Ledl v. Quik Pik Food Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 June 1984
• Docket Number: Docket No. 70495
• Parties: Ruth LEDL and John Ledl, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. QUIK PIK FOOD STORES, INC., a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellee. 133 Mich.App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 529, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2971
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 529

349 N.W.2d 529

Ruth LEDL and John Ledl, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. QUIK PIK FOOD STORES, INC., a Michigan corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 70495.

133 Mich.App. 583, 349 N.W.2d 529, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2971

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 14, 1983.

Decided April 3, 1984.

Released for Publication June 7, 1984.

[133 MICHAPP 585] Logan, Huchla & Wycoff, P.C. by Randall A. Pentiuk, Riverview, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Harvey, Kruse, Westen & Milan, P.C. by Michael F. Schmidt, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C.J., and ALLEN and DODGE ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff Ruth Ledl (hereinafter plaintiff) and her husband, John Ledl, appeal from [133 MICHAPP 586] the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiff's complaint alleged wrongful discharge and/or breach of employment contract, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and false light invasion of privacy. Plaintiff's husband sought damages for his derivative loss of consortium.

Plaintiff was employed as a general manager for defendant's store in Riverview, Michigan. On February 19, 1982, she and all other store employees were discharged by a new area supervisor for their failure to correct inventory shortages at the store. Plaintiff had been employed with defendant for eight years and was 57 years old.

On appeal, plaintiff argues initially that summary judgment was erroneously granted on her breach of contract claim. The basis for plaintiff's claim of breach of contract was that she had been told when she accepted employment with defendant that she would continue to be employed so long as her performance was satisfactory. Plaintiff cites Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880, reh. den. 409 Mich. 1101 (1980), in support of her argument.

Approximately seven and one-half years after plaintiff was hired by defendant, on June 28, 1981, plaintiff signed an employment agreement which stated in part:

"Our Quik Pik Store Employee Policies are the basis of our operations. They are central to the agreement you are undertaking with Quik Pik. They clarify for everyone exactly what is acceptable job performance and employee conduct and what is not.

"You will be held fully accountable for abiding by the Policies expressed in your store copy of Quik Pik Policies/Procedures Manual. Abiding by these Policy statements[133 MICHAPP 587] is a job requirement. In no fashion does this material or anything else presented to you in written or verbal form serve as a guarantee of your future employment with Quik Pik.

* * *

" 'In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and policies of Quik Pik, and that my employment and compensation can be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice at any time at the option of either the Company or myself. I understand that no Supervisor or representative of Quik Pik Food Stores, Inc., other than the President of the Company, has any authority to enter into any agreement contrary to the foregoing.' "

This employment agreement allows defendant to terminate plaintiff's employment with or without cause.

Although plaintiff alleges that this employment agreement should not be given effect because it is an adhesion contract and because the contract is not supported by any consideration, we believe that the Supreme Court's discussion in Toussaint indicates that defendant could properly change its employment policies in the manner indicated in the employment agreement. In Toussaint, the Supreme Court stated:

"While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices, where an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes them known to its employees, the employment relationship is presumably enhanced. * * * No pre-employment negotiations need take place and the parties' minds need not meet on the subject, nor does it matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the employer's policies and practices or that the employer may change them unilaterally.

* * *

"An employer who establishes no personnel policies [133 MICHAPP 588] instills no reasonable expectations of performance. Employers can make known to their employees that personnel policies are subject to unilateral changes by the employer. Employees would then have no legitimate expectation that any particular policy will continue to remain in force. Employees could, however, legitimately expect that policies in force at any given time will be uniformly applied to all." Toussaint, supra, pp. 613, 619, 292 N.W.2d 880. (Footnotes omitted.)

The Supreme Court also noted in Toussaint, supra, p. 610, 292 N.W.2d 880, that "[e]mployers are most assuredly free to enter into employment contracts terminable at will without assigning cause". Defendant here took the action expressly approved in Toussaint and entered into contracts with its employees making the employment of each individual terminable at will. Based upon this agreement, defendant terminated plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff does not allege, and the record does not indicate, that defendant's employment policy was less than uniformly applied. We find no grounds for invalidating the employment agreement signed by plaintiff at defendant's request some six months prior to her termination. Since this agreement specifically provides for termination with or without cause, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of employment contract.

Plaintiff also alleges that she was wrongfully discharged because her discharge violated public policy. While there is a "public policy" exception to the general rule that either party to an employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate it at any time for any reason, Suchodolski v. Mich. Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982), none of the theories alleged by plaintiff creates an actionable claim for wrongful discharge.

[133 MICHAPP 589] Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her defamation claim. We find no error. To show liability for defamation, the following elements must be proven:

"(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning plaintiff; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm (defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by the publication (defamation per quod ). Restatement Torts (2d), Sec. 558." Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich.App. 608, 618, 325 N.W.2d 511 (1982), lv. den. 417 Mich. 1050 (1983).

This Court has also recognized that a claim for defamation must be specifically pled:

" 'The essentials of a cause of action for libel or slander must be stated in the complaint, including allegations as to the particular defamatory words complained of, the connection of the defamatory words with the plaintiff where such words are not clear or are ambiguous, and the publication of the alleged defamatory words.' " Pursell v. Wolverine-Pentronix, Inc., 44 Mich.App. 416, 421, 205 N.W.2d 504 (1973), quoting 11 Callaghan's Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d ed), Sec. 78.09, pp. 256-257.

See also Hernden v. Consumers Power Co., 72 Mich.App. 349, 249 N.W.2d 419 (1976). Plaintiff's complaint here alleged only that:

"21. That on various occasions subsequent to the wrongful termination of plaintiff's...