Watson, In re, 438

• Decision Date: 08 May 1968
• Docket Number: No. 438,438
• Citation: 161 S.E.2d 1,273 N.C. 629
• Parties: , 35 A.L.R.3d 1114 In the Matter of Janet B. WATSON, Sprague Electric Company, Lansing, North Carolina, and Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, Raleigh, N.C.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 1

161 S.E.2d 1

273 N.C. 629, 35 A.L.R.3d 1114

In the Matter of Janet B. WATSON, Sprague Electric Company Lansing, North Carolina, and Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, Raleigh, N.C.

No. 438.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 8, 1968.

Maupin, Taylor & Ellis, Raleigh, for appellee, Sprague Electric Co.

LAKE, Justice.

The sole question for determination on this appeal is this: When the mother of a nine year old child is laid off from her job on the first shift, without fault on her part, and is thereafter tendered like work on the second shift, which she refuses solely for the reason that she is unable to obtain adequate care and supervision for her child during the work hours of the second shift, is she disqualified for unemployment insurance benefits? We conclude that the answer is, No.

The public policy of this State which gave rise to the Employment Security Act is thus declared in G.S. § 96--2:

'As a guide to the interpretation and application of this chapter, the public policy of this State is declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State. Involuntary unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action by the legislature to prevent its spread and lighten its burden which now so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family. * * * The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this State require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons Unemployed through no fault of their own.' (Emphasis added.)

It is elementary that the controlling principle in the interpretation of a statute is that it must be given the meaning which the Legislature intended it to have. State Highway Commission v. Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535, 153 S.E.2d 22; Sale v. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.C. 749, 129 S.E.2d 465; City of Greensboro v. Smith, 241 N.C. 363, 85 S.E.2d 292; Richmond Guano Co. v. Walston, 187 N.C. 667, 122 S.E. 663. Thus, when the Legislature has erected within the statute, itself, a guide to its interpretation, that guide must be considered by the courts in the construction of other provisions of the act which, in themselves, are not clear and explicit. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 315. We, therefore, must interpret the provisions of the Employment Security Act, setting forth the prerequisites to eligibility for its benefits and circumstances which will disqualify one from receiving its benefits, to the extent that interpretation is required, in the light of the foregoing declaration by the Legislature of the policy to be accomplished by the act.

G.S. § 96--13 prescribes the conditions for eligibility to benefits under the act. The portion pertinent to the present appeal is as follows:

'An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the Commission finds that * * *

'(3) He is able to work, and is available for work: Provided that no individual shall be deemed available for work unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the Commission that he is actively seeking work * * *.'

G.S. § 96--14 prescribes certain conditions which disqualify a claimant for benefits under the act. The pertinent portion of this section of the act is:

'An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: * * *

'(3) For not less than four, nor more than twelve consecutive weeks of unemployment * * * if it is determined by the Commission that such individual has failed Without good cause * * * (ii) to accept suitable work when offered him; * * *

'In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the Commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from his residence. * * *' (Emphasis added.)

It is apparent that the Employment Security Act was not designed to provide the payment of benefits to a person who is physically unable to work or who, for any other personal reason, would at no time be in a position to accept any employment if it were tendered to him, however capable and industrious such person may be. It is equally clear that the act was not designed to provide payment of benefits to a person who is able to work but who prefers compensated idleness to work for higher wages. The act does not provide health insurance to the industrious worker stricken by accident or disease. It does not provide compensation to the industrious worker whose family responsibilities are such as to preclude the acceptance of any and all employment. It does not provide for payment of benefits to one who, through fear that he may be overtaken by honest work, erects around himself all manner of conditions precedent to his acceptance of employment so as to preclude any possibility of his contact with a job. On the other hand, the statute must be construed so as to provide its benefits to one who becomes involuntarily unemployed, who is physically able to work, who is available for work at suitable employment and who, though actively seeking such employment, cannot find it through no fault of his own.

The terms 'able to work', 'available for work' and 'suitable employment' are not precise terms capable of application with mathematical precision. They are somewhat akin to the terms 'reasonable man' and 'due care,' which continue to defy the best efforts of both the lexicographer and the professor of torts to define them satisfactorily and yet are applied with considerable success each day by juries through the application of common sense and experience. A large measure of administrative discretion must be granted to the Employment Security Commission in the application of these terms in the statute to specific cases. The key words in the guidance of this exercise of discretion are 'through no fault of his own' and 'without good cause.' See, In re Abernathy, 259 N.C. 190, 130 S.E.2d 292, app. dism., 375 U.S. 161, 84 S.Ct. 274, 11 L.Ed.2d 261. Admittedly these guiding phrases, themselves, are not precise terms. They do, however, focus attention back upon the legislative purpose to provide temporary income to one 'involuntarily unemployed' who is physically able to work and desirous of work.

The statute, G.S. § 96--14(3), prescribes certain matters which the commission 'shall consider' in determining whether work tendered to a given individual is 'suitable' for that individual. This statutory catalogue of matters to be considered is not all inclusive. Other circumstances may make a job, which is 'suitable' for one person, 'unsuitable' for another. Obviously, the statutory catalogue makes the test of suitability of a job dependent, in some measure, upon the personal qualifications and circumstances of the individual claimant. This is not to say that, to be 'suitable,' a job must be free from all inconvenience and completely satisfying to the claimant. Few, if any, find such work as that. Without attempting to define 'suitable work,' we think it clear that this term relates primarily to the skills required, the compensation to be paid, and the risks incurred by the employee by reason of either the nature of the work to be done, or the environment or time in which it is to be done.

In the present case, the job rejected by the claimant involved the same kind of work she had previously done in the same plant at the same wage. There is no suggestion that she, personally, would not have been as safe while at work, or while going to and from work, on the second shift as she had been on the first shift. We conclude, therefore, that the job she rejected was 'suitable work.' Nevertheless, her rejection of it does not necessarily disqualify her to receive benefits under the act to which she would otherwise be entitled. The statutory disqualification arises only if her rejection of suitable work offered her was 'without good cause.'

It is a well settled principle of statutory construction that words of a statute are not to be deemed merely redundant if they can reasonably be construed so as to add something to the statute which is in harmony with its purpose. Jones v. Board of Education, 185 N.C. 303, 117 S.E. 37. By the express language of the statute, the skills, experience, earning ability, health and safety of the employee on and around the job relate to the question of whether the tendered job is 'suitable work.' Consequently, to determine what is 'good cause' for rejecting suitable work, other matters must be taken into account.

In G.S. § 96--14(1) it is provided that one is disqualified from receiving benefits under the act if he left work voluntarily 'without good cause attributable to the employer.' The disqualification imposed in G.S. § 96-- 14(3) for failure to accept suitable work 'without good cause' does not carry the qualifying phrase 'attributable to the employer.' It cannot be presumed that the omission of these qualifying words was an oversight on the part of the Legislature. Thus, the 'good cause' for rejection of tendered employment need not be a cause attributable to the employer.

Words in a statute are to be given their natural, ordinary meaning, unless the context requires a different construction. Byrd v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 256 N.C. 684, 124 S.E.2d 880. In the light of the legislative declaration of policy contained in the Employment Security Act, we conclude that an employee, having been separated from his job through no fault of his own, rejects other tendered employment for 'good cause' when his reason for such...