League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell

Decision Date10 February 2006
Docket NumberNo. 3:05CV7309.,3:05CV7309.
Citation432 F.Supp.2d 734
PartiesLEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OHIO, et al., Plaintiffs v. J. Kenneth BLACKWELL, Secretary of State of Ohio, and Bob Taft, Governor of Ohio, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

Brian D. Greer, Courtney E. Smothers, David E. Kouba, Kevin M. Green, Michael R. Geske, Shelby H. Hunt, Anne P. Davis, Bruce L. Montgomery, James P. Joseph, John A. Freedman, Arnold & Porter, Washington, DC, Benjamin J. Blustein, Jon M. Greenbaum, Jonah H. Goldman, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, Deborah Liu, Elliott M. Mincberg, People for the American Way Foundation, Washington, DC, Evan S. Greene, Bert H. Deixler, Bertrand C. Sellier, Brian H. Schusterman, Caroline S. Press, Jennifer R. Scullion, Proskauer Rose, New York, NY, Jeffery A. Gross, Proskauer Rose, Los Angeles, CA, Jason A. Hill, Steven P. Collier, Connelly, Jackson & Collier, Toledo, OH, Brenda Wright, National Voting Rights Institute, Boston, MA, Robert Rubin, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Damian W. Sikora, Office of the Attorney General State of Ohio, Columbus, OH, Rene L. Rimelspach, Christopher D. Betts, Office of the Attorney General, Richard N. Coglianese, Office of the Attorney General Constitutional Offices Section, Columbus, OH, Richard M. Kerger, Kerger & Associates, Toledo, OH, Linette M. Stratford, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Youngstown, OH, Ryan A. Zerby, Bailey Law Offices, Kenton, OH, Stephen K. Haller, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Xenia, OH, Gary' Leo Lammers, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Ottawa, OH, Daivia S. Kasper, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Norwalk, OH, Nicholas M. Barborak, Barborak Law Offices, Lisbon, OH, Jennifer S.M. Croskey, Marion, OH, Jennifer E. Redman, Ravenna, OH, John F. Manley, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Akron, OH, Patricia A. Nocero, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Painesville, OH, Gerald A. Innes, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Elyria, OH, James B. Vanzant, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Eaton, OH, James F. Stevenson, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Sidney, OH, Jennifer L. Springer, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Mount Vernon, OH, Daniel G. Padden, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Cambridge, OH, Andrew P. Pickering, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Springfield, OH, Rhonda L. Greenwood, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Cadiz, OH, Richard M. Howell, Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Greenville, OH, David M. Henry, Dungan & Lefevre, Troy, MI, for Defendants.

ORDER

CARR, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs League of Women Voters, et al. (LWV) brought this action against defendants J. Kenneth Blackwell, Secretary of State of Ohio, and Bob Taft, Governor of Ohio, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. LWV alleges Secretary Blackwell and Governor Taft administer a voting process which systematically impairs Ohio citizens' voting rights. Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Pending is defendants' motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity. For the reasons that follow, that motion shall be denied.

Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed this case July 28, 2005. Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss in which they did not raise a sovereign immunity defense. That motion was granted in part and denied in part, with plaintiffs' constitutional claims surviving defendants' dismissal request. (Doc. 201).

While that motion was pending, defendants filed a motion seeking leave to file a supplemental motion to dismiss. The gravamen of the supplemental motion to dismiss was that the complaint, as filed, sought prospective relief specifically and solely for the November, 2005, election. Such relief being moot after that election was held, defendants stated that they wanted to seek dismissal on the grounds of sovereign immunity. (Doc. 186).

During a telephone conference on November 21, 2005, shortly after the filing of the defendants' motion for leave to file their supplemental motion to dismiss, plaintiffs stated that their desired relief was not limited to the November, 2005, election, but related to future elections. They acknowledged that oversight on their part caused the complaint's prayer for relief not to have been as expansive as they desired.1

During the November 21st telephone conference, the defendants acknowledged that an amended complaint seeking prospective relief as to future elections would resolve the issue raised in their motion for leave to file a supplemental motion to dismiss. They reserved the right, however, to seek dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds once an amended complaint was filed.

I orally granted leave during the conference to the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to state their demand for prospective relief. I also overruled without prejudice the defendants' motion for leave to file a supplemental motion to dismiss.

During the November 21st conference, I had notified the parties that I shortly would be filing a decision with regard to the then pending motion to dismiss, and that I expected to grant the motion in part and deny it in part, so that plaintiffs' constitutional claims would remain pending. That decision was filed on December 2, 2006. (Doc. 201).2

Defendants filed the pending motion to dismiss on December 7, 2005. In it, in addition to seeking dismissal of the amended complaint [though it seeks only prospective injunctive relief] on the ground of sovereign immunity, defendants restate the arguments overruled in the order of December 2, 2005.

Discussion
A. The December 2, 2005, Order Governs This Case

In their motion, defendants raise arguments I considered in their initial motion to dismiss. They contend that because plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, the original complaint is moot, Klyce v. Ramirez, 852 F.2d 568, 1988 WL 74155 (6th Cir.1988). They argue, therefore, this court's December 2nd Order is also moot.

That argument misstates the law. An order denying a motion to dismiss with respect to an original complaint remains in force. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 36 F.Supp.2d 787, 789 (W.D.Mich.1998). Consequently, a motion to dismiss an amended complaint is no more than a motion for reconsideration to the extent it simply restates arguments already considered and rejected with respect to the original complaint. Id.

Reconsideration is only appropriate: "1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; 2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or 3) to correct a clear error of law or to prevent a manifest injustice." Sherwood v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 290 F.Supp.2d 856, 858 (N.D.Ohio 2003). "A party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden." Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F.Supp. 644, 669 (N.D.Ohio 1995).

Defendants have not met this burden. Put simply, they cite no intervening authority, new evidence, or indication of a clear error of law demanding a contrary result with respect to the issues of whether: 1) plaintiffs stated cognizable constitutional claims; 2) Secretary Blackwell and Governor Taft are proper parties; and 3) the organizational plaintiffs have standing. Thus, defendants' motion, which is deemed a motion to reconsider, with respect to these issues shall be denied.

Further, even if defendants' motion need not be considered a motion for reconsideration, it must still be denied because the December 2, 2005, Order remains the law of the case. Under that doctrine, the decision of this court at one stage of the case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation. U.S. v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir.1990) (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988)). The doctrine's purpose is to prevent continued litigation of settled issues. Id.

A court may depart from the law of the case doctrine only in limited circumstances: "where there is substantially different evidence raised on subsequent trial; a subsequent contrary view of the law by the controlling authority; or a clearly erroneous decision which would work a manifest injustice." U.S. v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1421 (6th Cir.1994) (citations and internal quotations omitted). This standard is nearly identical to the one governing motions for reconsideration. See p. 2-3, supra. Because defendants' arguments fail as a motion for reconsideration, they similarly fail to dislodge the December 2nd Order as the law of the case.

B. Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Plaintiffs' Claims

States are generally immune from suits brought by their own citizens in federal court. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)). That immunity does not, however, extend to claims brought against state officials in their official capacity alleging an ongoing failure to comply with federal law and seeking only prospective relief. Verizon v. Public Serv. Commn., 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852, 860 (6th Cir. 2002). To determine whether sovereign immunity applies, a court conducts only a "straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753 (internal quotations omitted).

Defendants argue plaintiffs do not allege any ongoing violation of federal law. In particular, Secretary Blackwell and Governor Taft contend LWV alleges only garden variety election problems that even if true, are...

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