LeCuyer v. Metropolitan Property and Liability Ins. Co.
| Citation | 519 N.E.2d 263,401 Mass. 709 |
| Parties | Donna LeCUYER v. METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY. |
| Decision Date | 16 February 1988 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
Alphonse P. San Clemente, Fitchburg, for plaintiff.
Andre A. Sansoucy, Boston, for defendant.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN and LYNCH, JJ.
This is the first of six cases we decide today raising the question whether an insured may recover more than the single limit of underinsured motor vehicle coverage stated in the policy when more than one vehicle is provided such coverage under a single standard Massachusetts motor vehicle insurance policy. In the vernacular, the question is whether the insured is entitled to "stack" the underinsured motorist coverage.
In January, 1984, the plaintiff was injured in a head-on collision with another vehicle while operating one of three vehicles insured by the defendant insurer under a 1984 standard Massachusetts motor vehicle policy issued to the plaintiff and her husband. The coverage for "Bodily Injury Caused by an Uninsured or Underinsured Auto" shown on the coverage selections page of the policy was $20,000 a person and $40,000 for each accident for each of the three vehicles. The plaintiff was injured seriously in the accident; the other vehicle involved in the accident was underinsured; the plaintiff settled her claim against the third party with the defendant's consent; and by this action she sought to recover $20,000 against the defendant with respect to each vehicle, or $60,000. The insurer does not dispute her right to coverage but argues that her coverage in the circumstances is limited to $20,000, which it has paid to the plaintiff. In other words, the insurer says, the plaintiff is not entitled to stack the underinsured coverage.
The plaintiff does not argue that the policy by its terms allows her more than a single recovery of $20,000. She argues, however, that any policy language limiting her to a single recovery directly conflicts with a mandate of G.L. c. 175, § 113L (1986 ed.), and must be disregarded. In his March, 1987, memorandum the judge noted that decided cases showed a division of opinion on this stacking question among Superior Court judges. He concluded that the policy clearly and unambiguously prohibited stacking and that the denial of stacking did not violate the requirements of G.L. c. 175, § 113L. He presciently expressed serious doubt whether this court would disregard the express language of the policy in the absence of a legislative mandate to do so. The plaintiff appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the insurer on its motion for summary judgment. We granted the insurer's application for direct appellate review and now affirm the judgment.
The significant language of the 1984 policy concerning underinsured motorist coverage states That language says that it does not matter how many vehicles the policy covers; a person only has underinsured motorist coverage to the limit stated in the policy.
The plaintiff argues that the policy language cannot be permitted to control her rights because G.L. c. 175, § 113L, requires that she be granted coverage cumulatively as to each vehicle. Section 113L(1) states, in relevant part, that each Massachusetts motor vehicle policy must provide liability coverage (in amounts prescribed for bodily injury or death for a liability policy under G.L. c. 175), "under provisions approved by the insurance commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder ... who are legally entitled to recover damages from [persons] whose policies or bonds...
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