Leahy v. St. Mary's Hosp., C7-83-429

• Decision Date: 28 October 1983
• Docket Number: No. C7-83-429,C7-83-432.,C7-83-429
• Citation: 339 NW 2d 265
• Parties: Patricia Ann (Kelly) LEAHY, Respondent (C7-83-429), Relator (C7-83-432), v. ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL and Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, Relators (C7-83-429), Respondents (C7-83-432).
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

339 N.W.2d 265 (1983)

Patricia Ann (Kelly) LEAHY, Respondent (C7-83-429), Relator (C7-83-432), v. ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL and Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, Relators (C7-83-429), Respondents (C7-83-432).

Nos. C7-83-429, C7-83-432.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

October 28, 1983.

James T. Hynes, St. Paul, for Patricia Ann Leahy.

Jon L. Levy, Sally J. Ferguson, Minnetonka, for St. Mary's Hosp. and Fidelity and Cas.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

SIMONETT, Justice.

This appeal raises questions as to whether a workers' compensation claim for retraining benefits is governed by the law in effect at the time of the work-related injury or by the law as subsequently changed. Both the employee and the employer-insurer seek review here of the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for recomputation of the retraining benefits.

Patricia Ann Leahy, the employee-respondent, injured her back in 1956 while working as a nurse's aid for relator St. Mary's Hospital in Rochester, Minnesota. St. Mary's is insured by co-relator, Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York. Twenty-five years later, in July 1981, after having had further surgery on her back, Mrs. Leahy sought and obtained certification by the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) for retraining as a chemical dependency counselor. The Court of Appeals, disagreeing with the compensation judge, held that the employee was entitled to 52 weeks of retraining benefits; that the rehabilitation law in effect in 1956 governed, except that the amount of the benefits was to be determined by the law as changed in 1979; and that, because Mrs. Leahy had been paid temporary total disability benefits she was entitled to 25% of such benefits for retraining during the 52-week period.

1. The threshold claim urged by the employer-insurer is that all provisions of the new law, Minn.Stat. § 176.102 (1982), enacted by the 1979 legislature, must be applied retroactively to the 1956 injury in determining retraining entitlement. We disagree.

Mrs. Leahy obtained retraining certification under the law prior to 1979 and which was in effect at the time of her 1956 injury. See Minn.Stat. § 176.101, subd. 3(45) (1957). This differs from the 1979 rehabilitation provisions. The 1979 provisions, among other things, require different claim procedures. Thus, for example, instead of a hearing on a contested petition for retraining benefits (as was done here), the new procedure provides for rehabilitation consultation, for supervision of a rehabilitation plan by the commissioner, and for an appellate review panel. See Minn.Stat. § 176.102, subds. 2, 4, 6 (1982). The employer-insurer argue that the legislature must have intended this new, comprehensive statutory program to apply to all retraining claims whether the injury occurs before or after October 1, 1979.

Our case law holds, however, that the workers' compensation law in effect on the date of injury governs, absent a clear manifestation of a contrary legislative intent. See, e.g., Yaeger v. Delano Granite Works, 250 Minn. 303, 306, 84 N.W.2d 363, 365 (1957). This rule applies here. Nor do we think Solberg v. FMC Corp., 325 N.W.2d 807 (Minn.1982), suggests otherwise. In Solberg we applied a provision of the new law, section 176.102, subd. 11 (1980), retroactively to an injury occurring prior to passage of that law, but we did so because subdivision 11 expressly states that this particular subdivision "shall not apply to retraining benefits for which liability has been established prior to the effective date of this subdivision." We said this language meant that subdivision 11 was to apply, then, to retraining benefits for which liability had not been established prior to the new law, regardless of when the injury occurred, and we also went on to say that, "With this one exception, the legislature evinced no intent that Minn.Stat. § 176.102 (1980) should apply to retraining for employees injured prior to its effective date." 325 N.W.2d at 808.

The employer-insurer cite a newly added amendment to section 176.102:

Subd. 11a. Applicability of section. This section is applicable to all employees injured prior to or on and after October 1, 1979, except for those provisions which affect an employee\'s monetary benefits.

Act of June 7, 1983, ch. 290, § 82, 1983 Minn.Sess.Law Serv. 1470, 1512-13 (West). This new amendment, argue the employer-insurer, evinces a clear legislative intent that section 176.102 in its entirety does apply retroactively to all retraining clauses for which liability had not been established by October 1, 1979. We think not. We conclude that the amendment is intended to change the law as of its effective date, July 1, 1983, rather than to explain the prior legislative intent of the 1979 law. Consequently, the 1983 amendment has no bearing on whether section 176.102 (1980) was intended, when enacted, to have retroactive effect.

2. If the old law applies, as we hold it does, then the employer-insurer argue that the employee does not meet the test of the old law. Under section 176.101, subd. 3(45), the commission must find "that the retraining is necessary." Here, since Mrs. Leahy already has an earning capacity to make wages in excess of what she was earning in 1956, the employer-insurer argue that retraining now, 25 years after the work-related injury, is not "necessary." We disagree. The term "necessary," as used in the retraining statute, does not mean indispensable; retraining is "necessary" if it appears that it will be likely to restore impaired capacity to earn a livelihood; and earning capacity may be impaired if the employee's injury prevents him or her from returning to the former employment or from securing advancement in that employment. See Norby v. Arctic Enterprises, Inc., 305 Minn. 519, 232 N.W.2d 773 (1975); Tibbitts v. E.G. Staude Manufacturing Co., 166 Minn. 139, 207 N.W. 202 (1926).

Here Mrs. Leahy had a herniated disc in 1956, requiring a laminectomy. She had intermittent back pain thereafter, for which a spinal fusion was performed in June 1980, resulting in a 25% permanent partial disability of the back. She was not able to return to work as a nurse's aid after 1956 but...