LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher

• Decision Date: 13 May 1998
• Docket Number: Docket No. 96-6287,C,BLANC-STERNBER
• Citation: 143 F.3d 748
• Parties: Rabbi Yitzchok Lehanie LeBlanc-Sternberg, Fred Walfish, Lewis Kamman, Park Avenue Synagogue, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert FLETCHER, Marianne Cucolo, John C. Layne, and Nicholas Vertullo, Individually and in their capacity as Trustees of the Village of Airmont, Maureen Kendrick, Individually and in her capacity as Mayor of the Village of Airmont, Raymond Kane, Paul Berliner, The Airmont Civic Association, the Town of Ramapo, and Herbert Reisman, Individually and in his capacity as Ramapo Town Supervisor, Defendants, The Village of Airmont, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 748

143 F.3d 748

Rabbi Yitzchok LeBLANC-STERNBERG, Chanie LeBlanc-Sternberg Fred Walfish, Lewis Kamman, Park Avenue Synagogue Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert FLETCHER, Marianne Cucolo, John C. Layne, and Nicholas Vertullo, Individually and in their capacity as Trustees of the Village of Airmont, Maureen Kendrick Individually and in her capacity as Mayor of the Village of Airmont, Raymond Kane, Paul Berliner, The Airmont Civic Association, the Town of Ramapo, and Herbert Reisman Individually and in his capacity as Ramapo Town Supervisor, Defendants, The Village of Airmont, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 96-6287.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Argued Oct. 9, 1997.

Decided May 13, 1998.

Reuben S. Koolyk, New York City (Arnold & Porter, New York City, Kevin W. Goering, Jeremy D. Platek, Coudert Brothers, New York City, Craig L. Parshall, Fredricksburg, VA, Anne-Marie Arriel, The Rutherford Institute,

Charlottesville, VA, on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Dennis E.A. Lynch, Nyack, NY (Rory K. Clark, Dorfman, Lynch & Knoebel, Nyack, NY, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: KEARSE and CABRANES, Circuit Judges, and CHIN, District Judge. ^*

KEARSE, Circuit Judge.

This case returns to us following several appeals in which we, inter alia, (1) reinstated a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs Yitzchok LeBlanc-Sternberg, the rabbi of plaintiff Park Avenue Synagogue, Inc., et al., against defendant Village of Airmont, New York ("Airmont" or the "Village"), for violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. ("FHA"), and for conspiracy to discriminate against plaintiffs on the basis of their Orthodox Jewish religion, in violation of the First Amendment, see LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir.1995) ("LeBlanc-Sternberg I "), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1017, 116 S.Ct. 2546, 135 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1996); (2) reversed the district court's entry of judgment against the United States in the government's parallel action against the Village under the FHA, see id.; and (3) affirmed, following proceedings on remand, the district court's granting of injunctive relief in both actions prohibiting the Village from future discrimination on the basis of religion and directing that certain amendments be made to the Village's zoning code, see LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 104 F.3d 355, 1996 WL 699648 (2d Cir.1996) (unpublished disposition) ("LeBlanc-Sternberg II "), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2431, 138 L.Ed.2d 193 (1997). In the present appeal, plaintiffs challenge so much of an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Gerard L. Goettel, Judge, as denied their motion under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988(b) and 3613(c)(2) for an award of attorneys' fees and costs against the Village. The district judge denied the motion, stating, inter alia, that plaintiffs had not prevailed against parties other than the Village, that plaintiffs were only "technically" prevailing parties against the Village "by virtue of the decision of the Court of Appeals," that they had not been granted the "major relief" they sought in the form of compensatory and punitive damages and the dissolution of the Village, that they had not materially changed the legal relationship between themselves and the Village, and that they had not prevailed on any issue critical or essential to their claims. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that by establishing the Village's liability for violation of their civil rights and thereby requiring the entry of equitable relief against the Village, they achieved significant success on their claims against the Village and were thus entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs against that defendant. Finding merit in plaintiffs' contentions, we vacate so much of the district court's order as denied plaintiffs such an award, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of the litigation and plaintiffs' establishment of the Village's liability is set forth in detail in LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d 412, familiarity with which is assumed. Only the proceedings and facts pertinent to plaintiffs' request for fees and costs against the Village will be summarized here.

A. Plaintiffs' Establishment of the Village's Liability

The present action was brought by plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and the FHA against the Village and others, alleging principally that the Village had been incorporated for the purpose of excluding Orthodox Jews from Airmont, in violation of the FHA and the First Amendment. The complaint requested, inter alia, a declaratory judgment nullifying the incorporation of the Village; a permanent injunction "restraining the Defendants ... from continuing their unlawful acts and conspiracy, including" acts "with respect to ... zoning" (Second Amended Complaint Until 1991, Airmont was an unincorporated area within the Town of Ramapo, New York ("Ramapo" or the "Town"), and was thus subject to the Town's zoning code. During the 1980s, after substantial numbers of Orthodox and Hasidic Jews moved to Ramapo, the Town made several zoning decisions to accommodate them, including, within certain limitations, allowing rabbis to use their own homes as congregational places of worship ("home synagogues") in order to permit these new residents to adhere to requirements of their religion. Some residents of Airmont objected and formed defendant Airmont Civic Association, Inc. ("ACA"), which pushed for Airmont's incorporation as a Village in order to exempt Airmont from the Town's zoning power and permit it to implement a local zoning code designed to exclude Orthodox and Hasidic Jews. See, e.g., LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 418 (" 'everybody knows ... why [ACA] was formed. What does [ACA] and the proposed village plan to do to keep these Hasid[i]m out?' " (quoting trial testimony describing a 1986 meeting of ACA)); see also id. at 418-19, 430-31. After Airmont residents had voted in 1989 to incorporate the Village, defendant Robert Fletcher stated at an ACA meeting that " 'the only reason we formed this village is to keep those Jews ... out of here.' " LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 419. Thereafter, candidates backed by ACA were elected Airmont's mayor and trustees; Fletcher, who was then ACA's president, was one of those trustees.

                at 32, p 1.b.);   and compensatory damages from the Village "in an amount to be determined at trial" (id. p 1.c.).  Thereafter, the United States brought a parallel action (the "government action") against the Village and others, also alleging that the Village had been incorporated for the purpose of enacting zoning regulations that would have the effect of excluding Orthodox Jews.  The government sought principally a declaratory judgment that the Village had violated the FHA and an injunction against future housing discrimination.  The two actions were consolidated for trial, with the government's claims and plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief to be decided by the court, and plaintiffs' claims for damages to be decided by the jury.  The evidence at the eight-week trial included the following
                

The zoning code eventually enacted by the Village contained language designed to curb the establishment and operation of home synagogues. The Village created a planning board to interpret and apply that code. Among the persons appointed to that board was ACA member James Montone, an active opponent of home synagogues and other accommodations for the observance of Orthodox tenets. Montone "had stated at an ACA meeting his view that 'most people were against houses of worship in residential areas,' " LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 421, and had sued to prevent a slight variance from the Town's 2-acre lot requirement that would have permitted construction of a synagogue on 1.926 acres, id. at 420. In addition, after an ACA board member, who was also a Village trustee, suggested that ACA not finance additional litigation against Orthodox and Hasidic Jews because " 'there are other ways we can harass them,' " id., Montone "had conducted surveillances of Orthodox Jewish homes at prayer times," id. at 421.

The jury, although finding that plaintiffs had not proven their claims against the individual defendants and had proven no damages, found that the Village had violated plaintiffs' rights under the FHA and had conspired to violate their rights under the First Amendment. In contrast, the district judge, in deciding the government action and the claims by plaintiffs for equitable relief, made findings in favor of the Village. The district judge found that although the Village's newly adopted zoning code could be interpreted to restrict home synagogues, the Village had not yet taken any action to apply it discriminatorily against Orthodox Jews; that there was insufficient evidence on which to conclude that the Village would discriminate against Orthodox Jews in the future; and that there was "no basis or need" for the equitable relief requested by the government and plaintiffs. See United States v. Village of Airmont, 839 F.Supp. 1054, 1064 (1993), rev'd, LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 435. In addition, on the basis of "[t]he facts recited in [his] opinion [in the government action]," LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 846 All of these rulings by the district judge were reversed on appeal. In LeBlanc-Sternberg I, we noted that the district judge had an obligation to attempt to harmonize the findings implicit in the jury's verdict, and we concluded that a reasonable and logically consistent interpretation of those findings was

                F.Supp. 294, 295 (1994), rev'd, LeBlanc-Sternberg I, 67 F.3d at 435, and on the basis of his view that the jury's verdict against the Village was inconsistent with its verdicts in favor of the individual defendants, the district judge concluded that "there was no possible basis for the jury's verdict

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