LeBlanc v. Sherwin Williams Co.

• Decision Date: 12 March 1990
• Citation: 406 Mass. 888,551 N.E.2d 30
• Parties: Jeanette LeBLANC et. al. 1 v. The SHERWIN WILLIAMS COMPANY et. al. 2
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 30

551 N.E.2d 30

406 Mass. 888

Jeanette LeBLANC et. al. ¹ v. The SHERWIN WILLIAMS COMPANY et. al. ²

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Worcester.

Argued Jan. 10, 1990.

Decided March 12, 1990.

Lawrence G. Cetrulo, Boston, for defendants.

Neil T. Leifer, Boston (Robert J. Doyle with him), for Jeanette LeBlanc.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

NOLAN, Justice.

This case involves a dispute about the proper scope of the jurisdiction of the Housing Court Department of the Trial Court. The plaintiff initially filed this action in the Superior Court in Worcester County against the family's former landlord, Joseph Marderosian, on behalf of two of her minor children. This action was then transferred to the Housing Court (the record is silent as to who transferred it). In December of 1987, the plaintiff amended the complaint to add, as defendants, five manufacturers and a trade association, the Lead Industries Association (LIA). The Sherwin-Williams Company, NL Industries, Inc., Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., SCM Corporation, and the LIA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Housing Court judge denied the motion to dismiss. The defendants then filed a petition to the single justice of the Appeals Court pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 118 (1988 ed.), seeking relief from the denial of their motion and were granted leave to appeal. The defendants appealed, and we granted their application for direct appellate review.

We note the following allegations from the complaint. The defendants produce and market lead for use in lead-based paint. Various rooms in the premises leased by the plaintiff and her children, as well as common areas, contained hazardous levels of lead paint in violation of G.L. c. 111, §§ 190-199A (1988 ed.). ³ The lead used in the paint had been produced and sold by the defendants. The plaintiff's minor children were injured when they ingested the lead paint. As early as the 1920's, the defendants knew or should have known that lead-based paints posed an unreasonable risk to the health and welfare of young children residing in premises where such paints were used. Nevertheless, the defendants continued to furnish lead for paints to be used on surfaces. The children's injuries were a direct result of the defendants' actions. The plaintiff seeks money damages against the defendants asserting claims for negligent product design, breach of warranty, negligent failure to warn, and market share liability. The plaintiff also claims that the defendants, acting by and through the LIA, "conspired and/or acted in concert with each other to conceal" from the public the unreasonable risks and hazards which lead posed to young children.

General Laws c. 185C, § 3 (1988 ed.), sets forth the scope of the Housing Court's jurisdiction. ⁴ The plaintiff asserts that this tort action involves a housing problem and affects the health, safety, and welfare of occupants, and thereby falls within the plain language of G.L. c. 185C, § 3 (1988 ed.). ⁵ Moreover, according to the plaintiff, this action is sufficiently related to housing to fall within the Housing Court's jurisdiction. More specifically, the plaintiff contends that (1) the presence of lead-based paint is a "housing problem[ ]" under G.L. c. 185C, § 3; (2) her claims arise out of injuries suffered by her children when they ingested lead-based paint while occupants of residential premises; and (3) these injuries were a direct result of the defendants' acts of producing and marketing lead for use in lead paint.

The defendants, on the other hand, characterize the action as a traditional products liability action whereby the plaintiff alleges personal injury caused by a defective product. The defendants contend that the action is only remotely related to a housing problem and that, therefore, the Housing Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the action. We hold that G.L. c. 185C, § 3, does not confer jurisdiction on the Housing Court to adjudicate this product liability action. Adopting the broad interpretation put forth by the plaintiff would contravene the legislative intent to grant only limited jurisdiction to the Housing Court.

The Housing Court of Boston was established by statute, G.L. c. 185A, inserted by St.1971, c. 843, effective January 1, 1972, so as to provide a specialized forum to handle criminal and civil matters regarding housing that arise in the city of Boston. ⁶ See Police Comm'r of Boston v. Lewis, 371 Mass. 332, 336, 357 N.E.2d 305 (1976). West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Commissioner of Dep't of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 745, 753, 297 N.E.2d 505 (1973). This statute was the product of legislative consideration between 1966 and 1971. See Police Comm'r of Boston v. Lewis, supra 371 Mass. at 337-339, 357 N.E.2d 305. In 1966, the Legislature appointed a special commission to investigate "the laws, codes, and regulations governing matters arising out of or connected with the relationship between landlords and tenants in the city of Boston, with a view to perfecting such laws ... and establishing a court, board or agency ... to afford, after prompt hearing, immediate relief to landlord or tenant ..." The special commission recommended to the Legislature that it create a special Housing Court to expedite and improve the disposition of housing cases and that the court "have jurisdiction over every facet of landlord-tenant relations dealing with substandard dwellings. It should be a specialized court which can play a meaningful part in ameliorating urban life." 1968 House Doc. No. 4498 at 16. The commission stated in its report that "housing laws and regulations are a difficult and specialized area.... Courts must be made to understand housing problems. The appropriate knowledge of the law and deftness of handling the parties cannot be learned when judges must consider the wide variety of cases that they do." 1968 House Doc. No. 4498 at 13. The special commission's report, many provisions of which were later adopted into law, reveals that the role envisioned for the Housing Court with respect to tenants was one of a "vigilant enforcer of the laws relating to housing conditions and the physical environment within the immediate vicinityof tenants' homes." Police Comm'r of Boston v. Lewis, supra at 338, 357 N.E.2d 305. Two proposed bills which served as the basis for the final bill, 1971 House Doc. No. 5873, contained the same preamble. 1971 House Docs. Nos. 956, 4202. This preamble (although deleted in the final bill, 1971 House Doc. No. 5873) reveals the intent of the sponsors of the legislation. See Police Comm'r of Boston v. Lewis, supra at 339, 357 N.E.2d 305. The preamble read: "The need for adequately maintained residential housing is of grave public concern, and the existing means of enforcing minimum standards of fitness for human habitation are unsuited to the volume and nature of the task.... A specialized, expert and remedial judicial procedure is urgently needed to stimulate better housing maintenance and better relations between property owners and occupants for the well-being of the public at large." 1971 House Docs. Nos. 956, 4202.

The judicial history of the statute also supports our conclusion that the Housing Court lacks jurisdiction in the present case. In Police Comm'r of Boston v. Lewis, 371 Mass. 332, 333, 357 N.E.2d 305 (1976), we considered whether G.L. c. 185A, § 3, conferred jurisdiction on the Housing Court over an action by tenants in public housing projects to require the provision of twenty-four hour police protection. In concluding that the statute did not confer jurisdiction in that case, we found "no indication in either the statute or its legislative history that the seemingly broad, and perhaps ambiguous, language of G.L. c. 185A, § 3, [could] reasonably be construed to cover the ... case." Id. at 340, 357 N.E.2d 305. We said that police protection and allocation of police resources, despite their significant impact on the welfare and safety of Boston residents, are not sufficiently related to housing to come within the Housing Court's jurisdiction.

In Chakrabarti v. Marco S. Marinello Assocs., 377 Mass. 419, 386 N.E.2d 1248 (1979), we concluded that the statute did not confer jurisdiction on the Housing Court over actions arising under G.L. c. 93A. We based our conclusion on the Legislature's implied exclusion of c. 93A actions. ⁷ See Chakrabarti v. Marco S. Marinello Assocs., supra at 422-423 & n. 5, 386 N.E.2d 1248. In Haas v. Breton, 377 Mass. 591, 387 N.E.2d 138 (1979), we held that the Housing Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an action by buyers of a home against the sewer contractor for negligent damage and improper repair to the septic tank system. In Haas, after a comprehensive review of the legislative history leading to the creation of the Housing Court, we concluded that "[t]o uphold the power of the court to entertain ordinary negligence actions between homeowners and contractors would be to dilute the expertise of that court and to delay the resolution of disputes properly before it." Id. at 600-601, 387 N.E.2d 138.

In 1979, after our decisions in Chakrabarti and Haas, the Legislature enacted certain amendments to G.L. c. 185C, § 3, which appear in St.1979, c. 72, § 3, and which may give to the Housing Court subject matter jurisdiction over the kinds of disputes involved in Chakrabarti and Haas. St.1979, c. 72, § 3. ⁸

More recently, in Boston v. Kouns, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 506, 495 N.E.2d 317 (1986), the Appeals Court considered whether the Housing Court had subject matter jurisdiction over an action concerning the operation of a solid waste transfer station located near a residential housing development. The plaintiffs in Kouns asserted that the transfer station was being operated in violation of G.L. c. 111, § 150A, and 310 Code Mass.Regs. § 18.00 (1980), and...