Ledford v. Hubbard

• Decision Date: 11 November 1930
• Citation: 236 Ky. 373
• Parties: Ledford v. Hubbard.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

236 Ky. 373

Ledford v. Hubbard.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Decided November 11, 1930.

1. Judges. — Judicial officer, to avoid distrust, should recuse himself if any substantial ground exists for suspicion that he is not wholly disinterested.

Ky. Stats., sec. 971-6, in effect supports the foregoing principle by providing method for replacement of judge when it is made to appear that he will not afford litigant a fair and impartial trial or hearing.

2. Judges. — Reasonable presumption exists that former relationship of client and attorney between judge and litigant might influence action of judge.

3. Judges. — Disqualification of judge to hear pending case extends to supplemental proceedings taken to enforce judgment rendered.

4. Judges. — Judge, as former counsel of party to election contest, held disqualified to act in suit involving right to fees and emoluments during period contestee was de facto officer.

Appeal from Clay Circuit Court.

A.T.W. MANNING and MURRAY L. BROWN for appellant.

ROY W. HOUSE for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY COMMISSIONER STANLEY

Reversing.

In the case of Ledford v. Hubbard, 219 Ky. 9, 292 S.W. 345, it was determined that Ledford was entitled to the office of sheriff of Clay county for the term beginning January 4, 1926, because Hubbard, who had received a plurality of votes, did not have his name placed on the ballot in a manner prescribed by law. About November 15, 1926, pursuant to the mandate of this court, Hubbard surrendered the office. Thereafter Ledford instituted this suit against him to recover the fees and emoluments of the office during the period he (Hubbard) was serving as a de facto officer. Hubbard defended the suit on the ground that the expense of the office had exceeded its receipts.

The plaintiff seasonably moved to have the regular judge of the Clay circuit court vacate the bench in the case because he had been counsel for the defendant in the election contest and was thereby disqualified. Upon the motion being overruled, the plaintiff asked this court for a writ of prohibition against the judge to prevent him trying the case. It was held that the court was without authority thus to control the action of the trial court, and that whatever relief the plaintiff was entitled to could be obtained by an appeal from any judgment which might be rendered against him. Ledford v. Lewis, Judge, 227 Ky. 396, 13 S.W. (2d) 276.

Upon the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, Hubbard, and the plaintiff prosecutes this appeal, insisting that the court erred in not vacating the bench as well as in his decision on the merits of the case.

We shall not consider the judgment on the merits nor express any opinion in respect thereto, for the court is of the opinion that the judge was disqualified by reason of his connection as attorney for one of the parties in the original cause out of which this one grew. This suit was but an effort to realize in part the benefits of the judgment secured by reason of that litigation. Perhaps any judge...