Leahy v. Board of Trustees of Community College Dist. No. 508, County of Cook, State of Ill.
| Decision Date | 17 October 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-1471,D,AFL-CI,89-1471 |
| Citation | 912 F.2d 917 |
| Parties | 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2507, 17 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1402, 62 Ed. Law Rep. 861 William J. LEAHY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT NO. 508, COUNTY OF COOK, STATE OF ILLINOIS, and Cook County College Teachers' Union Local 1600, AFT,efendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
J. Paige Clousson, Lawrence J. Springer, Clousson & Associates, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
George F. Galland, Jr., Mark Kende, Davis, Miner, Barnhill & Galland, Robert Eygenhuysen, City Colleges of Chicago, Lawrence A. Poltrock, Gregory N. Freerksen, James M. Pietz, Witwer, Burlage, Poltrock & Giampietro, Chicago, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Before FLAUM and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. *
Plaintiff, William Leahy, is employed as a professor of English by the defendant City Colleges of Chicago. 1 Although Leahy is not a member of the defendant Cook County Teachers' Union (hereinafter "the Union"), he is considered a member of the bargaining unit, and is covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Union and City Colleges. The Union is the exclusive representative of the teachers at City Colleges.
In accordance with Article IX(A)(1)(a) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Union and City Colleges, tenured faculty members may be granted sabbatical leave "for a period not to exceed one academic year and not less than one semester for resident study, research and writing, travel, or other purposes designed to improve the services of the faculty member to the Colleges." As a tenured professor, Leahy was entitled to, and did receive, a sabbatical leave with pay. 2 He chose, however, to use part of his sabbatical leave to participate in a protest against City Colleges regarding proposed changes in certain seniority rights. Having used part of his sabbatical for nonacademic purposes, Leahy demanded that City Colleges extend his sabbatical with pay to make up the lost time. City Colleges denied Leahy's request.
Leahy thereafter asserted his rights under the Collective Bargaining Agreement to file a grievance against City Colleges. Having unsuccessfully pursued his own grievance through the first two levels of the grievance procedure, Leahy sought the Union's assistance in submitting his grievance to arbitration. The Union declined Leahy's invitation. Undaunted by the Union's response, Leahy attempted to submit his grievance to arbitration on his own behalf.
On November 23, 1987, City Colleges' Chancellor Salvatore Rotella, notified Leahy that under Article X(B)(3) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement only the Union could submit a grievance for arbitration. 3 Noting that the Union had refused Leahy's request for arbitration, the Chancellor concluded that under the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Leahy was prohibited from personally arbitrating his grievance. Leahy thereafter filed suit against both the Union and City Colleges.
Leahy's original complaint purported to present a claim under Sec. 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185. The Union moved to dismiss on the ground that the Act did not apply to public employers. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 152(2). Leahy voluntarily withdrew the complaint and filed a first amended complaint which generally mirrored the first, but alleged a violation of Leahy's civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 rather than a Sec. 301 violation. The first amended complaint also alleged a violation of state law, although it did not specify which state law. In response to the Union's second motion to dismiss, which was premised, among other things, on Leahy's failure to plead "state action" in support of his Sec. 1983 claim, Leahy filed a second amended complaint. If the defendants and district court were puzzled by Leahy's first two efforts to plead a cognizable cause of action, his third effort did nothing to alleviate their bewilderment.
In Count I of the second amended complaint, Leahy alleges a violation by both the Union and City Colleges of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 contending that the defendants conspired to deprive him of "his rights to free speech, equal treatment and contract under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution" when City Colleges denied his request for an extended paid sabbatical, and refused to let him personally arbitrate his grievance, and when the Union refused to take his grievance to arbitration. Leahy contends that the defendants discriminated against him because of his past political associations and his tendency to publicly express his political views.
In an attempt to establish the requisite "state action," Leahy contended that both the Union and City Colleges were established under the laws of the State of Illinois; that City Colleges delegated its "discretionary authority over conditions of employment" to the Union as evidenced by the Collective Bargaining Agreement; and that City Colleges' refusal to arbitrate Leahy's grievance was tied to the Union's decision not to carry the grievance to arbitration on Leahy's behalf. Leahy concluded, based on these "facts," that the defendants were involved in a conspiracy to deprive him of fair representation, and that such conduct constituted state action.
Count II of the second amended complaint contained Leahy's modified pendent state claims, in which he alleged a violation by the Union of its duty of fair representation under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA), Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 48, para. 1701 et seq., and a breach of contract on the part of City Colleges relating to its refusal to extend the sabbatical leave or to arbitrate his grievance.
The Union's response to Leahy's third attempt to state a cause of action was simply to renew its motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6). By order dated August 4, 1988, the district court granted the Union's motion to dismiss with prejudice, holding that the second amended complaint, like the first, failed to allege the requisite "state action" on the part of the Union, and that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction was inappropriate because Leahy failed to exhaust his admimistrative remedies in accordance with Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 48, para. 1715. 4
On January 30, 1989, the district court issued a second memorandum opinion granting City College's motion to dismiss with prejudice. 5 The district court held that Leahy's Fourteenth Amendment "contract claim" lacked merit because there was no "contract clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;" that Leahy's First Amendment and equal protection claims failed to implicate a constitutional injury of sufficient magnitude to justify judicial intrusion into an academic decision such as the granting of a sabbatical; and that Leahy had failed to plead a due process violation in his complaint. The court also found Leahy's allegations of a conspiracy between the Union and City Colleges to be inadequate as no facts were stated, and neither agreement nor overt acts were pled. As a final note the district court held that City Colleges would escape liability in any event under the rule of Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), as Leahy had failed to allege any policy or custom which proximately caused his injury, to identify who denied him full use of his sabbatical rights, or to demonstrate that that individual possessed final authority to establish policy.
Having dismissed the federal claim, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state claims, without making any determination of the sufficiency of those claims.
On March 6, 1989, Leahy filed a notice of appeal from the district court's final order of dismissal. At the time Leahy filed his notice of appeal, the Union's Rule 11 motion for attorney's fees and costs was still pending before the district court. The motion was subsequently granted in part, and the Union was awarded $1,890.00 in attorney's fees. In making the award, the district court found that:
The pleadings in this case indicate that plaintiff's counsel failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the law for the basis of his claims. If he had, by the filing of the second amended complaint he would have realized that for the federal court to have jurisdiction state action must be alleged, that the existence of a collective bargaining agreement does not satisfy the state action requirement and that the claim in Count II must first be heard by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board.
Leahy challenges the dismissal of both the Union and City Colleges on several grounds. He contends that the district court erred when it found (1) that the allegations of his complaint failed to establish state action or constitutional injury; (2) that exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IELRA was a prerequisite to a civil action for breach of contract; and (3) that the Union was entitled to Rule 11 sanctions.
In determining the propriety of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), we take as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Corcoran v. Chicago Park District, 875 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir.1989). We will affirm the dismissal of a complaint only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047, 106 S.Ct. 1265, 89 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986).
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