Leclerc v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act

• Decision Date: 23 January 1951
• Citation: 137 Conn. 438,78 A.2d 550
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: LECLERC v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 550

78 A.2d 550

137 Conn. 438

LECLERC v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan. 23, 1951.

William S. Zeman, Hartford, with whom was Harry Cooper, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Harry Silverstone, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was William L. Hadden, Atty. Gen., for the appellee (defendant).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN and COMLEY, JJ.

BALDWIN, Judge.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing her appeal from an award of the unemployment commissioner which denied benefits because of her unavailability for work.

The finding is not subject to correction. The facts follow: The plaintiff is a married woman living with her husband and two young children. She had been working as a drill press operator in a factory in Hartford. Her hours of employment were from 3:30 in the afternoon until midnight. On March 2, 1949, she was laid off for lack of work. On March 13 she registered for work. At the same time, she filed claims for unemployment benefits and received them for four weeks. On April 27, the examiner disapproved her claim of April 23 because she had so restricted the conditions under which she would accept employment as to render her unavailable for work and therefore ineligible for benefits. This decision was affirmed by the commissioner. Had she been referred, or had any job been offered, she would not and could not have taken daytime employment because of the necessity of caring for her small children. On June 13 she resumed her former job, working between the hours of 3:30 p. m. and midnight. This recall by her former employer was the only offer of employment or referral which she received during the entire period of filing claims.

Section 7507 of the General States provides than an unemployed person shall be eligible to receive benefits only if it shall be found that '(2) he is physically and mentally able to work and is available for work, provided no person shall be termed available for work unless he has been and is making reasonable efforts to obtain work'. To be available for work within the meaning of the statute, one must be ready, able and willing to accept suitable employment. He must be exposed unequivocally to the labor market. Reger v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn. 647, 651, 46 A.2d 844; Mishaw v. Fairfield News, 12 Conn.Sup. 318, 321. Section 7508 describes suitable employment as that which must 'reasonably be expected to yield remuneration at a rate greater than the individual's benefit rate for total unemployment' and as 'either employment in his usual employment or other employment for which he is reasonably fitted, * * * provided such employment is within a reasonable distance of his residence or last employment, and in determining whether or not any work * * * is suitable for an individual, the administor may consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety and morals, his physical fitness and prior training and experience'. It is to be noted that these factors all relate primarily to the employment itself and not to the domestic circumstances, personal wishes of convenience of the claimant. The plaintiff expressly limited her availability for work to the hours between 3:30 p. m. and midnight because of her domestic responsibilities. Whether or not it was essentially material, the fact is that the compensation awarded her for four weeks gave her a period of readjustment during which, if she neither was recalled to her former job nor procured employment for like hours, she had reasonable opportunity, by adjusting her situation, to arrange for daytime employment. This she did not choose to do. She thus refused to expose herself unequivocally to the labor market. She made herself available for work upon a restricted and contingent basis only, subject to the conditions and limitations which she prescribed. The case is not one where some compelling reason, beyond her control, limited her to the hours of work prescribed by her. The act was never intended to guarantee any one a job identical in kind and hours with that which he had previously held. Its purpose and intent was to relieve the...