Leclair v. Touchette
| Decision Date | 04 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2020-074 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | Brian LeClair* v. Michael Touchette |
Note: In the case title, an asterisk (*) indicates an appellant and a double asterisk (**) indicates a cross-appellant. Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
Superior Court, Caledonia Unit, Civil Division
DOCKET NO. 124-6-19 Cacv
Trial Judge: Mary Miles Teachout
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Defendant appeals pro se from the civil division's denial of his Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 petition seeking credit for time served. He argues that he was entitled to credit against his controlling sentence for time served prior to his arraignment for the crime that led to the controlling sentence. We affirm.
On September 24, 2018, petitioner was sentenced in six separate criminal dockets for four counts of burglary, one count of possession of heroin, and one count of operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. Petitioner was sentenced to serve zero-to-one year for the vehicle theft, and four-to-eight years for each of the other counts. All of the sentences were imposed concurrently to each other.
Petitioner was incarcerated for much of the time that he was awaiting trial in the six dockets, apparently because he was unable to post bail. He was not serving time for a preexisting sentence during that period. As a result, he had up to 520 days of sentence credit in some of the dockets. He had the least amount of credit for the burglary conviction in docket number 1688-5-17 Cncr—482 days—because he was arraigned for that charge after he was arraigned in the other dockets. The Department of Corrections used the sentence and credit applicable to this docket to calculate the dates on which petitioner will have served his minimum and maximum sentences for all of the dockets. The Department refers to this as the "controlling sentence."
Petitioner filed grievances with the Department, asserting that because his sentences were imposed concurrently, he was entitled to the maximum amount of credit toward each sentence, namely, 520 days. The grievances were denied. In June 2019, petitioner filed a Rule 75 complaint in superior court. In February 2020, the superior court denied petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, holding that the sentence had been properly calculated. Petitioner appealed to this Court.
The superior court's decision denying credit for time spent in custody involves a legal question, which we review without deference. Bridger v. Systo, 2018 VT 121, ¶ 6, 208 Vt. 649. Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he is entitled to relief. Id. Section 7031 of Title 13 requires the sentencing court to award defendants credit toward service of their sentence for any days spent in custody. 13 V.S.A. § 7031(b). The statute provides:
The period of credit for concurrent and consecutive sentences shall include all days served from the date of arraignment or the date of the earliest detention for the offense, whichever occurs first, and end on the date of the sentencing. Only a single credit shall be awarded in cases of consecutive sentences, and no credit for one period of time shall be applied to a later period.
Id. § 7031(b)(1). The sentencing statute also provides that in cases where multiple sentences are imposed concurrently, "the shorter minimum terms merge in and are satisfied by serving the longest minimum and the shorter maximum terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the longest maximum term." Id. § 7032(c)(1). As discussed above, although the court imposed the same minimum and maximum sentences for five of petitioner's six convictions, the sentences had different effective terms because petitioner had differing amounts of sentence credit for each conviction. The Department correctly applied these two statutes by using the sentence with the longest minimum and maximum—here, the one for which petitioner had the least credit—as the controlling sentence.
Petitioner argues that because he received concurrent sentences for his various convictions, he is entitled to the maximum period of credit toward his sentence. He argues that his position is supported by our decisions in State v. Blondin and State v. LeClair. See Blondin, 164 Vt. 55, 61 (1995) (); LeClair, 2013 VT 114, ¶ 10, 195 Vt. 295 (). However...
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