Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery
| Decision Date | 09 April 1970 |
| Docket Number | CA-CIV,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 12 Ariz.App. 32,467 P.2d 256 |
| Parties | LECHUGA, INC., a California corporation, Appellant, v. Eddie MONTGOMERY, Appellee. 1197. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Westover, Keddie & Choules, by Tom C. Cole, Yuma, for appellee.
The application of the doctrine of strict liability in tort to lessors is presented in this appeal from the Superior Court of Yuma County.
Plaintiff-appellee, Eddie Montgomery, brought suit against defendant-appellant. Lechuga, Inc., a California corporation, for personal injuries he sustained as a result of the use of a truck owned by the defendant and leased to plaintiff's employer. Defendant by its answer placed in issue its negligence, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and the defense of the assumption of risk. After the close of the evidence and at the time of settling instructions, plaintiff requested and was granted permission to amend his complaint to add allegations of strict liability in tort. The plaintiff had forewarned the defendant of his intention to request this amendment.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and after denial of defendant's post trial motions, this appeal followed.
Defendant is the owner of certain trucks used in the harvesting of lettuce. These trucks were leased to Vukasovich, Inc., plaintiff's employer. The lease provided that defendant was to keep and maintain the trucks in good and serviceable condition.
In connection with the leasing operation, defendant maintained a storage yard and maintenance shop in Yuma, Arizona, where the leased trucks were delivered each evening and picked up in the morning by lessee's employees. The lessee dispatched all trucks, and assigned individual drivers to each truck. It was the duty of the individual drivers before taking the trucks out each morning to check the tires, water and oil and to start and warm up the engines. Some of these operations required the engine cover to be lifted. Because of the special construction of these trucks and their height, it was necessary to walk onto an area which would be the right front fender of an ordinary automobile and lift the engine cover. These engine covers weighed between eighty and eighty-five pounds. The cover is hinged at the front of the truck and opens from the back of the engine to the front. Most of the trucks were equipped with a chain which was attached to the engine cover and the frame of the truck to keep the engine cover from swinging over the front of the truck and damaging the cover. The 'safety chain' was of sufficient length to allow the engine cover to be raised to a height where a metal rod could be easily inserted between the engine cover and the frame of the truck and thus allow the engine cover to remain open and to make the engine comparatment accessible. It was also the duty of the individual driver to report to the defendant's mechanics any malfunctions of the various trucks.
On the morning of 18 February 1967 the particular truck involved in this accident had been assigned by plaintiff's employer to one Frank Mills, this truck's normal driver. The truck was not equipped with a safety chain. Mills was aware of its absence but he had not brought this to the attention of defendant's employees. After performing the normal checking procedures including raising the engine cover and closing it, Mills climbed into the cab and attempted to start the engine warm-up procedure. The engine did not start. The plaintiff, among others, was of the opinion that the 'emergency kill switch' had been activated. The 'emergency kill switch' is a device which is activated inside the cab and is used to stop the engine from running in emergency situations. In order to deactivate the switch, it was necessary to lift the engine cover and turn a mechanism located on the engine.
Plaintiff volunteered to assist his fellow employee in resetting this switch. He had no knowledge that this particular truck had no safety chain. The plaintiff climbed up on the catwalk over the right front wheel, stooped to grasp the handle on the engine cover, and proceeded to lift the cover. As he pulled up, the cover continued to rise to a point where it became overbalanced and went over the front of the vehicle. Plaintiff was unable to extract his hand from the engine cover handle, lost his balance, fell and injured his leg.
Defendant presents several questions on appeal which may be summarized as follows:
(1) Was the evidence sufficient to submit to the jury the liability of the defendant under the theory of negligence?
(2) Does the doctrine of strict liability in tort apply to lessors of chattels?
(3) If the doctrine applies, was the absence of a safety chain a 'defective condition, unreasonably dangerous' within the concept of this doctrine?
(4) Was plaintiff precluded from maintaining this action because of the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the State of Arizona?
Defendant first contends that there was insufficient evidence to submit the question of defendant's liability to the jury under ordinary theories of negligence. This evolves itself into a determination of whether defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, whether it breached that duty, and whether that breach was a proximate cause of plaintiff's resultant injury. Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969). Defendant's duty as the lessor of chattels is stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 408 (1965):
'One who leases a chattel as safe for immediate use is subject to liability to those whom he should expect to use the chattel, or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by its use in a manner for which, and by a person for whose use, it is leased, if the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to make it safe for such use or to disclose its actual condition to those who may be expected to use it.'
This same duty of a lessor of personal property is imposed in Arizona. See Patterson v. Chenowth, 89 Ariz. 183, 360 P.2d 202 (1961); Casey v. Beaudry Motor Co., 83 Ariz. 6, 315 P.2d 662 (1957). That defendant was required to lease a chattel as safe for immediate use is evidenced by its lease with plaintiff's employer, which contained language that defendant covenanted to maintain and keep the trucks it leased in a 'good and serviceable condition.' This is further evidenced by testimony that all needed repairs to the leased trucks were to be reported to defendant's employees.
The lease itself also provided that plaintiff's employer was to 'provide and pay for all operators' of the leased trucks. The jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff was among the class of persons which defendant 'should expect to use the chattel.'
Tacitly admitting these factors, the defendant argues that since the absence or presence of a safety chain does not affect the primary use for which the truck was leased, the harvesting of lettuce, defendants breached no duty to the plaintiff. However, the evidence discloses that among other duties imposed upon the drivers of the leased trucks was the duty, each morning, to check the oil and add any, if necessary. While the first function did not necessarily require the lifting of the engine cover, the evidence disclosed that this was a general practice among the lessee's employees. The function of adding oil necessitated the raising of the engine cover. We hold that the duty to supply a truck reasonably safe for the purpose for which it was intended, not only includes the general intended use, that is, the transportation of lettuce, but also includes any incidental use of that truck consistent with its general leased purpose, including placing the truck in such a condition that it will perform its leased purpose. From all the testimony, there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury whether or not plaintiff's injury by the truck was 'caused by its use in a manner for which * * * it is leased.'
The evidence further disclosed that all of the leased trucks which plaintiff had driven were equipped with a 'safety chain.' Plaintiff testified that he came to rely on the existence of this chain in raising the engine cover. Because of this reliance, the length of the chain, the length of the rod in supporting the cover when raised, and the weight of the engine cover itself when compared to the physical strength of the lessee's several employees, we believe there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff were foreseeable by the defendant.
From what has been stated, whether defendant's failure to provide plaintiff's employer with a truck having a safety chain or ascertaining that the chain was missing was a breach of the duty of defendant to 'exercise reasonable care' to make this truck safe, was a proper jury question.
We hold that there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of the defendant's duty, whether that duty was breached, and whether that breach resulted in a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.
Defendant's second contention raises a question of first impression in Arizona, that is, the applicability of the doctrine of strict liability to lessors, who are neither manufacturers, sellers, retailers nor wholesalers. However, we need not make such a determination in this case, for our conclusion as to plaintiff's burden of proof as to this doctrine is dispositive of this issue. Under these circumstances we are not called upon to decide whether the doctrine of strict liability applies to lessors of personal property or whether the doctrine applies under the circumstances of this particular commercial lease transaction. The nature of the defect complained of in this action is the absence of a safety chain to prevent the engine cover from...
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