Lech v. Escobar

• Citation: 318 Mass. 711,63 N.E.2d 891
• Parties: LECH v. ESCOBAR (two cases).
• Decision Date: 27 November 1945
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

318 Mass. 711

63 N.E.2d 891

LECH

v.ESCOBAR (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Nov. 27, 1945.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Bristol County; Walsh, Judge.

Actions of tort by Helen Lech and Joseph Lech, her husband, against Joseph Escobar for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff wife in automobile accident, and for medical expenses incurred by plaintiff husband. The jury returned verdicts for plaintiffs, defendant's motion for directed verdicts was denied, and he brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Before FIELD, C. J., and LUMMUS, QUA, DOLAN, and WILKINS, JJ.

H. W. Radovsky, of Fall River, and M. A. Goldberg, of New Bedford, for plaintiffs.

F. E. Smith, of Taunton, for defendant.

WILKINS, Justice.

These are two actions of tort, one by the female plaintiff for personal injuries, and another by her husband for medical expenses. The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs. The defendant's exceptions concern the denial of his motions for directed verdicts. The only question is whether there was evidence of the defendant's negligence. The female plaintiff (hereinafter called the plaintiff) was riding on the front seat in an automobile operated by her sister, Sophie Guzwa, which on March 8, 1941, about 2 P.M. stopped on Pleasant Street at the corner of Mill Street, New Bedford, in the rear of two other automobiles which had stopped to permit the passage of traffic. There was a layer of snow on the street. After the plaintiff had remained seated in the standing automobile ‘for about two to three minutes,’ a bus, operated by the defendant, collided with the rear of the automobile, ‘doing some damage to the trunk in the rear,’ and the ‘car went forward into the car ahead.’ Sophie Guzwa testified that she stopped about five feet from the nearer of the two automobiles; that her ‘footbrake was set’; that as she sat there, she saw in the mirror the bus about fifty feet away coming from behind; that there was ‘no other traffic in the road,’ which was level; that the bus collided with the trunk, pushing it in, and ‘happened’ to push her automobile into the one directly ahead; that the impact lifted the plaintiff off the seat up in the air; that the plaintiff's head snapped back, and she felt a sharp pain at the base of her neck and the end of her spine, and became unconscious; and that the witness talked with the defendant and asked for his registration and license number, but the defendant said that he was...