill of peace, an ancient procedural vehicle in equity, named not only the plaintiffs (hereinafter "dioxin plaintiffs"), who were suing LRFP in the original dioxin litigation, but the dioxin plaintiffs' respective attorneys of record. The relief sought by way of the bill of peace was case management for the dioxin litigation and injunction of further prosecution of these cases except before the Perry County Chancery Court.

The dioxin plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss the bill of peace, which were granted by the chancellor. There were three different groups of attorneys representing the thousands of dioxin plaintiffs in the dioxin litigation. For convenience in this discussion, we are designating them as the "Deakle Group," the "Pritchard Group," and the "Ingram Group." The Deakle Group, Appellees here, subsequently moved for the imposition of sanctions against LRFP for filing the bill of peace. The chancellor found the bill of peace was frivolous as it applied to the dioxin plaintiffs' attorneys named as parties and imposed sanctions in the amount of $7,387.56 and costs to cover mailing of notices regarding the outcome of the bill of peace to each of the Deakle Group's clients. LRFP has appealed to this Court, seeking review of only one issue:

A. Whether, on this record, sanctions against the Appellants

were justified.

This opinion addresses the continued vitality of the ancient bill of peace as well as the propriety of the bill of peace on the instant facts and sanctions pursuant to M.R.C.P. 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellants LRFP, with the exception of Perry County, were defendants in various dioxin lawsuits in several Mississippi courts, involving thousands of plaintiffs. These cases were based upon claims for damages in regard to the alleged pollution of the Leaf River. Perry County subsequently intervened as a defendant in the dioxin litigation, with the authority of the Perry County Board of Supervisors. ¹ The "Deakle Group" of attorneys represented certain dioxin plaintiffs before the Jackson County Circuit Court, which plaintiffs demanded jury trials. The "Pritchard Group" of attorneys represented certain dioxin plaintiffs before the Jackson County Chancery Court. The "Ingram Group" of attorneys represented certain dioxin plaintiffs before the Perry County Chancery Court.

In an attempt to enjoin the multiplicity of suits, LRFP (the dioxin defendants including Perry County), filed a bill of peace in the Perry County Chancery Court against the more than 7000 dioxin plaintiffs. LRFP joined as defendants in the bill of peace the attorneys for the thousands of dioxin plaintiffs. Process was served only on the dioxin plaintiffs' attorneys. The bill of peace requested that the Perry County Chancery Court take jurisdiction of all the above mentioned dioxin litigation. The relief prayed for in the bill of peace included injunction of further prosecution of the dioxin cases except before the Perry County Chancery Court and case management for the dioxin litigation. LRFP also prayed that process issue in accordance with the provisions of M.R.C.P. 4(b) and that the court make such orders regarding service as would be appropriate in light of the vast numbers of dioxin plaintiffs/defendants to the bill of peace. ²

The Pritchard Group filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for a More Definite Statement or in the Alternative a Motion to Strike. The Deakle Group filed a 12(b) Motion to Dismiss. LRFP amended its complaint for a bill of peace, again serving only the dioxin plaintiffs' attorneys. LRFP's amendment to its bill of peace did not seek any additional relief, but cited further examples of the lack of case management synchronization in the dioxin litigation.

The Perry County chancellors recused themselves and requested that this Court appoint a special chancellor. The Honorable Robert H. Oswald was appointed to hear the complaint for a bill of peace. Judge Oswald dismissed the complaint for a bill of peace on the Pritchard and Deakle Groups' motions, which cases were filed in Jackson County Circuit and Chancery Courts. Subsequently, the Deakle Group moved that sanctions be imposed upon LRFP. At the hearing on this motion, it was argued that while LRFP requested an injunction in its bill of peace, had such an injunction been granted it could only have been enforced as against those parties who were served with the bill of peace, i.e., the dioxin plaintiffs' attorneys. The Deakle Group further argued that the Perry County Chancery Court had no jurisdiction over the thousands of dioxin plaintiffs named as defendants in the bill of peace other than the Deakle Group's clients. The Deakle Group also claimed that Perry County's Board of Supervisors had not authorized the County to act as a plaintiff in this bill of peace. In sum, the Deakle Group contended that by serving only the dioxin plaintiffs' attorneys in the bill of peace, LRFP had violated M.R.C.P. 11 and Miss.Code Ann. § 11-55-7, particularly subsections (g) and (i).

LRFP responded that it had not sought with its bill of peace a consolidation of all cases but a consolidation of the cases in one forum, the coordination of discovery and trial scheduling, and the appointment of a master to determine certain preliminary matters. LRFP further argued that the bill of peace was filed only after comprehensive research and analysis and that there was a good faith belief in the grounds supporting the claims and the relief sought. Moreover, LRFP had hopes of success in the case. LRFP also noted that the bill of peace asked for a temporary hearing to determine the issue of service on the mass numbers of dioxin plaintiffs/defendants to the bill of peace. In response, the Deakle Group stated that had the dioxin plaintiffs' attorneys not been named as parties, no sanctions would have been sought against LRFP.

Perry County argued that it was properly a plaintiff in the bill of peace because that action was part of the evolution of the original dioxin litigation proceedings rather than a wholly new action.

At the close of the hearing, the judge found that Mississippi had a need for a sensible method to deal with the problems presented by massive tort cases, but that suing the attorneys representing the plaintiffs was not the answer. In the bench ruling, the court noted that the bill of peace requested that the court hear and resolve the service problem. The judge awarded the Deakle Group attorney fees in the amount of $7,387.56 and costs in a sum to cover the cost of mailing notices regarding the outcome of the bill of peace to each of the Deakle Group's clients. Finally, in response to a question by counsel, the judge stated that he found the filing of the complaint for the bill of peace was frivolous as to the dioxin plaintiffs' attorneys. LRFP's Motion to Reconsider was denied. Aggrieved, LRFP appealed to this Court.

III. THE LAW

A. Whether, on this record, sanctions against the Appellants

were justified.

1. Bill of Peace

A bill of peace is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "[o]ne which is filed when a person has a right which may be controverted by various persons, at different times, and by different actions." Black's Law Dictionary 151 (5th ed. 1979). "The object of a bill of peace is to obtain the protection of equity against the necessity for maintaining or defending numerous actions at common law in order to protect the interests of the parties, where claims of more than one party on at least one side were involved." Henry J. McClintock, McClintock on Equity § 176, at 480 (2d ed. 1948).

Bills of peace are not ordinarily allowed in cases where many claims of personal or property damage have been made against a single negligent act of the defendant because the determination of a common question would not relieve the necessity of numerous actions at law and because the right to a jury trial is considered of paramount importance to such plaintiffs. McClintock on Equity § 178, at 486-87. However, in cases where "extreme hardship" would result to the defendant, such as where the defendant is subject to numerous suits in differing counties, some of which may be given the same or overlapping trial dates, all of which arise from the same act of negligence, the court should provide relief if any can be given. Id. at 487-88.

a. Does it Still Exist?

While there is no case law in our state addressing this precise point, State Oil & Gas Bd. v. McGowan, 542 So.2d 244, 248-49 (Miss.1989), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 604 So.2d 312 (Miss.1992), provides some guidance. In McGowan, the Board argued that the ancient bill of discovery had not survived the adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure; this Court disagreed. The Court stated that although the procedural names...