Leatherwood v. State

• Decision Date: 09 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. A93A2282,A93A2282
• Citation: 212 Ga.App. 342,441 S.E.2d 813
• Parties: LEATHERWOOD v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 813

441 S.E.2d 813

212 Ga.App. 342

LEATHERWOOD v. The STATE.

No. A93A2282.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 9, 1994.

Allman & Peters, James P. Peters, Atlanta, for appellant.

George C. Turner, Jr., Dist. Atty., James E. Barker, Jeff L. Ballew, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.

POPE, Chief Judge.

Defendant James Bradford Leatherwood, age 18, appeals his convictions for underage possession of alcohol, reckless conduct, and three counts of misdemeanor assault.

1. Defendant filed a timely written motion to suppress evidence and exclude certain custodial statements. He enumerates as error the alleged failure of the trial court to hold "a full and complete evidentiary hearing" on this motion.

(a) The State contends that the merits of this motion to suppress have already been determined adversely to defendant after a hearing held with respect to an earlier indictment arising out of the same events. In this regard, both defendant and the State have attempted to supplement the record as transmitted to this court by the clerk of the court below by appending attachments to their respective briefs. This procedure is not an authorized method to supplement the record. See OCGA § 5-6-41(g), (i). "This court cannot consider the factual assertions of the parties appearing in briefs when such evidence does not appear on the record. [Cit.] Moreover, parties cannot supplement the record merely by attaching matters to or reciting matters in their briefs. [Cit.]" Williams v. State, 193 Ga.App. 677, 678, 388 S.E.2d 893 (1989).

(b) At the commencement of trial, defendant announced "Ready, ... subject to our motion." The record demonstrates that the trial court subsequently conducted a Jackson-Denno hearing on the voluntariness of defendant's custodial statements. While there is reference in colloquy to a previous ruling on a motion to suppress made under an earlier indictment, the record does not reflect that defendant ever insisted upon an evidentiary hearing on this motion to suppress, and that the trial court denied defendant's request. Rather, the record shows only that the trial court adopted the previous ruling of another judge as its own. The tangible items subject to the written motion--vodka and beer discovered in defendant's truck--were admitted over various objections but none going to the lawfulness of the seizure of these items from defendant's vehicle after he fled in his truck from the scene of a search conducted under a warrant. Defendant invoked no ruling on the record by the trial court as to his right to an evidentiary hearing on his motion and proffered no evidence or argument. His silence amounts to acquiescence such that this issue has been waived. State v. Pattee, 201 Ga.App. 690, 693, 411 S.E.2d 751 (1991).

2. Defendant moved to exclude from evidence an incriminating statement he made while in custody, claiming that he had not been properly cautioned of his rights. After a Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court determined that this custodial statement was voluntary and admissible. This evidentiary ruling is enumerated as error.

Defendant did not testify at the voluntariness hearing. After his arrest, defendant was taken first to the hospital and then to the jail. The arresting officer gave defendant Miranda warnings while they were in transit but did not question him. Several hours later, when defendant was being booked, he asked the booking officer if he would go to prison, stating that he had almost killed some policemen trying to get away. This officer replied that it was up to the courts, whereupon defendant stated to her that he was sorry and wished that he had not tried to run from the police. Defendant urges that because he was not given a second Miranda warning this statement is inadmissible. However, it is axiomatic that Miranda warnings are required only in the context of custodial interrogation. Moon v. State, 208 Ga.App. 540, 541(1)(a), 431 S.E.2d 128 (1993). The testimony adduced below authorized the trial court's conclusion that defendant's "statement 'was spontaneous and not in response to any interrogation or prodding by ( [the booking] officer).' [Cits.]" Hallman v. State, 263 Ga. 72, 73(1), 428 S.E.2d 344 (1993). The determination of the trial court is supported by evidence, is not clearly erroneous, and will not be disturbed on appeal. Wilson v. State, 211 Ga.App. 457(1), 439 S.E.2d 685 (1993).

3. Defendant enumerates as error three instances where the trial court permitted the State to introduce impeachment testimony. Defendant's objection that a rebuttal witness must testify during the State's case-in-chief or be excluded by operation of OCGA § 17-7-110 is patently without merit. "There is no requirement that the State call more witnesses than it needs to present its case." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fitzgerald v. State, 193 Ga.App. 76(3), 386 S.E.2d 914 (1989). The exclusion of testimony from a witness whose name has not been provided to the defense by the State pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-110 does not apply to rebuttal witnesses. Bentley v. State, 210 Ga.App. 862, 864(2)(b), 438 S.E.2d 110 (1993). Defendant's reliance upon Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851, 853(8), 353 S.E.2d 805 (1987) is misplaced, for the impeachment evidence here was proper rebuttal of matters testified to and not improperly withheld expert opinion evidence. Objections to impeachment evidence on the basis of hearsay also are without merit. Hearsay is admissible to impeach a witness by showing that a prior contradictory statement has been made. Gee v. State, 210 Ga.App. 60, 61(2), 435 S.E.2d 275 (1993). We find no error in the trial court's admission of the complained-of evidence under the circumstances presented in this case.

4. Defendant's fourth enumeration of error asserts that the "State's failure to obtain [defendant's] consent prior to the nolle prosequi of the First Indictment after jeopardy had attached to the case violated OCGA § 17-8-3 and thus any retrial on those counts is barred by double...