Ledford v. State
Decision Date | 13 February 1985 |
Docket Number | Nos. 69215,69216,s. 69215 |
Citation | 173 Ga.App. 474,326 S.E.2d 834 |
Parties | LEDFORD v. The STATE. DYER v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Claude S. Beck, Blairsville, for appellant (case no. 69215).
Robbie E. Colwell, for appellant (case no. 69216).
V.D. Stockton, Dist. Atty., Michael H. Crawford, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
After a trial by jury, appellant Ledford was convicted of three counts of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. Counts I and III charged Ledford with the sale of marijuana; Count II with distributing marijuana. Appellant Dyer was charged with and convicted of selling marijuana for his part in the same incident giving rise to Ledford's conviction on Count III. Appellants were tried together. We will consider their appeals in this single opinion.
1. Appellant Ledford raises the general grounds. The evidence adduced by the State in support of appellant's conviction on each of the three counts is as follows: On September 7, 1983 Ledford was introduced by a confidential informant to undercover G.B.I. Agent Bruce Miller. The meeting took place on the grounds of the Pine Top Baptist Church in Union County. At the initial meeting, Ledford sold Miller a quantity of marijuana for $500. On September 11, 1983 Miller again met with Ledford at the Pine Top Baptist Church where Ledford provided Miller with a sample of Sinsemillia marijuana in anticipation of a later, larger purchase of marijuana by Miller from Ledford.
During the following nine to ten days, Ledford and Miller talked together to work out the details of a large purchase of marijuana. These conversations, by telephone as well as face-to-face, were tape recorded by Miller without Ledford's knowledge. At trial the jury was provided with transcripts of the tapes. The transaction was to occur on September 21, 1983 again on the grounds of the Pine Top Baptist Church. Due to the size of the purchase and large amount of money involved ($20,000), Ledford agreed that Miller would be accompanied by one person. Ledford told Miller that his brother-in-law had been helping him and would also be at the site of the planned buy. According to Ledford, his brother-in-law would be parked in his vehicle on a nearby road adjacent to the church where Miller would deposit his passenger and then proceed the thirty-five yards to meet Ledford for the actual purchase. On Wednesday, September 21, 1983, all went exactly as Ledford and Miller had arranged except the size of the buy was $15,000. When Miller checked to be certain that he was buying marijuana, he paid Ledford and signalled a team of agents waiting in the surrounding woods to arrest Ledford.
Miller's passenger was Agent Cagle who joined Ledford's brother-in-law at the pre-determined spot. The brother-in-law, appellant Dyer, was parked in his pick-up truck with a twelve-gauge shotgun laying across his lap. Dyer told Cagle that he was squirrel hunting. Cagle testified that Dyer seemed nervous, glancing around into the woods and the rear-view mirror. At the time the stake-out team came out of the woods and proceeded toward Dyer's truck, Dyer started his engine and sped away, throwing his shotgun out of the vehicle. Dyer was arrested about a mile away. The license plate of his truck had been smeared with mud.
Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found Ledford guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Davis v. State, 167 Ga.App. 764(1), 307 S.E.2d 546 (1983); Sankey v. State, 167 Ga.App. 224, 306 S.E.2d 357 (1983).
2. Ledford asserts that the State failed to establish venue in Union County. However, testimony at trial showed that each offense occurred on the grounds of the Pine Top Baptist Church in Union County. We find this enumeration to be wholly without merit. See Davenport v. State, 165 Ga.App. 299, 300 S.E.2d 549 (1983); Salter v. State, 163 Ga.App. 655(1), 294 S.E.2d 612 (1982).
3. Ledford contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a continuance to allow him to locate and procure a subpoenaed witness. The record reveals that no mention of a continuance was made until the close of the State's evidence. At that time, Ledford's counsel informed the trial court that his only witness was not present. The trial court offered to issue a rule for the witness, Cliff Cothren. Counsel had not spoken to Cothren who had purportedly been served with subpoena by Ledford. There was no return of service. According to Ledford's counsel, Cothren resided nearby, but previous efforts to find him that morning had been unsuccessful. Further, counsel stated that Cothren Counsel informed the trial court that Ledford had told him that Cothren would testify that he had "set the whole thing up" and that Ledford had never before had any drug dealings with Cothren.
The trial court asked counsel how much time he wanted to locate the witness. Counsel answered fifteen minutes. A recess was called and, when court reconvened, Ledford presented no evidence and rested his case. No objection nor further mention of continuance was made at trial.
Even assuming that Ledford actually moved for a continuance, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to continue the case. Grimes v. State, 168 Ga.App. 372, 377, 308 S.E.2d 863 (1983). "Each of these requirements must be met before an appellate court may review a trial judge's discretion in denying a motion for continuance based upon the absence of a witness." Brown v. State, 169 Ga.App. 520, 521, 313 S.E.2d 777 (1984). Pretermitting a discussion of the doubtful materiality of the expected testimony, Ledford failed to show that Cothren's testimony could be expected to be procured at the next term of court. We find no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant a continuance at trial nor any error in denying Ledford's motion for new trial on this ground. See Tomlin v. State, 170 Ga.App. 123(5), 316 S.E.2d 570 (1984). See also Lee v. State, 154 Ga.App. 562(4), 269 S.E.2d 65 (1980).
4. Appellant Dyer bases his appeal on the trial court's denial of his motion to sever his trial from that of Ledford and subsequent refusal to grant his motion for new trial on that same ground. 1 OCGA § 17-8-4 provides in pertinent part that when two or more defendants are jointly indicted for a felony less than capital, "such defendants may be tried jointly or separately in the discretion of the trial court." Jackson v. State, 249 Ga. 751, 757, 295 S.E.2d 53 (1982). ...
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Jones v. State, A95A0983
... ... "A motion for continuance based on absence of a witness is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and an appellate court will not interfere unless it is clearly shown it has abused its discretion." Ledford v. State, 173 Ga.App. 474, 476, 326 ... S.E.2d 834 (1985). In this case, Jones was not even able to identify any witnesses who would be called to testify, and therefore, the trial court ... ...
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Franklin v. State
...a trial judge's discretion in denying a motion for continuance based upon the absence of a witness." (Cit.)' Ledford v. State, 173 Ga.App. 474, 476 (326 SE2d 834) (1985)." Curry v. State, 177 Ga.App. 609(1), 340 S.E.2d 250. In the case sub judice, defense counsel moved for a continuance bas......
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Curry v. State, 71378
...a trial judge's discretion in denying a motion for continuance based upon the absence of a witness.' [Cit.]" Ledford v. State, 173 Ga.App. 474, 476, 326 S.E.2d 834 (1985). The record in the instant case shows that a warrant for appellant's arrest was issued in June of 1983. He was indicted ......