Lechner v. Barnhart

• Decision Date: 14 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-C-1425.,03-C-1425.
• Citation: 321 F.Supp.2d 1015
• Parties: William LECHNER, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

321 F.Supp.2d 1015

William LECHNER, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant.

No. 03-C-1425.

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

June 14, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David Traver, for Plaintiff.

Nora Barry, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ADELMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff William Lechner brings this 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) action seeking judicial review of the decision of defendant JoAnne Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying his application for supplemental security income (SSI) under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff alleged that he was disabled due primarily to mental illness. His application was denied by the Administration initially and on reconsideration, thus, plaintiff sought and obtained a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). However, the ALJ also concluded that plaintiff was not disabled. When the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See Gudgel v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 467, 468 (7th Cir.2003).

Plaintiff asks that I reverse the ALJ's decision and remand the matter either for an award of benefits or further proceedings. The Commissioner argues that the decision must be affirmed. The matter has been fully briefed and is ready for decision.

I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Disability Standard

In order to obtain benefits under the Social Security Act, plaintiff must be disabled, that is, he must be unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). He must show that his "impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

The Administration has adopted a sequential five-step test for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. The first step is to determine whether the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA). If not, the ALJ moves on to the second step, which is to determine whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment or combination of impairments. An impairment is "severe" if it significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a).

If the claimant has a severe impairment, the ALJ must determine at step three whether any of the claimant's impairments are listed by the Administration as being so severe as to preclude SGA. These presumptively disabling impairments are compiled in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (i.e. "the Listings"). If the claimant can demonstrate a listed impairment, he will be found disabled.

The Listings of mental impairments consist of three sets of "criteria": the paragraph A criteria (a set of medical findings), paragraph B criteria (a set of impairment-related functional limitations), and paragraph C criteria (additional functional criteria applicable to certain Listings). The paragraph A criteria substantiate medically the presence of a particular mental disorder. The criteria in paragraphs B and C describe the impairment-related functional limitations that are incompatible with the ability to perform SGA. If a claimant satisfies the A and B, or A and C criteria, he will be considered disabled. Wates v. Barnhart, 274 F.Supp.2d 1024, 1036 (E.D.Wis.2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.00); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a (detailing evaluation of mental impairments).

If the claimant's impairment does not meet or equal a Listed impairment, the ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). RFC is an assessment of the claimant's ability to perform sustained work-related physical and mental activities in light of his impairments. SSR 96-8p. The relevant mental work activities include understanding, remembering, and carrying out instructions; responding appropriately to supervision and co-workers; and handling work pressures in a work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(c).

At step four, the ALJ must determine whether, given his RFC, the claimant can perform his past work. If so, he is not disabled. If not, the ALJ must move on to step five and determine whether the claimant is able to perform any other work in the national economy in light of his age, education and work experience. E.g., Samuel v. Barnhart, 295 F.Supp.2d 926, 929 (E.D.Wis.2003).

The burden is on the claimant to present the requisite proof at steps one through four. However, if the claim proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the Administration to establish that the claimant can engage in some other type of substantial gainful employment. The Administration may carry this burden either by relying on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE"), who evaluates the claimant's ability to perform work in the national economy in light of his limitations, or through the use of the "Medical-Vocational Guidelines," (a.k.a. "the Grid"), 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, a chart that classifies a person as disabled or not disabled based on his exertional ability, age, education and work experience. However, the ALJ may not rely on the Grid to deny a claim if the person's attributes do not correspond precisely to a particular rule, or if non-exertional limitations (e.g., pain, or mental, sensory or skin impairments) might substantially reduce the applicant's range of work. In such a case, the ALJ must solicit the testimony of a VE, although she may use the Grid as a "framework" for making a decision. E.g., Samuel, 295 F.Supp.2d at 929.

B. Standard of Review of ALJ's Decision

Under § 405(g), a district court may affirm, modify or reverse an ALJ's decision, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. However, the court's review of the ALJ's the decision is limited, and the ALJ's factual findings must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 305 (7th Cir.1995). Substantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the district court must take into account both evidence in support of a conclusion and anything that fairly detracts from its weight. Young v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 388-89 (7th Cir.1992). The court must review all the evidence in the record, and such review "must be more than an uncritical rubber stamp." Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 610 (7th Cir.1984).

Nevertheless, it is the ALJ who has the duty to weigh the evidence, resolve material conflicts, make independent findings of fact and determine the case accordingly. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 399-400, 91 S.Ct. 1420. A reviewing federal court may not decide the facts anew, re-weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir.2000). Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is entitled to benefits, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ. Binion on Behalf of Binion v. Chater, 108 F.3d 780, 782 (7th Cir.1997).

If the ALJ commits an error of law, however, reversal is required without regard to the volume of evidence in support of the factual findings. Id.; see also Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir.1989). The ALJ commits such an error if she fails to comply with the Commissioner's regulations and rulings. See Prince v. Sullivan, 933 F.2d 598, 602 (7th Cir.1991).

The ALJ's decision must also demonstrate the path of her reasoning, and the evidence must lead logically to her conclusion. Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir.1996). While the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record, she must provide at least a glimpse into her reasoning. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir.2001). Regardless of the volume of evidence in support of the decision, the court cannot uphold it if the reasons given by the ALJ "do not build an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result." Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (1996). Finally, ALJs "must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their own independent medical findings." Rohan, 98 F.3d at 970. "The medical expertise of the Social Security Administration is reflected in regulations; it is not the birthright of the lawyers who apply them." Schmidt v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 117, 118 (7th Cir.1990).

II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff's Application and Administrative Decisions

Plaintiff applied for SSI on August 10, 1999.¹ (Tr. at 82.) He alleged that he was unable to work because he would "blank out 100 times a day" and had a "bad left knee, bad back, [and] 3erd [sic] grade level [education]." (Tr. at 86.) The application was denied initially on October 28, 1999 (Tr. at 62) based on the determination that plaintiff's physical problems did not limit his functioning and his mental problems were not severe enough to preclude unskilled work (Tr. at 64). Plaintiff requested reconsideration on December 16, 1999 (Tr. at 68), but his request was denied on August 23, 2000 (Tr. at 63). On October 24, 2000, plaintiff requested a hearing (Tr. at 75), and on November 6, 2001 he appeared before ALJ Marsha Stroup. (Tr. at 40.)

B. Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff and VE Les Goldsmith were the only witnesses at the hearing. Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (Tr. at 36.)

1. Plaintiff's Testimony

Plaintiff testified that he was 47 years old, unmarried, and lived...