Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1907
• Parties: LEBOURDAIS v. VITRIFIED WHEEL CO.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

194 Mass. 341

80 N.E. 482

LEBOURDAIS v. VITRIFIED WHEEL CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

February 28, 1907

COUNSEL

Charles J. Martell, for appellant.

W. C Cogswell, for appellee.

OPINION

BRALEY J.

The manufacturer of an article of merchandise which he puts upon the market ordinarily is not responsible in damages to those who may receive injuries caused by its defective construction, but to whom he sustains no contractual relations, although by the exercise of reasonable diligence he should have known of the defect. If such an extended liability attached where no privity of contract exists it would include all persons however remote who had been damaged either in person or property by his carelessness, and manufacturers as a class would be exposed to such far-reaching consequences as to seriously embarrass the general prosecution of mercantile business. In the usual course of trade upon making a sale, as the article passes from the control or ownership of the maker it is held that when these cease his liability also should be considered as ended. Davidson v. Nichols, 11 Allen, 514; Clifford v. Atlantic Cotton Mills, 146 Mass. 47, 48 15 N.E. 84, 4 Am. St. Rep. 279; Glynn v. Central Railroad Co., 175 Mass. 510, 512, 56 N.E. 698, 78 Am. St. Rep 507. But where by reason of its nature the article sold is commonly recognized as intrinsically dangerous to life or property among which gunpowder, nitroglycerin, and other highly explosive compounds, naphtha, and poisonous drugs are some familiar examples, if the seller without notice of their dangerous or noxious qualities delivers them to a customer or to a carrier who is ignorant of these properties he is liable not only to him, but to others to whom while in the exercise of reasonable care they are the proximate cause of injury. Davidson v. Nichols, ubi supra; Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567, 96 Am. Dec. 682; Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64; Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143, 8 Am. Rep. 298; Boston & Albany R. R. Co. v. Shanly, 107 Mass. 568; Turner v. Page, 186 Mass. 600, 72 N.E. 329; Oulighan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287, 292, 75 N.E. 726; Flynn v. Butler, 189 Mass. 377, 388, 75 N.E. 730; Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455. A similar liability exists where a caterer furnishes impure and unwholesome food by which the guests of his customer are made sick, or where a manufacturer or vendor knowingly sells for general use without disclosing the existence of the defect, a machine, mechanical instrumentality, or other article, which because of its defective construction or condition when put out causes injury. Bishop v. Weber, 139 Mass. 411, 417, 1 N.E. 154, 52 Am. Rep. 715; McDonald v. Snelling, 14 Allen, 290, 92 Am. Dec. 768; Flynn v. Butler, ubi supra; Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 P. 398, 31 L. R. A. 220, 52 Am. St. Rep. 146; Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 57 C. C. A. 237, 61 L. R. A. 303; Clarke v. Army & Navy Co-operative Society [1903] 1 K. B. 155, 167. In all of these various transactions his liability does not rest on privity of contract, but the act itself is deemed not only a legal wrong, but may be said to be in violation of the duty he owed to those with whom he dealt, as well as of the implied duty which he owes to the community to refrain from the commission of acts of negligence whereby injury follows to its members in person or property. If damages are suffered he is...