Lee Bros. Furniture Co. v. Cram
| Decision Date | 13 December 1893 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | LEE BROS. FURNITURE CO. v. CRAM. |
Case reserved from court of common pleas, Fairfield county; Curtis, Judge.
Replevin by the Lee Bros. Furniture Company against E. J. Cram. Case reserved for supreme court Judgment for plaintiff.
A. B. Beers, for plaintiff.
Stiles Judson, Jr., for defendant.
On the 10th of August, 1893, the plaintiff delivered to one Skidmore, a resident of the town of Bridgeport, in this state, certain goods under a written agreement, set out upon the record, signed by Skidmore, conditioned that the goods should remain the property of the plaintiff till paid for in full. The agreement has never been recorded in the town clerk's office in Bridgeport. On the 23d of August, 1893, Skidmore, without having paid for the goods in full or at all, and without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, sold the goods to the defendant, who bought them in good faith for an adequate consideration, believing Skidmore to be the owner of them, and without notice to the contrary, and after he had examined and found that there was no record of any conditional sale of them to Skidmore. The plaintiff, after demand and refusal, brought the present action of replevin for the goods, and upon the facts found the case was reserved for the advice of this court.
There is but one question in the case, and that is whether the failure to record the agreement in the town clerk's office in Bridgeport made the transaction between the plaintiff and Skidmore an absolute sale. This question arises under the statute passed at the last session of the legislature of this state, which reads as follows: Pub. Acts 1893, c. 147. It must be conceded that the agreement in question is a contract for the sale of property, within the meaning of this act; and that, by failing to record it, it was not "made in conformity with the provisions" of the first section. The first section is mandatory in its terms, and apparently, on its face, applies to all agreements of conditional sale; but it does nor. state what the consequence or effect shall be of a failure to conform to its provisions. To ascertain these, recourse must be had to the second section, and that provides that in case of such failure such agreement "shall be held to be" an absolute sale. That is the effect, and the only effect, that is to follow such failure. "When a statute specifies the effects of a certain provision, courts will presume that all the effects intended by the lawmaker are stated." Perkins v. Thornburgh, 10 Cal. 189. Furthermore, by the second section even this effect is not to follow such failure as against "the vendor and his heirs." The language is, "shall be held to be absolute sales, except against the vendor and his heirs." This language is plain, certain, and unambiguous, and no reasonable doubt can arise concerning its meaning. It means—if language is capable of expressing such a meaning—that the vendor and his heirs are excepted out of the class of persons to be affected by the prescribed consequence or effect of failure to comply with the provisions of the act. As against them, contracts of the kind described in the first section, which do not comply with its provisions, are not to be held to be absolute sales, but are to remain unaffected by the statute. Such language does not require the aid of rules of construction or of interpretation to make the intention and meaning of the lawmaker plain and clear. Interpretation and construction, in the ordinary sense, In reference to such language, are alike out of place. ...
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