Leddy v. Barney
Decision Date | 24 June 1885 |
Citation | 2 N.E. 107,139 Mass. 394 |
Parties | William Leddy v. Theophilus Barney |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Tort for personal injuries occasioned to the plaintiff by the alleged negligence of the defendant. Trial in the Superior Court, before Brigham, C. J., who allowed a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows:
Both parties were employed by one Augustus Chace, the plaintiff as a common laborer, and the defendant as a superintendent.
The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that he was injured by the carelessness of the defendant in the moving of a derrick in the work in which they were engaged.
There was no evidence tending to show Chace's liability, except the facts that the defendant was employed as superintendent by Chace, and, at the time of the accident, in June, 1883 was engaged in the work which he was employed to do.
The plaintiff disclaimed any cause of action against Chace, and some evidence was given that the plaintiff never made any claim upon him.
The defendant relied upon a release of Chace, which he contended was a bar to this action.
There was evidence on the part of the plaintiff tending to show that in October, 1883, the plaintiff consulted Milton Reed Esq., an attorney at law, and claimed damages against the defendant; that Reed saw Chace, who, after denying all liability, made a gift to Reed of $ 150 as a charity to the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff received of Reed $ 120, and signed an instrument under seal, stating that, in consideration of $ 150 paid to him by Chace, he did "hereby discharge and release the said Chace from all actions, causes of actions for damages, or otherwise, held by me against said Chace for any cause heretofore existing;" that he did not read it, nor was it read to him, and he understood it to be a receipt for Reed to show to Chace that he had paid him. Reed was called as a witness by the defendant, and testified, against the plaintiff's objection, that the plaintiff came to see him in reference to this claim; that the witness conferred with both the defendant and Chace; that he finally received of Chace $ 150 of which he paid the plaintiff $ 120; that he told Chace that the claim was for personal injuries received by the plaintiff in the summer of 1883; and that "it was settled by Chace." It was admitted that no action was brought against Chace.
The defendant also asked Reed if he read the release to the plaintiff, and Reed replied that he had no recollection of the physical act of reading the paper; thereupon the defendant asked the witness, "According to your best recollection and belief about it?" The witness replied, "It was read to him." The plaintiff objected to the question and answer.
The defendant called Chace as a witness, who testified, against the plaintiff's objection, that he paid Reed $ 150; that he considered it a gift on his part mainly out of sympathy, because he did not consider himself liable; another reason was to release the claim which the plaintiff made upon him.
The plaintiff asked the judge to give the following rulings:
The judge declined to give these rulings, and instructed the jury, that, if Chace paid the money in charity, the payment was not a bar to this action; but that, if Chace paid it partly on account of charity and partly in settlement of the claim, and to avoid a suit, the release was a discharge of and a bar to,...
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