Leary v. Corvin

• Decision Date: 11 April 1905
• Citation: 73 N.E. 984,181 N.Y. 222
• Parties: LEARY v. CORVIN et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

181 N.Y. 222

73 N.E. 984

LEARY

v.CORVIN et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 11, 1905.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Action by Rose M. Leary against Lizzie J. Corvin and others. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (88 N. Y. Supp. 109,92 App. Div. 544) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Modified.

See 71 N. Y. Supp. 335.

David McClure, for appellant Lizzie J. Corvin.

Michael J. Scanlan, for appellant Church of St. Mary.

J. Aspinwall Hodge and J. Philip Berg, for respondent.

CULLEN, C. J.

The plaintiff is the only child and heir at law of Patrick J. Corvin and Mary, his wife. In February, 1880, said Patrick acquired by deed the premises known as 278 East Broadway, in the city of New York, for the sum of $6,500. He and his wife continued to reside on the premises during their lives. In December, 1890, Patrick and Mary deeded the property in fee to the defendant the Church of St. Mary for a nominal consideration, and at the same time the church conveyed back to said Patrick and Mary an estate in said premises during their joint lives and that of the survivor. In February, 1892, Mary Corvin died. In December of the same year the church conveyed the premises to the defendant Lizzie J. Hurley (now Corvin), and at the same time Patrick quitclaimed to her his life estate therein. The defendant Lizzie Hurley mortgaged the premises for the sum of $6,000, $5,000 of which she gave to the defendant the Church of St. Mary, and thereupon conveyed to Patrick Corvin a life interest in said premises. Subsequently the said Corvin married the said Lizzie Hurley. Patrick Corvin died in March, 1898, and in August of the same year the plaintiff instituted this action. It is alleged in the complaint that, prior to the purchase of the premises by Patrick Corvin, the plaintiff drew from the savings bank moneys belonging to her, amounting to the sum of $1,300, and gave them to said Patrick, under the agreement that the said money should be applied to the purchase of a house, which was to be used and enjoyed by said Patrick and his wife Mary during their lives, and upon the death of the survivor of them the said premises were to go and become the property of the plaintiff in fee simple. The complaint further charged that the conveyance by Patrick and Mary Corvin to the defendant the Church of St. Mary was made in trust to convey the same to the plaintiff after the death of the survivor of her said parents, and that the conveyance by the church to the defendant Lizzie Hurley was made without consideration and in fraud of the plaintiff's rights. The plaintiff demanded judgment that the said deed to the defendant the Church of St. Mary be declared to be in trust for her use and benefit, and that she be declared the owner of the premises described therein; that the deed to the defendant Lizzie Corvin be declared fraudulent and void; that said defendant account for the rents and profits of the premises received by her; and that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the church the sum of $5,000 paid to it from the proceeds of the mortgage placed on the premises by the defendant Lizzie Corvin. The plaintiff succeeded at Special Term, and judgment was awarded her substantially as prayed for in the complaint. That judgment has been affirmed by the Appellate Division by a divided court.

While the Special Term decided the case in favor of the plaintiff, it did not find all the facts charged in the complaint. On the contrary, it rejected the claim that the conveyance by Patrick Corvin and his wife to St. Mary's Church was in trust for the plaintiff after the death of said grantors. The learned court based its decision on the original agreement between the plaintiff and her father, Patrick Corvin, and the subsequent acquisition of the property by the latter. The facts found are best stated by the following quotation from the decision of the court: ‘In 1875 the plaintiff, the sole child of Patrick J. Corvin and Mary Corvin, entered into an arrangement with them by which it was agreed that if she would draw some $1,385 from the savings bank, in which she had deposited it to her credit, they would add to it certain moneys, and with the funds thus provided would purchase a house for a home, where they would live until the death of the parents, and at their death the plaintiff would have the house. This arrangement was acquiesced in by all the parties, and on or about the 17th day of February, 1875, the plaintiff handed over to her father the said $1,385 for the purchase of the home. For some time no purchase was made, as no available house was found, and the money apparently remained in the hands of Patrick J. Corvin until 1880; the interval being employed in looking about for a suitable place. In the latter year the premises described in the complaint, and known as [181 N.Y. 226]279 East Broadway, in New York City, was purchased for $6,500; the balance of the purchase price being furnished by Mrs. Corvin from the sale of certain United States bonds which she possessed. The deed to these premises was taken in the name of Patrick J. Corvin, but that the deed stood in his name does not appear to have been known by the plaintiff. Her parents, and for a part of the time the plaintiff, resided in these premises, down to the time of the death of the mother, Mary Corvin, which occurred on the 3d day of February, 1892.’ The further findings of the court relate to the subsequent conveyances and transfers of the property. It is unnecessary to refer to them, as the facts are substantially conceded, and no claim is made that either of the defendants was a purchaser for value. As the decision of the Appellate Division was not unanimous, we are not precluded from examining the evidence, but in such a case the only question before us is whether there was any evidence to sustain the finding of the trial court. If so, such finding is conclusive upon us. It would not be profitable to review the evidence. It is sufficient to say that, in our opinion none of the findings of fact was destitute of any evidence for its support.

The question, however, remains whether the facts found entitled the plaintiff to the relief the court has awarded to her. At common law, where one person paid the purchase money for lands, and the conveyance of the same was taken to another, a trust resulted in favor of the person who paid the purchase money. This doctrine was carried to the extent of holding that the legal title vested in the party paying the consideration, and the lands could be sold on an execution against him. The Revised Statutes changed the common-law rule, and enacted (sections 51, 53, tit. 2, c. 1, p. 728, 1 Rev. St.) that where a grant for a valuable consideration is made to one person, and the consideration therefor paid by another, no trust results in favor of the person by whom such payment is made, except where the alienee named in the conveyance takes the same as an absolute conveyance in his own name, without the knowledge of the person paying the consideration, or where such alienee, in violation of some trust, purchases the land so conveyed with moneys belonging to another person. As the trial court found that the plaintiff was unaware that her father, Patrick Corvin, had taken an absolute deed in his own name, the case is not affected by the provisions referred to. The plaintiff's rights are to be determined under the general rule of equity. Now, while...